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Authentication
Authorization
Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity
Usability
Usable
The process of confirming an identity as it is portrayed
The process of defining whether an action is allowed for a given 
identity
The requirement for information to be available for access when 
required, without delay.
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been granted access by its owner
The principle of restricting modification of information to those who 
have been granted rights to do so by its owner
The ease with which something can be used to achieve a specific goal
The ability for something to be used for a specific goal without 
hindrance and excessive complication. See also, Usability
Abstract
This thesis addresses the problem of achieving fine-grained and sustained control of access to 
electronic information, shared in distributed collaborative environments. It presents an 
enhanced approach to distributed information security architecture, driven by the risks, 
guidelines and legislation emerging due to the growth of collaborative working, and the often 
associated increase in storage of information outside of a secured information system 
perimeter.
Traditional approaches to access control are based on applying controls at or within the 
network perimeter of an information system. One issue with this approach when applying it 
to shared information is that, outside of the perimeterized zone, the owner loses control of 
their information. This loss of control could dissuade collaborating parties from sharing their 
information resources. Information resources can be thought of as a collection of related 
content stored in a container. Another issue with current approaches to access control, 
particularly to unstructured resources such as text documents, is the coarse granularity of 
control they provide. That is, controls can only apply to a resource in its entirety. In reality, 
the content within a resource could have varying levels of security requirements with 
different levels of control. For example, some of the content may be completely free from 
any access restriction, while other parts may be too sensitive to share outside of an internal 
organisation. The consequence being that the entire resource is restricted with the controls 
relevant to the highest level content. Subsequently, a substantial amount of information that 
could feasibly be shared in collaborative environments is prevented from being shared, due to 
being part of a highly restricted resource.
The primary focus of this thesis is to address these two issues by investigating the 
appropriateness and capability of perimeter security, and entire-resource protection, to 
provide access control for information shared in collaborative distributed environments.
To overcome these problems, the thesis develops an access control framework, based on 
which, several formulae are defined to clarify the problems, and to allow them to be 
contextualised. The formulae have then been developed and improved, with the problem in 
mind, to create a potential solution, which has been implemented and tested to demonstrate
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that it is possible to enhance access control technology to implement the capability to drill 
down into the content of an information resource and apply more fine-grained controls, based 
on the security requirements of the content within. Furthermore, it is established that it is 
possible to shift part of the controls that protect information resources within a secure 
network perimeter, to the body of the resources themselves so that they become, to some 
extent, self protecting. This enables the same controls to be enforced outside of the secure 
perimeter.
The implementation is based on the structuring of information and embedding of metadata 
within the body of an information resource. The metadata effectively wraps sections of 
content within a resource into containers that define fine-grained levels of access control 
requirement, to protect its confidentiality and integrity. Examples of the granularity afforded 
by this approach could be page, paragraph, line or even word level in a text document. Once 
metadata has been embedded, it is bound to a centrally controlled access control policy for 
the lifetime of the resource. Information can then be shared, copied, distributed and accessed 
in support of collaborative working, but a link between the metadata and the centrally 
controlled policy is sustained, meaning that previously assigned access privileges to different 
sections of content can be modified or revoked at any time in the future.
The result of this research is to allow information sharing to reach a greater level of 
acceptance and usage due to:
i. the enhanced level of access control made possible through finer-grained controls, 
allowing the content of a single resource to be classified and restricted at different 
levels, and
ii. the ability to retain sustained control over information through modifiable controls, 
that can be enforced both while the information is stored on local information 
systems, and after the information has been shared outside the local environment.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
In both academia and industry, information is frequently shared between consortia and 
individuals who work collaboratively for the duration of a project. Collaborative working 
arrangements can have a dynamic lifespan, with users, roles, and the access control 
requirements of shared information resources changing at any time from project inception to 
completion. During that time, the owner of a shared information resource (resource owner) 
may wish, or be legally required to, revoke access to content previously shared with 
distributed collaborators in an Internet connected environment. An Internet connected 
environment effectively is a set of machines that are connected through the Internet. Internet 
connectivity is not always permanent; machines may connect and disconnect periodically. 
However, we assume Internet connectivity is present for the purposes of collaboration.
A prominent characteristic of most existing access control technology is that it enforces 
access control for information resources at, or within, a secured network, which places a 
perimeter of control, often a Firewall, between the information and the external Internet 
connected environment. Thus, outside the perimeter, access control is unenforceable, 
meaning access control enforcement is not possible after information has been shared and 
moved outside the perimeter. This poses a significant problem to organisations that require 
the ability to retain control of their information after it has been shared and moved beyond the 
perimeter, and often leads to data losses or the withholding of some information that would 
be useful to be shared with consortia members. Additionally, as collaborative working 
arrangements evolve, access control rights for shared information may also change. New 
consortium members may be given access to shared information, while other members may 
leave the consortium, and have their access rights revoked. To enable this, the access control 
policy for shared information needs to be modified, and the changes enforced on information 
shared outside the perimeter. This is not currently possible. Therefore, there is a requirement 
to develop an approach to access control that could be implemented to enhance the capability 
of existing technology, to be able to support the definition, modification and enforcement of 
the access control policy, for information stored outside the perimeter.
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Furthermore, information resources are containers for a collection of related pieces of 
information, which often have varying levels of security requirements. Text documents and 
databases are examples of information resources. Certain parts of a resource may be restricted 
to use within an organisation, such as personal information protected by data protection laws 
or unpatented intellectual property. Other parts may be non-sensitive content that could be 
shared with collaborating partners. It may not be trivial to remove the restricted content 
before sharing, as it may be mixed into sections of less sensitive content. Another prominent 
characteristic of existing access control technology is that it enforces access control policy on 
the entire-resource, and not on different sections of content within the resource. As a result, 
the restricted content within a resource, often means the entire resource is not shared, limiting 
the effectiveness, dynamism, and potential of collaborative working. This presents a 
requirement for an approach to access control that could enhance the functionality of existing 
technology, such that it can apply controls not only to the resource in its entirety, but to 
different levels of the content within.
This thesis focuses on addressing these requirements, and aims to provide an approach to 
access control more suitable for supporting the sharing of information in distributed 
collaborative working environments, by developing a framework which supports these 
requirements and could theoretically be implemented to enhance existing access control 
technology. Because the drivers for this research stem from collaborative working involving 
text-based documents, the research and its results are applied specifically to text-based 
documents for the purpose of exemplifying and testing the suggested approach. However, the 
conclusions in Chapter 7 give some insight as to the wider applicability of the research, 
including databases. The rest of this chapter outlines the background and motivation behind 
the research, and defines the research methodology adopted to address these requirements, 
before defining the hypothesis and the contributions that proving the hypothesis would make 
to the information security domain.
1.1. Background and Motivation for Research
The emergence of high-speed networks in support of Grid Computing [FKNT02], Service- 
Oriented Architectures (SOA) [PL03], Web 2.0 [Ore07], and Cloud Computing [Hay08], and
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an ever increasing connection to mobile Internet [VC02], has dramatically enhanced the 
connectivity and data transfer potential between distributed Information Systems (IS). IS 
users can now use electronic devices such as PDAs, mobile phones and laptops to send and 
receive data through high-speed network connections and wireless communication protocols, 
enabling an underpinning infrastructure for collaborative working through the sharing and co­
development of information resources.
Collaborative working arrangements can have a dynamic lifespan and can vary tremendously 
in their purpose, scope and community [CL087, CAGL07, SheOO, FKT01]. Roles, users, and 
the access control requirements of information content shared in collaborative environments 
may change at any time during, or at the end of, a collaboration arrangement. Resource 
owners need to control access to information shared with their collaborators and, at any time, 
may wish, or be legally required, to revoke access to previously shared content.
A scenario that represents this kind of environment is the sharing of information from 
Electronic Health Records (EHRs) in the health and social care domain. A typical sharing 
scenario starts with a patient presenting symptoms to their GP, being assessed, and being 
diagnosed. A report is then written by the GP. If the symptoms present a case for further 
investigation, such as a painful lump beneath the skin, the GP may also write a referral letter. 
The referral letter will contain information such as the presented symptoms, symptom 
duration, location and degree of pain it is causing. The referral may require the patient to visit 
a hospital. The hospital would be given access to the GP’s report, the referral letter and 
perhaps some medical history. The hospital visit may result in a scan and an associated 
report. If required, the patient may be referred to a second hospital, which results in a physics 
report. The second hospital would be given access to the GP’s report and referral letter, and 
the scan and report from the first hospital. If a cancer is confirmed, the patient will be 
referred to a consultant oncologist who will write a prognosis report and write up a course of 
treatment, based on all the relevant information shared by the other institutions. Various 
other reports are generated as treatment continues. Any of these document outputs may be 
requested and shared between any of the healthcare professionals along the patient care path, 
as they collaborate to treat the patient. The GPs, clinicians, consultants and biomedical staff 
effectively become a collaborative consortium, working at different geographic sites within 
their own distributed, autonomous network perimeters.
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Each institution is legally responsible for the data protection of the information they hold 
about a patient, under the UK Data Protection Act (1998) [DPA98]. Additionally, as 
Perioellis et al. [PCC+06] note, collaborative working environments are dynamic by nature 
and thus access rights should not be automatically assumed on inclusion in a collaborative 
working consortium. Rather they should be granted and removed when necessary throughout 
the lifetime of the collaboration. Access rights for a particular collaborator may vary 
depending on the task in which a collaborator is active. Therefore, if  information is to be 
shared between organisations, there is a clear requirement for resource owners to retain 
management of the access control policy for information shared outside their perimeter. In 
the healthcare scenario, each collaborator only needs access to a patient’s medical record for 
the duration of the patient care, and even then, they only need access to the parts of the record 
that are required to perform their role in the collaboration. For example, while the clinician 
performing a scan at a hospital might need access to the patient’s medical history to 
determine if the patient has a medical condition that could be aggravated by the scanning 
process, there may be certain sensitive parts of that information such as a history of mental 
illness or HIV status that do not need to be shared, and would ideally be removed from the 
report before it is shared to limit the potential risk of its exposure. As Anderson points out 
[And08], there is an ongoing effort to achieve acceptance of the Electronic Patient Record 
(EPR) in accordance with the British Medical Association (BMA) Security Policy [And08]. 
The problem of how to restrict access to specific parts of patient records, such as identity, 
medical history, sexuality, and prescribed medication is an ongoing situation. More people 
now have electronic access to patient information and current technology has not managed to 
implement an effective means of “sealing and locking” certain parts of the patient record to 
provide selective restricted access to a document. There is therefore a requirement for access 
control to be applied to content within a resource at different levels, as well as to the resource 
in its entirety.
This scenario poses two key requirements to achieving the secure sharing of information in 
collaborative working environments: sustained control o f information after it is shared, and 
varying levels of control over the content of a shared resource, not just the resource in its 
entirety. These requirements are not unique to this scenario. The concept of access control 
retention and limiting access to certain parts of shared resources is applicable to any 
organisation wishing to share information in an Internet connected environment, for which 
they have a responsibility, to themselves or others, to protect. Changes to the UK Data
Protection Act (1998) [DPA98] mean stricter controls and harsher penalties for data 
controllers who leak personally identifiable information. In addition to this, many 
organisations have information resources that would cause financial or reputational loss if not 
controlled properly, but would be useful to share with collaborators for the purpose of 
achieving a shared goal. Examples of this are pre-budget financial reports, ideas for new 
products and services, and designs for technology, machinery or new pharmaceutical drugs. 
All of these could be developed in distributed collaborative working environments, and could 
be harmful if not properly controlled. Indeed the latest Boeing aircraft can be assembled and 
rolled out in three days [BOE], largely due to distributed collaborative development and 
manufacture. The plans for the aircraft are very sensitive to Boeing but must be shared in a 
distributed collaborative working environment to facilitate the speed of assembly. This 
research is applicable to any individual or organisation that shares information with other 
parties, in a collaborative Internet connected environment, and has a responsibility to protect 
the information while it is being shared.
1.2. Developing a Framework for Access Control
These requirements are currently extremely difficult to support using existing access control 
technology, and provide motivation for research into enabling such support. The limitations 
of existing technology are discussed in a literature review in Chapter 4. However, the reasons 
why it is currently difficult to support these requirements are very clear from a high level 
overview of existing access control technology. It is possible to formulate a basic access 
control framework as follows, which aims to represent a typical current situation such as the 
health information sharing problem [And08] and the collaborative working environment at 
Boeing [BOE], as defined in Section 1.1.
Let D be a set of documents.
Let C be set of information classification schemes.
Let Ube a set of users.
Let A be a set of actions (to be performed on a document).
Let R be a set of access control rules.
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Within a distributed collaborative environment, it is possible to take an individual 
organisation’s classification scheme (c*) where Ck E_C, a user (uz) where uz e  U, and assign 
the user a security label from the information classification scheme. This creates a user 
security label cm- It is possible to take a document owned by that organisation (dx) where dx £  
D, and do the same, giving a document security label cm- Assuming the labels in Ck are 
ordered in some way, i.e. for any two labels cu and Ckj, where Cki * %, Cki < %  or cm > Ckj, both 
user and document labels represent security levels. The document label represents the level of 
security required for a user to access the information held within. The user label typically 
represents the highest security level for which they can obtain access. This means there will 
exist some relationship between and Ckd that determines whether access should be granted 
or denied. These relationships are expressed using rules, defined by the organisation. A set of 
access control rules (rb) where rb C R, as defined by the organisation, can be defined to 
support access control decisions and restrict user access to a document. Using elements from 
the basic access control framework, we can express perimeterized access control decisions as 
a function f(cku,Ckd,ai,rb)), where the function is passed a user label the target document 
label Ckd, the requested action a,, where <2/,e^4, and set of rules rb, as input parameters. The 
function then determines if the requested action is allowed or denied by evaluating the set of 
access control rules defined by the organisation (rb), and a result o f ‘allow’ or ‘deny’ would 
be returned. For example, if an access control rule (rbi) states that the user’s security label 
must be greater than that of the document in order to gain read access, i.e. rbi where rbi £ rb — 
Cku > Ckd, an invocation of the function with input parameters Cku = LevelO and cm — Level 1, 
would result in an output of deny because LevelO is not greater than Level 1. Access control 
rules are explained in further detail in Chapter 3.
However, assigning a security label Ckd to a document dx. means the entire document is 
classified at a single level. This assumes that the user, should they meet the requirements of 
the access control rules, is able to access the entire document, and that all content within the 
document has the same security requirements. This is often not the case. For example, take 
the Electronic Patient Record (EPR) sharing scenario. The record comprises demographic 
patient details, medical history, current and previously taken medication, and long-term 
illness details. The information owner, for example a GP, may wish to share some of this 
information with a local hospital when referring a patient. Or, from a global view, a patient 
may become ill while abroad and the local hospital may require access to an EPR to 
understand a patient’s reaction to a particular treatment. The GP, and in fact the patient, may
not wish to share the entire record. Long term illness such as HIV or previous medication for 
depression is not relevant to anyone other than the GP and could be damaging to the patient’s 
reputation if exposed. For this reason, only part of the document should be shared. The basic 
access control framework cannot support access control beyond a document in its entirety 
and for that reason becomes inappropriate at this point for information shared in distributed 
collaborative environments. An investigation is needed to extend the framework to support a 
more granular level of access control.
A major limitation relating to the sustained control of information after being shared with 
collaborators is the current approach taken to providing access control. Traditional 
approaches to access control are based on a perimeterized approach. Documents are stored 
inside secured perimeters and access control is enforced at, or within, the perimeter. Network 
perimeter technology is the most commonly used barrier between users and information. An 
organisation will set up its information system, store all its information resources and access 
control rules on local disks and servers within a local area network and deploy controls such 
as firewalls that control incoming and outgoing connections at the network perimeter to 
protect the information held within. According to the BERR 2008 survey conducted by Price 
Waterhouse Coopers [BERR08], 98% of organisations use this approach. However, a 
distributed collaborative information-sharing environment is inherently detrimental to the 
security of information secured using the perimeterized approach, because to share 
information the documents often have to leave organizational perimeters, rendering the 
access control technology used to protect the documents ineffective. For example, if a GP e- 
mails an EPR to a clinical consultant at a hospital, or gives them access to an online 
repository from which the EPR can be downloaded, the document that comprises the EPR 
moves from within the GP’s perimeter to the hospital’s perimeter which, by definition, means 
the perimeterized controls used to restrict access within the GP’s perimeter cannot be used to 
enforce access control rules.
The identification of this as an issue is supported by the number o f reported recent 
information exposures and losses, including 25 million personal records lost by Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), due to careless control or theft of remote working 
devices such as laptops, portable storage drives and mobile phones [BBC07a], [BBC07b], 
[Esp08], [BBC08a], [BBC08b], [Cor08]. This evidence further increases the pressure and 
need to retain control over distributed information. The interim solution within HMRC, as 
outlined in the Transformational Government annual review [HMG07], has been to put a
complete ban on the transfer of bulk data without adequate security, such as encryption, and 
to disable the downloading of information onto removable media unless a senior manager 
overrides this for critical purpose. The same report details that the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) has done something similar, needing the explicit permission of the IT security officer 
to download information to removable media. These are organisations that need to share 
information outside their perimeters for audit and case working processes, but are now 
heavily restricted because of recent data losses.
To extend the framework to represents this issue, we need to introduce the concepts of 
domains, perimeters and enforcement controls.
A perimeter in this context is the interface between Internet-connected users and 
organisation-owned documents. This is typically deployed at the gateway to an organisation’s 
network.
A domain in this context comprises a subset of all perimeters that have a common and agreed 
information classification scheme and set of access control rules. For example, a domain 
could be a collection of organisations with common national purpose such as hospitals within 
the National Health Service or Government departments, or a wider international purpose 
such as the G8 forum.
An enforcement control in this context is a technology that makes decisions on whether to 
allow or deny document access to a user, and enforces the decision.
Thus,
Let I be the set of all machines connected to the Internet
Let M be the set of all domains within the Internet
Let P  be the set of all perimeters
Let E be the set of all enforcement controls
This thesis is focused on information security in distributed collaborative computing 
environments; therefore, we can assume that this environment contains all machines that are 
connected to the Internet. Thus, our applicable environment is /.
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All organisations have perimeters. All domains have perimeters. However, a domain can be a 
subset of all perimeters, when comprised of several organisations.
Perimeters are used to manage access to information held within them. They contain 
documents managed by the organisation, rules defined to control access, and enforcement 
controls to make access control decisions and enforce them. A given organisation’s perimeter 
therefore can be formulated as Pa = <{d\...dn} ,{r\..rn) ,{e\.„en}>, which represents a 
perimeter containing a subset of all documents, rules and enforcement controls.
With the perimeterized access control approach, documents depend on the perimeter to 
mediate between users and enforcement controls to ensure access in not granted to documents 
without a user being authorized by the enforcement control. The mediation works by a user 
sending an access request to an interface at the perimeter of the organisation that stores the 
documents. The request will include the document identifier (dx), the user’s identity (wz) and 
a requested action (a), for example ‘read’ or ‘write’. The perimeter interface will invoke an 
enforcement control from the set {e\...en}, to make the access control decision for a document 
dx, using rules from the set {r\..rn}. The first job of the enforcement control is to look up the 
user and document security labels from their identifiers. The access control decision function 
f(cku,ckd,ctj,r0) is then used to make that access control decision, being passed the user and 
document labels, requested action, and set of rules to use when making the decision. The 
decision is then enforced by the enforcement control. The key issue with this approach is the 
reliance on the perimeter interface to ensure the enforcement control is invoked, and the 
requirement for the access control decision function to know where to find the set of rules to 
use. If the document is not within the perimeter, the enforcement control can be bypassed. 
Even if the control is enforced, and it attempts to invoke the access control decision function 
outside the perimeter, the function would not know where to find the rules to use to make its 
decision. The decision function cannot be executed outside the perimeter, unless the user 
label (Cku), document label (ckd) and set of rules (r0) are able to be interpreted and enforced 
within a different perimeter. To achieve this requires an agreed information classification 
scheme and set of access rules between perimeters, something characteristic of a domain in 
the context defined above, but something that seldom exists outside of pre-defined domains.
A domain M is effectively a subset of all perimeters. That is M  C P. Domain subsets of P  can 
be exempt from the problems of the perimeterized access control approach because they can 
agree a shared classification scheme and set of rules, which means they can interpret user and
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document labels, implement the access control decision function, and enforce the rules 
between its perimeters.
However, domains are difficult to construct between organisations that deal with very 
sensitive information but need to share information to collaborate, such as GPs and hospitals, 
or the organisations that collaborate in the design of Boeing aircraft, where the concern is the 
exposure of information such as personal information protected by data protection laws or 
unpatented intellectual property. The information owner must remain in control of who 
accesses this information, and thus, in control of the set of rules that govern its access. This 
means the set of rules of an organisation (r0) must remain within the owner’s perimeter, to 
prevent anyone modifying them. Thus, the perimeterized approach cannot support 
information sharing in distributed collaborative environments because the access control rules 
cannot be enforced by the access control function of another perimeter, without leaving the 
control of the information owner. Thus, sharing information outside the perimeter becomes 
very limited.
To combat this, a study is required into how perimeterized access control functionality can be 
configured more appropriately, such that the enforcement of access control rules is available 
to support the situation where a document moves outside the perimeter, as it would in a 
distributed information-sharing scenario, but where the rules remain under the control of the 
owner so that they can manage and modify the access control policy to their requirements.
The main aim of this research is to define an advanced framework that will provide a 
platform for the enhancement of existing access control approaches, to allow individuals and 
businesses to share information required for collaboration where, previously, limitations in 
technology may have restricted their ability to share such information, due to: small amounts 
of highly restricted content in a resource raising the classification of the entire resource or; 
the requirement to retain sustained control over the information to comply with data 
protection laws. Also, to reduce the likelihood of the kind of information exposures and 
losses that have been reported recently.
The motivation for this research, based on observations of real-world security breaches and 
scenarios, indicates that important issues needing to be addressed are:
• Enabling the refined, granular classification and labelling of information that reflects 
varying levels of content security requirements within an information resource.
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• Defining, modifying and enforcing access control policy on information shared 
outside the perimeter in distributed collaborative Internet connected environments.
1.3. Hypothesis
The hypothesis of the research is as follows.
A document’s content can have security enforced at different levels of granularity within 
the overall document, and the rules defining its access control are always modifiable and 
enforceable in an Internet connected environment, no matter where the document is held.
1.4. Research Methodology
A literature review will investigate how to enforce controls outside the secure network 
perimeter by analysing how existing work applies access controls inside the perimeter, and 
then identifying how to extend this to allow them to be applied outside the traditional 
perimeter of control. The review will focus on how well current access control models and 
technology support the owner of an information resource in the protection of their 
information, identifying shortcomings in current approaches and looking at what can be done 
to improve support for the owner from an access control point of view. Furthermore, from a 
collaboration information security perspective, it will also investigate the extent to which 
currently implemented access control technologies support collaborative working, focussing 
on information security once access has been granted to a collaborating partner, and how this 
can be sustained in distributed collaborative environments. This includes the current levels of 
access control granularity available for an information resource, that is, how far the owner 
can drill down into their resource to apply access control restrictions, and the current ability 
to retain control of information after it has been shared.
If information is to be protected at finer levels of granularity, then there is a need to classify 
information content at different levels, in order to apply the proposed protection to it. 
Research into classification schemes, both governmental and commercial is important, as it 
will inform the development of a classification scheme for use in information sharing, and 
investigate the possibility of a common format for representation of information classification 
labels.
13
To get a clear understanding of the business, legal and technological motivation behind 
existing methods and approaches, the literature review will take a bottom up approach. This 
will begin with an investigation of the early security methods published some thirty years 
ago, and build on these foundations to determine, through risk assessment, the emerging risks 
associated with the development of contemporary distributed collaborative working 
environments. Supporting mechanisms such as standards and best practice currently used for 
access control, methods for securing information in situ and in transit, information 
classification schemes, and handling proprietary documents across distributed, homogenous 
systems, will be considered against current approaches.
The limitations of existing technology and the resulting risk to information, identified from 
the literature review, will define a system threat model, which will be the basis of a 
requirements definition for an extension of the basic access control framework that is better 
suited to the modem collaborative working approach.
To test the feasibility of implementing the resulting framework, a prototype application will 
be developed that will attempt to codify the formulae and rules that emerge through the 
research. Once implemented, the system threat model will be used, together with the initial 
hypothesis, to evaluate whether or not the extended framework can be used to support the 
statement in the hypothesis, and mitigate the threats identified in the threat model. This will 
identify weaknesses in the framework and the prototype and perhaps identify other risks and 
issues that were not captured in the initial risk assessment.
1.5. Contribution to Information Security
The major contribution of this thesis is a framework that supports i) the concept of granular 
information classification, to the content level within a document, rather than being limited to 
the document in its entirety, and ii) the concept of a de-perimeterized approach to access 
control enforcement, such that access control policy can continue to be modified and 
enforced, even after information has been shared outside an organisation’s perimeter and 
stored anywhere in an Internet connected environment. The framework enables resource 
owners to identify sensitive sections in their information resources and apply multiple 
classification labels to content within the resource, in addition to classifying the resource as a 
single entity. The framework also enables resource owners to retain access control of their 
information, even after it has been shared outside the perimeter. Retention of access control
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allows changes in security requirements to be enforced on information that has already been 
shared, enabling revocation of access to some parts of a resource, or complete redaction of 
the information to occur, no matter where the resource is stored or how many times it is 
replicated.
The framework has been implemented in a prototype application. The application has been 
used to test the feasibility of the framework. That is, to prove that it is possible to codify the 
concepts of the framework and implement its functionality. If the framework is applicable to 
an individual’s research agenda or security requirements, the application itself can be 
considered a contribution.
1.6. Arrangement of Thesis
The thesis presents the understanding of the problem, an analysis of electronic information 
management, existing access control models, techniques and technology, a risk assessment 
and derivation of a system threat model as a requirement specification for new access control 
technology, and the development and implementation of new technology in response to this 
problem, thereby supporting the claims of the hypothesis.
Chapter 2 gives an understanding of the nature and purpose of collaborative working 
environments, together with a risk assessment and system threat model for information 
sharing in such environments. It details recent information exposure cases and the responses 
from governing bodies to these cases by the introduction o f new legislation and 
reconsideration of the way people work and collaborate in the light of this. Finally, it 
identifies the personal and business drivers for an advanced approach to access control that 
defines the need for protection against information exposure and corruption in distributed 
environments, as well as some of the legal issues that could arise as a result of not providing 
these facilities.
Chapter 3 investigates current access control methods in relation to the collaborative 
distributed working domain. This section is largely focussed on the development of the 
access control framework and forms the basis for comparison of current technologies within 
the framework, and emerging risk identified in collaborative distributed working 
environments.
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Chapter 4 is an analysis of existing access control technology placed within the framework. 
The aim of this section is to identify the shortcomings of existing approaches to access 
control when considering the new framework and risks associated with the currently 
emerging electronic environments in the light of the complexities and requirements needed to 
deal with this risk.
The final part of Chapter 4 investigates the current approaches to information classification. 
Namely, how information content with varying levels of access restriction requirement can be 
assigned labels that identify the content as having a certain classification and how access to it 
should be restricted.
Chapter 5 details the design of a prototype application that is used to test the feasibility of 
implementing the framework. This builds on current information security methods and 
technologies, to implement a framework more capable of handling information sharing in 
Internet connected environments.
Chapter 6 goes on to evaluate the framework by testing the results of its implementation and 
identifies advantages and limitations with both the framework and the approach used to 
implement and test it.
Chapter 7 includes the conclusions of the research and identifies future work to be carried 
out.
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Chapter 2 - Electronic Information Management
The emergence of high-speed networks in support o f Grid Computing [FKNT02], Service- 
Oriented Architectures (SOA) [PL03], Web 2.0 [Ore07], and Cloud Computing [Hay08], and 
an ever increasing connection to mobile Internet [VC02] has dramatically enhanced the 
connectivity and data transfer potential between distributed Information Systems (IS). IS 
users can now use electronic devices such as PDAs, mobile phones and laptops to send and 
receive data through high-speed network connections and wireless communication protocols 
enabling an underpinning infrastructure for collaborative working, through the sharing and 
co-development of information resources. It is now feasible that in the not too distant future; 
people, electronic agents, services and devices may seamlessly interact with any number of 
IS under autonomous control [KFJG06], creating an ambient communication environment 
[Lin05] in which information sharing and collaboration between organisations can occur.
Innovation has led to the evolution of internal and inter-organisational business practices to 
support on-demand collaboration between geographically dispersed users, electronic 
information resources and electronic services [SheOO]. Enabling technology such as Web 
Services and Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), which will be introduced in the next 
section, can traverse organisational information system network perimeters allowing 
collaborative working through audiovisual conferencing technologies and electronic data 
interchange. This thesis focuses on the information security requirements and emerging risks 
to information shared within distributed collaborative working environments such as Virtual 
Organisations (VOs).
This chapter extracts the requirements for information security within collaborative working 
environments from the literature, and draws attention to the emerging risks associated with 
the nature of such environments, as new methods of collaborative working are introduced and 
as social attitude towards online collaboration shifts to a shared information culture.
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2.1. Virtual Organisations
Foster and Kesselman, prominent researchers in collaborative distributed computing [FKT01] 
define a VO as a set of individuals and/or institutions that support highly controlled resource 
sharing. Resource providers and resource consumers in a VO clearly and carefully define 
exactly what is shared, who is allowed to share, and the conditions under which sharing 
occurs. They also define the purpose of a VO as being used for the sharing of distributed 
processing power in highly processor intensive applications. This was arguably the founding 
reason for VOs, which is in line with the development of high speed networks, and processor 
farms that acted as a springboard for Grid computing, high performance computing and 
distribution of processor intensive tasks [FKNT02]. However, the technology that emerged to 
enable such VOs now supports the management of ad-hoc integration and connectivity 
between inter-organisational, distributed, heterogeneous information systems, through a 
mapping of organisational roles into an electronic environment [CAGL97, Var02, PCH+06]. 
VO infrastructure allows information to be shared within the VO controlled domain and 
stored within the autonomous network perimeters of the distributed collaborating partners 
[Var02].
VOs can be dynamically formed and dispersed as required, thus allowing a virtual team of 
collaborators to allocate roles, responsibilities and resources, just as they would in a real 
organisation. The difference being that these organisations only exist as a virtual team formed 
for a particular task or activity, and the VO infrastructure supports their collaboration.
The role of a collaborator in VOs can change regularly from system-to-system with varying 
levels of responsibility and information access privileges [PCC+06]. The ad-hoc nature of a 
VO makes it difficult to define a static set of users, roles and resources upon which 
information security constraints can be defined. The development of the infrastructure to 
support VOs as a collaborative technology has created a new generation of information 
exchange capability. This leads to a new level of threat, new vulnerabilities, and new 
requirements for information protection. It is the security management during information 
interchange and collaborative development in VOs that drove the research described in this 
thesis. Thus, it is important to look at the supporting technologies for VO functionality in 
order to understand the transfer infrastructure for distributed information, and the 
vulnerabilities and threats that are present.
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2.1.1. Service Oriented Architecture
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) [PL03] is becoming well established in the distributed 
computing domain, as an enabler for computing applications to draw on the functionality of 
other computing applications across a network. The SOA architecture is based on what is 
known as the publish-fmd-bind paradigm as illustrated in Figure 2.1. The owner of a 
computing resource, also known as a service, publishes the availability and functionality of 
their service into a service registry, so that they can be discovered (found) by other people on 
the network, who can then bind to this service and utilise its functionality and so gain 
connectivity between disparate IS.
FindBind
Service
Requestor
Publish
Figure 2.1 -  Service Oriented Architecture
The SOA architecture spawns three major roles: Service Provider, Service Broker and 
Service Requestor which correspond to the publish-find-bind paradigm. SOA effectively 
enables, where feasible, the functionality of any particular part of a business process 
(including information) to be deployed on any web enabled and configured resource. This 
allows the business process to be decomposed into services and distributed across multiple 
networks and organisations. Remote services are often managed, administered and deployed 
by different, collaborating organisations with information being shared between the 
collaborating services. This configuration is a prime example of a VO in practice. Take an 
example of inter-organisational collaboration involving the sharing of information between 
organisations. The service resource could be the information itself, the requestor would be an 
organisation requiring access to that information, and the registry could be a list of 
information resources shared within the VO by each organisation. Thus, the SOA architecture 
is a means of supporting the dynamic sharing of information resources in VOs. However, the
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sharing of information may require the transfer of information outside of the network 
perimeter of the organisations that own the information. The vulnerability of this lies with 
traditional information security being based on a perimeterized security model, which means 
that, while connectivity between disparate IS can be achieved, controls cannot be applied to 
information after it has been shared in this way and has moved outside the perimeter. This 
provides motivation for research into a suitable access control model to protect information 
after it is shared in this way.
2.1.2. Web Services
IBM’s definition of Web Services states that “Web Services are self-contained, modular 
applications that can be described, published, located, and invoked over a network, generally 
the World Wide Web” [One03]. In relation to an SOA, Web Services are effectively the 
services involved in the publish-find-bind paradigm, connected over the Web, hence the 
name, Web Services.
The major difference between Web Services and previous distributed computing technology 
such as CORBA [Vin97] and DCOM [CHY+98], is that Web Services use what is known as 
dynamic binding. This means that any application wishing to invoke a Web Service can be 
dynamically composed and can bind to the service upon being run for the first time. Other 
technologies such as CORBA and DCOM require an application wishing to invoke a 
distributed service to be previously aware of the binding and communication paradigms, and 
information input/output requirements used in the remote service. This means that 
applications invoking the service require the hard-coding of this information into the 
application, which reduces the dynamism, flexibility and adaptability of the application. Web 
Services use structured service descriptors published in files known as Web Service 
Description Language (WSDL) documents [CCMW01]. WSDLs contain the binding and 
communication paradigms, and input/output requirements of the service, and are made 
publicly available on a network so that they can be utilised when required to compose an 
application that invokes the service. WSDLs are structured and standardised across all Web 
Services meaning that Web Services are programming language and operating system 
independent. CORBA and DCOM are not independent, as they require prior knowledge of 
the remote services’ object types and programming languages. The nature of Web Services 
makes them ideal for supporting collaborative working through an SOA in VOs. They allow 
organisations to communicate in real-time, without any human involvement in setting up the
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communication, and the potential heterogeneity due to the operating systems and 
programming languages used at each end is not an issue. However, the use of Web Services 
also means that the information used within and between services must be dynamically 
accessible. This provides further motivation for research into the protection requirements of 
information in this situation. In earlier distributed computing activity when the binding 
between distributed services had to be hard coded, it was possible to identify the information 
required during the interaction and the users who would be using the services. This allowed 
the owner of the information the opportunity to apply access control restrictions to the 
information. With the dynamic nature of Web Services, this becomes increasingly difficult to 
implement since the authorised users of the services change frequently, as does the 
information usage. Thus, the information requirement is not obvious until the services bind. 
This dynamic information sharing and usage requirement motivates investigation into a 
suitable method for protection and access control in these situations.
2.2. Collaborative Information Management: The Problem 
Defined
With the increasing adoption of dynamic collaborative connectivity between IS’s in VOs, 
comes the emerging risk of information vulnerability to exposure, and loss of organisational 
control over restricted information. The majority of the current access control technology (see 
Chapter 4) involve maintaining a secure perimeter, within which, information resources are 
stored. The perimeter model assumes intense, scrutinised access control is enforced with a 
basic precept that nobody would breach that perimeter and have access to the resource, unless 
they have been granted the necessary permissions. The granting of access and usage 
permissions, or privileges, is usually dealt with by information security administrators. This 
group of people within an organisation are responsible for the definition and enforcement of 
the protection and restriction requirements for information owned or stored by the 
organisation. Aside from the fact that the network perimeter doesn’t always stand up to 
intruder hits [BERR08], and control over restricted information can be lost despite these 
preventative measures, the adoption of collaborative working environments and dynamic VO 
formation has meant that information must be shared and accessed outside the network 
perimeter, to allow information to be shared with the right people at the right time to enable 
collaborative working [HMG08b].
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The initial motivation for this research stems from work on the DTI funded COVITE project 
[BPJ+05] that investigated early Grid and Web Service techniques for information sharing 
within VOs. The VOs involved in the COVITE study were made up of collaborating 
members of project consortia within the construction industry. COVITE produced an 
infrastructure for distributed searching of heterogeneous, autonomous supplier databases to 
support the electronic procurement of products and services required during the lifetime of a 
construction project. A major concern of collaborating partners who provide information to 
the consortia (supplier database owners) is how much control they have over their 
information once it has left their systems (perimeter). They have discretionary control over 
who is allowed to search their databases and can restrict the tables and columns of the 
databases that are queried on site and want similar control when the information moves to 
another site. This detailed, often sensitive content is vital to the business process of the 
suppliers. Its protection outside of the local system and within a VO domain is an important 
concern when the supplier is considering its release to the VO for collaboration to occur, and 
this must conform to the information security requirements of the supplier. Suppliers must be 
able to trust the VO security infrastructure to provide the desired level of control over shared 
information. This level of control of information was not possible at the start of the project in 
2002 or at the end of the project in 2005. Quite often, when conducting interviews with 
suppliers about the COVITE proposals, the response was that unless they had full control of 
what happened to their information outside their information system perimeter, they would 
not consider letting the information leave their system. This response indicated the 
weaknesses in current information sharing controls and how lack of continuous control over 
information hinders its usage in distributed collaborative working.
Recent contributions to research into access control of shared information in collaborative 
working, detailed in Chapters 3 and 4, have focused on enforcing controls based on a 
perimeterized approach, where information resources reside within a secure perimeter such as 
the network of an organisation or on a personal computer [WSF+03], [CO02], [TJM+99], 
[ACC+03]. The rules that define the users, roles and access controls to shared resources are 
typically developed within VOs and are enforced within a perimeter boundary.
However, for collaborative working to occur, which enables collaborators to access and 
contribute to information resource content, it is sometimes necessary for information to be 
shared outside the perimeter and stored on the information systems of fellow collaborators, as 
occurred in the COVITE project [BPJ+05], and is still occurring in scenarios such as
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Electronic Patient Record sharing [And08], as described in Chapter 1, and in government 
services. The scope of information sharing in government is defined in the Information 
Commissioner’s Data Sharing Review, 2008 [TW08] which states that personal information 
must often be shared to protect national security, to help prevent crime, and to identify the 
perpetrators of crime. In times of a heightened risk of terrorism, agencies, typically, but not 
necessarily in the public sector, are increasingly sharing or pooling relevant information 
about people identified as presenting a risk of harming others. It goes on to detail that it is 
self-evident that personal data must be shared in order to achieve these purposes, but that this 
begs questions about the scale and circumstances of the sharing. Collaborating agencies will 
add and modify the content of the shared information, passing the latest version of the 
information between them over whatever data transfer mechanisms they choose. In this 
scenario it becomes practically impossible to enforce perimeter-based security as the 
information is moved outside of the perimeter.
The UK Government is facing the same issue with its Transformational Government agenda 
[HMG08a], which outlines a “shared services culture” in terms of information and 
infrastructure, and aims to empower public service users with a greater level of control over 
the information held about them and available to them. Websites such as Direct.gov.uk and 
Businesslink.gov.uk have already been developed with the aim of creating a central point for 
users to access information generated and managed by many different Public service sectors. 
The “Data Handling Procedures in the Government” report [HMG08b] commissioned by the 
Prime Minister in June 2008 states that Public service delivery relies on the right information 
being available to the right people, while the 2007 Transformational Government Annual 
Report [HMG07] states that public and private sector organisations need to be able to share 
information securely in order to be able to provide these services. This neatly summarises the 
current situation with regard to information sharing. It is recognised that information needs to 
be shared and accessed by authorised people, often outside of a secure perimeter, in order for 
collaboration between organisations to occur and for efforts such as Transformational 
Government to succeed. At the same time, organisations need to be able to perform this 
sharing of information in a secure manner, which is proving to be very difficult to achieve as 
existing approaches to securing information when sharing information and working outside 
the perimeter clearly have weaknesses, as demonstrated by the number of recent news articles 
identifying information security breaches. Some of these are summarised in the next 
paragraph.
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In November 2007, HM Revenue and Customs lost discs containing the personal details of 25 
million people [BBC07a]. This was followed by news in December 2007 that nine NHS 
trusts in England had lost patient records [BBC07b]. In January 2008, four CDs containing 
personal details from court cases were lost by the Courts Service [Esp08]. Also in January 
2008, a laptop was stolen containing the personal details of 600,000 people who had 
expressed an interest in, or applied to join, the Royal Navy [BBC08a]. HSBC revealed that a 
disc containing the details of 370,000 people had been lost in April 2008 [BBC08b]. In July 
2008, it was revealed that 121 memory sticks had been missing or stolen from the Ministry of 
Defence since 2004, three of which contained information classified as ‘secret’ and nineteen 
contained ‘restricted’ information [Cor08]. These are just a selection of the reported cases, 
which show the wide range of national, civil, and commercial services involved. It is not 
down to technology alone that these losses are occurring. It is also important to consider the 
procedures and policies put in place within the organisations to protect information, as 
defined in the ISO 27001:2005 information security management specification [ISO05], and 
how well the employees of the organisations are educated in how to apply those procedures. 
However, the recent information exposure and loss due to careless control or theft of remote 
working devices such as laptops, portable storage drives and mobile phones, further increases 
the need to maintain control over distributed information outside the perimeter. The HMRC 
data loss prompted the development and publication of the Data Handling Procedure in 
Government report by the cabinet office [HMG08b]. This report defines how the UK 
Government has introduced new measures to protect information including the obligatory use 
of protective measures such as encryption, and controls for use with mobile devices and 
access to records. In the healthcare domain, the UK National Health Service (NHS) has also 
defined a National Encryption Framework and Encryption Code of Practice [NHS], 
mandating the use of encryption for information that is to be moved outside the perimeter. 
These reports are intended to protect all personal data, while recognising that some data 
requires a greater degree of protection than others. A significant research problem then, is 
how to maintain control over information outside the perimeter and how to classify 
information according to its required degree of protection.
In addition to the embarrassment that organisations incur when the news of data losses hits 
the headlines, it could be argued that the traditional approach to protecting information 
resources in their entirety within a network perimeter, and not effectively maintaining control 
of the information once it leaves the perimeter, is not a satisfactory approach to complying
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with the requirements of the UK Data Protection Act (1998) [DPA98]. The DPA states that 
controllers of data must ensure that “measures ensure a level of security appropriate to the 
harm that might result from such unauthorised or unlawful processing or accidental loss, 
destruction or damage”. Perimeterized control could be seen as no longer appropriate for 
protecting information shared in collaborative distributed environments, as essentially there is 
no control outside the perimeter. If this were the case then it is also feasible that people could 
begin to take legal action against organisations that lose information held about them. Section 
13, Part II of The Data Protection Act 1998 provides legislative backing for people to do just 
that, and states that “an individual who suffers damage by reason of any contravention by a 
data controller of any of the requirements of this Act is entitled to compensation from the 
data controller for that damage”. Currently, in the UK, repercussions facing an organisation 
are legislative and can enable financial punishment to be enforced. The Prime Minister has 
recently requested that the Information Commissioner conduct an independent review of data 
sharing to consider the way the Data Protection Act (1998) operates in the UK, and the 
options for implementing any such changes, as well as recommendations on the powers and 
sanctions available to the regulator and courts in the legislation governing data sharing and 
data protection. This report [TW08] states that an amendment to the Data Protection Act will 
give the Commissioner the power to impose civil penalties on any data controller (public or 
private) who breaches the data protection principles deliberately or recklessly. This means 
that the person in charge of data protection is personally liable, if  there is a breach of data 
protection on the information they control. This is particularly relevant to the scenarios 
described in these first two chapters, as they involve the sharing of personal information that 
would be governed by the Data Protection Act.
One could argue the amendments to the Data Protection Act will create a more vigilant and 
security conscious information officer, but equally it could be argued that this amendment 
does not bode well for the uptake of information sharing while technology cannot provide an 
appropriate means of securing shared information. If sharing information means there is a 
chance a person’s finances, future employment, or even freedom are at risk, they will be 
much less likely to allow that information to be shared, if they cannot be certain the 
information will remain secure in a distributed collaborative environment. Given the recent 
data loses, this is evidently not a guarantee they can currently be offered. Thus, this scenario 
once again presents the problem of how to maintain control over information outside of the 
perimeter.
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The interim solution within HMRC, as outlined in the Transformational Government annual 
review [HMG07], has been to put a complete ban on the transfer of bulk data without 
adequate security, such as encryption, and to disable the downloading of information onto 
removable media unless a senior manager overrides this for critical purpose. The same report 
details the reaction of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) who have done something 
similar; by needing the explicit permission of the IT security officer for downloading 
information to removable media.
These recent reports by HM Government, together with the COVITE and healthcare 
scenarios have highlighted two major points:
1. There is a desire to share information between collaborating organisations to provide 
more accurate and efficient provision of services. Transformational Government aims 
to facilitate the sharing of information between Public sector services and the 
population of the UK. COVITE requires the sharing of supplier data in product and 
service searches. In healthcare, patient information is shared between the 
organisations treating the patient. Thus this need is present in both public and private 
sectors.
2. There is not enough protection available to facilitate the sharing and storage of 
information outside the perimeterized information systems of these collaborating 
organisations. This is evident in the actions of HMRC and the CPS who, by banning 
the transfer of information to removable media, have effectively put a definite limit on 
the ability to share information with external organisations.
These two points define a clear weakness in the current information security domain, and 
underpin a research agenda to investigate the problem of content-based access control to 
information shared outside of an information system perimeter.
The Jericho Forum, a working group of information security officers/architects from some 
very large organisations such as Boeing, HSBC, and the pharmaceutical company 
AstraZenica, has also identified these weaknesses and has coined the term de- 
perimeterization (De-P) to describe it [Jer07]. De-P is the realisation that information system 
perimeters are becoming less effective due to the expanding boundaries of organisational 
network perimeters in support of collaborative working. They believe the expansion will 
reach a point, where information would be better protected if the perimeters were no longer
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used as the access control point between the outside world and the information. Instead, 
information should be controlled at the content level and be able to have policy enforced 
wherever it resides. They do not provide solutions, but have written several position papers 
on this subject, indicating the same security requirements are evident in large corporate 
environments [Jer08], and that the IT industry is not currently providing a solution to them.
Microsoft has also recognised that network perimeter security is becoming a dated approach. 
In a keynote speech at the 2007 RSA conference [Mur07], Bill Gates and Craig Mundie 
commented on the requirement for more flexibility in control of networked resources. To 
quote Mundie, “We could continue to invest in this fortress mentality of protecting 
everything, but I don't think that will be sufficient", this suggests that Microsoft are thinking 
along the same lines as the Jericho Forum in recognising that securing a perimeter around the 
resources of an organisation is not the answer to all information security problems. He 
continued, “most people would agree that our castle is fairly porous, because a lot of the 
assets actually leave the castle”, this relates to the problem of controlling information 
resources outside the network perimeter. It supports the argument for the ability to enforce 
access control policy remotely and to be able to modify access control policy for centrally 
managed distributed information, in the modem electronic information world. It is also 
impossible to assume the secure perimeter is impenetrable. Even if it was, to enable 
collaborative working, collaborating partners need to allow their perimeters to be breached to 
some degree and information to be moved from system to system in order to support 
collaboration.
2.3. Threat Model
2.3.1. Risk Assessment
The literature review of current issues and approaches to electronic information sharing and 
management uncovered many situations where sharing information in distributed 
collaborative environments puts the information at risk. The risk to information in any given 
situation is determined by conducting a risk assessment. Many risk assessment methods take 
a quantitative approach to risk, which defines a set of assets to be protected, potential 
vulnerabilities of the assets, and the likelihood of a threat agent exploiting the vulnerabilities 
[ISO05, Cob06]. The likelihood of a threat agent exploiting a vulnerability, and the impact of 
this on the organisation, usually financial, are two indicators that are often ranked on a
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numerical scale and multiplied together to make a total risk factor, i.e. the likelihood of a 
threat agent exploiting a vulnerability, multiplied by the impact of this happening, gives the 
total risk factor. Because the information sharing scenarios discussed in this chapter are 
largely focussed on unquantifiable risk, as they are not focussed on the financial impact of 
risk; a qualitative approach is taken to risk assessment here. This involves drawing out the 
most pertinent risks to information from the situations found in the literature review. 
Government reports and legislation have a reasonably large impact on this, due to 
modification of data protection laws and the fact that information owners will soon be liable 
to civil action for not providing appropriate security for their information. In the light of the 
emerging use of information sharing in collaborative distributed environments, the threats 
highlighted in these reports are particularly relevant.
The risks identified in the qualitative risk assessment, form the basis of a system threat 
model. Threats, in this model, are defined as situations that exist in the information sharing 
environment where the information is at risk. It is possible to classify threats into three 
categories:
• Anticipated threats where it is not deemed necessary to mitigate
• Anticipated threats that can be mitigated
• Anticipated threats that cannot currently be mitigated
All possible anticipated threats to information shared in a collaborative distributed 
environment make up a complete threat model for that environment. To develop a security 
focussed solution which reduces or mitigates some of the unmitigated risks posed by threats 
to information in such environments, it is possible to select a subset of the full threat model 
and create what will be known as a system threat model. The system threat model, effectively 
a requirements definition, contains mostly unmitigated threats from the information sharing 
environment. The system threat model will be used to inform the enhancement of the basic 
access control framework from Chapter 1, by identifying where the gaps in security provision 
currently lie. It will also be used to evaluate the prototype technology used to test the 
feasibility of implementing the new framework, on completion of the research, to determine 
to what extent the technology protects information against the unmitigated threats identified.
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2.3.2. System Threat Model
Taking a qualitative view of risk to information shared in distributed collaborative 
environments, the situations outlined in this chapter contribute to a three tier system threat 
model that drives the development of the approach to access control documented in this 
thesis:
The main risk to information shared in collaborative working environments is unauthorised 
access and use of information. This threat arises because of the current approach to 
controlling access (see Chapter 4), by using perimeter controls. The approach does not scale 
to enable security in distributed collaborative environments, as is evident from the 
documented data losses, and the HMRC and CPS clamp down on storing sensitive 
information on removable media and taking it outside of the perimeter. This means that any 
information shared outside an organisation’s network perimeter can no longer be protected 
using the original perimeterized access control mechanisms.
A secondary level of risk is the lack of sustained, modifiable control over shared, distributed 
information. This threat to information occurs because, if access was granted initially to a 
collaborator, there is no means of revoking access to that information, if  required. There may 
be several situations where revoking access may be necessary. For example:
• The collaborator may prove to be untrustworthy, if it is reported that they have had 
their systems hacked or lost portable media where sensitive information has been 
exposed;
• The collaboration relationship may come to a scheduled end and the owner of the 
shared information may wish to retain intellectual property rights, and therefore 
revoke further access to that information;
• Previously shared information becomes reclassified, so that it is unsuitable for 
sharing.
A further level of risk is the lack of granular control over content within shared resources. 
When information resources are shared between multiple organisations, the access control 
rights granted to each organisation by the resource owner may vary. As the Data Handling 
Procedure in a UK Government report by the cabinet office [HMG08b] states; some 
information requires a greater degree of protection than others. Going back to the healthcare
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scenario, a patient’s medical history may be shared from an electronic health record, while 
their current medication and long term illness status may be restricted to only some of the 
collaborators. The threat to content comes when it is merged into a single resource, which is 
given a single security label. While it is desirable to share the patient record, the resource 
owner cannot separate control of the restricted content from the rest of the resource, making it 
very difficult to do so. The ongoing effort to achieve acceptance of the Electronic Patient 
Record (EPR) in accordance with the British Medical Association (BMA) Security Policy 
[And08] exemplifies this. More people now have electronic access to patient information and 
current efforts have not managed to implement an effective means of “sealing and locking” 
parts of the patient record to provide selective restricted access while allowing freer access to 
other parts.
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Chapter 3 - Access Control Models
Several major access control models exist that aim to provide approaches to restricting access 
to information, based on rules and relationships. These models are either multi-level security 
models, based on a hierarchy; or multi-lateral models, based on information flow. This 
chapter investigates both the multi-level and multi-lateral models and places them within the 
framework introduced in Chapter 1.
For reference, part of the basic access control framework is repeated below.
Let D be a set of documents.
Let C be set of information classification schemes.
Let £/be a set of users.
Let A be a set of actions (to be performed on a document).
Let R be a set of access control rules.
This basic access control framework will be used to analyse existing access control models 
and derive ways of representing the rules and relationship required to link the security labels 
of users and documents, to a rule set that determines whether access should be allowed or 
denied.
3.1. Multi-Level Security Models
In a multi-level access control model we would expect to see a hierarchical classification 
scheme being used to assign a security level to users and documents. An example of a 
hierarchical classification scheme is the military and governmental classification scheme of 
Unclassified, Classified, Secret, Top Secret. These levels are used to derive the access control 
rules. For example, the Bell-La Padula access control model [Bel05], which is a multi-level 
model, defines a set of classifications based on the hierarchical military classification model 
(top secret, secret, classified, unclassified), and a list of categories related to the domain of 
the information (e.g. home affairs, foreign affairs). Levels of restriction to information are 
defined by assigning each information resource one classification label and one or more
categories from the list. In addition, each user is granted a classification label indicating the 
highest level of classified information they can access, and one or more category labels -  
information domains to which they have access. The model defines two access control rules 
for use with the classification labels:
• Simple security -  dealing with reading information.
• The star or * property -  dealing with writing information and creating new 
information.
The simple security rule deals with read access and states that a user (uz where uz E.U) may 
only access a resource (dx where dx e  D) if  their classification label ( q m where cm E Q  E Q  is 
equal to or higher than the label of the resource (Ckd where Ckd E  Ck E Q  . Thus to read a 
document cm >= Ckd must be true. This prevents people from reading information above their 
label, sometimes referred to as “no read up”. This means that if Cku = ‘Secret’, and if the user 
tries to read document dx where cm = ‘Top Secret’, the request will be denied because their 
classification label is below the classification label o f the information.
The star or * property defines write access rules and states that a user (uz) may only write to a 
resource (dx) that has a classification label higher than or equal to that of the user. Thus to 
write to a document Cku <= cm must be true. Taking the example used in simple security, this 
means that if cm = ‘Secret’, the user can write to dx where cm = ‘Secret’ or ‘Top Secret’, but 
cannot write to the lower classified information. This rule is often referred to as “no write 
down”. The Bell-La Padula model aims to preserve information confidentiality by preventing 
users from reading information classified above their level and writing higher classified 
information into lower classified documents, thereby exposing the content to those with 
lower security levels.
While the Bell-La Padula model attempts to assure confidentiality, the Biba multi-level 
model [Bib77] was developed to provide integrity. Bell-La Padula restricts users to “no read 
up, no write down”, but an issue arising from the star property is that users are able to write 
to information that is above their level, meaning that if c,>iU = ‘Secret’, the user (uz) could, in 
theory, write information to a document (dx) where Ckd = ‘Top Secret’, which they are not 
even allowed to read. In an extreme case, this gives the user the potential to overwrite all of 
the information in the document so it no longer contains any information or inaccurate 
information. The Biba model was developed to support the Bell-La Padula model. Its aim is 
to ensure that users cannot change information content above their own classification label so
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that it is no longer accurate, or becomes corrupt. Biba has the same two rules as Bell-La 
Padula -  Simple security deals with reading, and the star or * property deals with writing. 
The difference is that both rules are the opposite of Bell-La Padula. That is, “no read down, 
no write up”. Instead of simple security stating that a user is not able to read information 
above their classification label, the rule restricts read access to information that is below their 
label, formulated as Cku <= cm- The star property switches from restricting write access to 
information below a user classification label to stating that a user cannot write to information 
above their label in the Biba model, formulated as Cku > -  Ckd. The opposite of the Bell-La 
Padula rules. The majority of the time it is relatively harmless to allow a user to read 
information below their classification level, but it is imperative to ensure that users cannot 
write to information above their classification label in order to maintain the integrity of the 
information.
The Bell La Padula and Biba models combined equate to Cku = Ckd which is the model most 
organisations use when protecting their information. This rule means that a user, given a 
security level, can only read from and write to documents with the same security level as 
their own. While currently, labels are typically applied to entire resources, the work of Bell- 
La Padula and Biba has created a means to classify different sections of content within a 
resource at different levels, and map access rights to those sections to user classification 
labels.
Denning’s Lattice model is another multi-level approach [Den97], which focuses on the 
secure flow of information within a system. The principal is that information can only flow 
between users if the recipient user’s classification label is equal to or higher than the sender’s. 
For example, User Z, where uzCku — ‘Secret’, can only send a document to user Y, if uyCku = 
‘Secret’ or higher, formulated as uzCku <= uyCku, effectively equating to the Bell-La Padula star 
property.
Denning’s lattice brings out one of the major problems with both multi-level and multi-lateral 
approaches, indeed with the basic access control framework in general. That is, in order to 
accurately enforce controls using conditional rules, the classification scheme used to label 
information must be based on a common scheme for all documents. This is feasible for a 
single organisation but much more complex in a VO environment, where each organisation in 
the VO may have a different interpretation of what each classification scheme actually 
means. If User Z and User Y are from different organisations, the problem of how to convey
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and resolve differences in the meaning of classification labels between the organisations 
becomes an important issue when perimeter secured information is shared outside the 
perimeter.
Given that access control decisions in multi-level access control models are made by 
mapping a user’s security label to a document’s security label through a hierarchical rule, 
using elements from the basic access control framework, we can define a formula that can be 
used to represent all possible hierarchical access control rules, ra = cjt« + {—y>—)<—y>y<}  + cjw, 
which we can call the basic access control formula. We can say this formula is able to 
support hierarchical access control decision-making as long as the classification scheme Ck, 
from which the labels are selected, is supported by all systems that intend to implement the 
formula, so that the labels have the same meaning. This means that Ck must either be the same 
between the systems, or there must exist some mapping between Ck and the classification 
scheme of other systems. For example Ck = { 1 ,2 ,3 }  of the system used by User Z could map to 
ci = {x,y,z} of the system used by User Y where i=x, 2=y and y=z. So, if uzCku = x and uyc\u = 1, 
even though different classification schemes are used (Ck and ci), the meaning of the label is the 
same between systems. The same applies to document labels. Problems with enforcing access 
control across set boundaries begin to occur when different classification schemes have 
ambiguous interpretations or mappings. In a multi-level model this may occur where the 
security level in one scheme only maps partially to a level in another. Another problem is the 
sharing of rules. Just because the labels have the same meaning does not mean that the 
security manager of system Z is satisfied for User Y of system Y to gain access to their 
documents, even though the labels used to classify documents within system Z can be 
mapped to those used in system Y, and user Y has the appropriate label for access within 
their own organisation. This is part of the problem of perimeterized access control, as define 
in Chapter 1, and will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
Landwehr’s military message access control model [LHM84] identifies that an information 
resource -  in Landwehr’s case a military message, may comprise component sections of 
content with varying security levels. For example, the message may contain a number of 
paragraphs; each assigned its own security level. This principal is very relevant to this 
research. Landwehr introduces the concept of a container, an information resource with a 
multi-level classification scheme that may contain other containers, each with their own 
classification. This model really addresses the concept of finer levels of granularity within a 
restricted information resource. It exemplifies the potential strength of the Bell-La Padula and
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Biba models for enforcing confidentiality and integrity. However, Bell and La Padula also 
realised that one cannot protect resources with finer granularity than the protection 
mechanisms themselves support. Thus, the current approach of controlling access to entire 
resources as a single entity, prevents access control models such as Landwehr's model from 
becoming implemented in electronic access control environments and providing more 
refined, granular levels of control.
3.2. Multi-lateral Security Models
Multi-level security models are not necessarily the natural choice for information sharing in 
modem VO environments. Both Bell-La Padula and Biba models of access control stem from 
military security requirements, where the focus is on preventing the downward flow or 
upward modification of information through a hierarchy. In modem VO environments the 
flow of information may be more laterally controlled with the information being prevented 
from flowing “across” organisational domains. This type of control is known as multi-lateral 
security. In a multi-lateral security model, the security considerations are slightly different. 
There is no hierarchical classification scheme to assign security levels. Rather, the focus is on 
information flow.
An example of a multi-lateral model is the Chinese Wall model [BN89] which considers 
professional competition logic to restrict information flow between users who have roles with 
a conflict of interest, such as the corporate advisory and investment roles within investment 
banks, and the editorial and advertisement roles within a newspaper. The mle is that if an 
individual has worked or is currently working for an organisation in a particular sector, they 
are not able to share information with another organisation in the same sector.
Another model that focuses on information flow is the Clark-Wilson model. Clark and 
Wilson published their concerns regarding the focus of the Bell-La Padula model and other so 
called lattice based approaches on a military requirement for information security, and how 
this does not necessarily map onto commercial requirements [CW87]. A lattice based model 
generally describes any approach to access control involving multiple users and targets 
(information resources), where a conceptual lattice structure is formed through the definition 
of relationships between the security labels of users and targets, as formulated within the 
basic access control formula in Section 3.1. They argue that there are two distinct classes of 
access control mechanism required, as they believe that security policies and mechanisms
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required in commercial environments are very different to that of the military. Their stance is 
that the model used in the military based approach, as proposed by Bell-La Padula, is too 
simplistic to solve the entire problem of commercial information restriction. Their suggestion 
is that a well formed transaction, and separation of duties among employees, is needed.
The well formed transaction relates to logging and audit, where user actions can be traced at a 
later date to check for unauthorised data modifications or actions. This works by firstly 
making the user aware that their actions are traceable to deter them from malicious activity, 
and providing an audit trail to determine the malicious user if such activity occurs. In the case 
of information sharing in VOs, this could potentially relate to an audit history of access 
control and information sharing, i.e. who had access to specific information, and between 
which dates and times were they granted access. This information would be used together 
with details of information breach or misuse i.e. specific information content, date and time 
of the breach or misuse, to build a case and determine who was responsible for the data 
breach or misuse in a court of law.
Separation of duties involves separation of business processes into subparts that are executed 
by different people. For example, the process of purchasing an item involves several steps: 
authorising a purchase order, recording the arrival o f the item, recording the arrival of the 
invoice and making payment. The next task in the process should not proceed unless the 
previous task has completed correctly, and each task should be performed by a different 
person. Collusion aside, this is a very effective method of preventing fraudulent activity. 
Clark and Wilson’s suggestion to separate duties is that it is necessary for a computer system 
used for commercial data processing to ensure that a data item can only be manipulated by a 
certain set of programs that have been inspected for proper construction, and controls must be 
provided for the capability to install and modify these programs. This provides a level of 
integrity in the programs that are operating the business processes. To ensure separation of 
duties, each user should be permitted usage rights to a specific set of programs based on the 
requirement to use those programs as part of their duties as an employee. The major 
difference between the Clark-Wilson model and Bell-La Padula models is that there are no 
multi-level security attributes assigned to users and targets within the system; rather a 
specific set of applications allowed to manipulate a resource is defined, together with a set of 
user constraints on the use of those applications to read and write information. The user is not 
restricted on the information they can read and write, but on which applications they can 
execute. There are implicit information access and modification restrictions applied to these
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applications. Both the Bell-La Padula and Clark-Wilson models have an underlying concept 
of mandatory access control. Bell-La Padula requires the classification of users and targets 
with security labels, and a supporting architecture to enforce these rules. This relates to the 
basic access control formula. Clark-Wilson puts the control over user actions with the 
applications on the system itself, and classifies a user by granting access to specific 
applications. Furthermore, controls that may be considered in a multi-lateral model may 
consider geographical borders where legislation and regulation may not support the level of 
security required, and to a certain extent, temporal constraints such as limiting access to 
information between the hours of 0800 and 1800. To contextualise multi-lateral access 
control in the basic access control framework, we must allow an information classification 
scheme, Ck, to be considered as more than a hierarchical and structured scheme, and consider 
it as a tuple of information flow restricting requirements, such as role, domain, geography, 
time, and of course there is no reason why levels from a multi-level classification scheme 
cannot be added to the tuple. For example, in addition to c* = {x,y,z}, c* = 
<{x,y,z},{user,admin,guest},{europe,asia,north_america}>, where Ckd = {x,admin,europe}. 
This means the user’s label must represent the ability access level ‘x ’, have an 1 admin’ role 
and be accessing the data from within 'europe’. The important point to note from the access 
control framework point of view is that the basic access control formula that maps a user’s 
security label Cku against a document’s security label Ckd, when evaluating whether to allow or 
deny access to a document, still applies in a multi-lateral model, albeit with additional labels. 
The problems of different classification schemes having ambiguous interpretations or 
mappings could still occur in multi-lateral models. Indeed, in a multi-lateral model it is 
possible that the problem will be exacerbated due to the complexity o f security tuples 
including controls based on geography, roles and time.
3.3. Desirable Features of an Access Control Model for 
Collaborative Distributed Working
In conclusion, the desirable features to be supported in an access control framework, with the 
aim of improving information security in collaborative, distributed VOs would be the ability 
to:
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• Classify users and assign labels based on the levels of access they are allowed, in
order to define the maximum level of information a user can access. This is based on
the strengths of the Bell-La Padula and Biba models. It limits user access to 
information, when access is not required to carry out their tasks in an organisation.
• Classify content within information resources to a much finer-grained level, in line
with the Landwehr model for access control. This allows content with varying levels
of sensitivity to be classified at different levels in the same resource, and also allows 
contributors to an information resource to classify their own information, with their 
own protection requirements.
• Support classification label interoperability between organisations, so that 
classifications defined by one organisation can be interpreted by another organisation 
when accessing and handling information. This is an issue from studying the 
application of Denning’s lattice, in collaborative environments, between multiple 
organisations.
• Be implementable as machine enforceable controls, so that classification labels can be 
related to access control restrictions, and controls can be enforced. This would enable 
mandatory access control through a software infrastructure, as suggested by Clark and 
Wilson’s separation of duties model.
• Support an audit trail by logging user access requests, as suggested by Clark and 
Wilson’s well-formed transaction model. In the case of information misuse, an audit 
can be performed to analyse actions which determine the acting parties.
• Ensure that information is not released to collaborating organisations that have a
conflict of interest, based on the Chinese Wall model.
These desirable features have been defined from the literature review of existing access
control models. They will be used in the next Chapter to analyse and compare the 
functionality of existing access control technology, which are effectively implementations of 
access control models, and identify shortcomings in existing access control technology when 
evaluated against the set of desirable access control model features in this section, the System 
Threat Model defined in Section 2.4.2, and the limitations of the basic access control 
framework identified in Section 3.2. The analysis will draw out how existing 
implementations of technology implement the basic access control framework, and abstract
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additional framework elements with the aim of defining a framework to support the 
hypothesis.
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Chapter 4 - Existing Access Control Technology
The problem of maintaining fine-grained control of information outside the perimeter was 
highlighted in Chapter 2. The desirable features of an access control model for collaborative 
distributed working were defined in Chapter 3. This chapter investigates the limitations of 
current access control technology in dealing with the problem of maintaining fine-grained 
control of information outside the perimeter, and how they implement access control models 
to enforce access control.
4.1. Access Control Techniques
To control access to restricted resources there are two archetypal methods used: 
Authentication and Authorisation [IS096]. Authentication is the process of requesting some 
identity credentials from an entity that is attempting to access a resource, and consequently 
determining whether the entity is indeed who they portray to be. Once authentication has 
taken place, Authorisation is used to grant access rights to an entity and limit the accessibility 
and actions that can be performed on the resource. This is based on the identity credentials of 
the entity, using a pre-defined access control policy. Access Control systems associate three 
major components with its use; subjects -  users, services and other entities that intend to 
access and possibly manipulate information; targets — the information involved in the 
subject’s access request, and rules -  these define the subject’s access rights to the target. 
These three components form what is known as an Access Control Policy.
There are two general methods for enforcing access control: discretionary access control 
(DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC). DAC is based on a human decision about the 
access and usage rights granted to each subject, in relation to whether a subject should be 
allowed to access a particular target. This is a very subjective means of applying access 
control. In a VO environment, the management of user privileges is quite often managed by 
the VO as a unit. A nominated group of members or perhaps all members of the VO carry 
joint responsibility for controlling access to the information resources used within the VO, 
which will often include resources from several organisations. Because of the human 
intervention aspect, DAC may not be the type of control that information security 
administrators of restricted information within a VO would be confident of relying on, as an 
administrator would be subjecting information to the discretionary control of other members
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of the VO. In the real world this could relate to allowing collaborating business partners to 
have an opinion and some control over how an organisation’s information is shared, and to 
what level it is protected, with an uncertainty as to what might happen to it or how it might be 
exploited. For information protected under the Data Protection Act (1998), and sensitive 
military or commercial information, this could, and should, be unacceptable to information 
owners, because of the liability faced by the individuals responsible for its protection. DAC 
may be an approach used by VO members to define an access control policy for information 
within their own system, because they are in control of this information, but for distributed 
electronic environments, resource owners require a more rigid and consistent enforcement of 
access control.
MAC offers a more rigid and consistent level of control, in which the computer system 
enforces the access control based on a set of pre-defined rules. MAC is based on security 
labels, where each subject in the system is given a label reflecting its level of responsibility 
and access rights, and each target is also given a label that specifies the level of rights 
required to access it. This is a technical interpretation of multi-level security, as illustrated in 
Chapter 3 with the Bell-La Padula and Biba models. When a subject attempts to access a 
target resource, the system determines whether access should be allowed, based on a 
comparison of the subject’s security label and the target’s security label. A conditional set of 
rules state how the two should relate, with the Bell-La Padula and Biba models defining that 
access should only be granted if the subject’s security label is equal to that of the target. 
Chapters 1 and 3 formulated this using elements from the basic access control framework, as 
the basic access control formula ra — c*„ + /=,>=,<=>,</ + Ckd• One issue with MAC is that a 
subject may have multiple roles within an organisation, with different associated security 
labels. In a VO environment this means that a user may have multiple identities within a VO 
with different associated security labels. For example, a user may be the administrator of the 
VO, and thus have full access to the access control policy for the VO, but also be a member 
of the VO and have limited access to restricted information shared by a collaborating 
organisation. The organisation sharing the restricted information within a VO has to trust the 
user to log into the VO using the member account, when accessing information and not 
change level of access rights by using the administrator account. This is where the Clark- 
Wilson model of separating duties and recording transactions becomes important. The 
logging of information access and modification makes it possible to audit the use of roles in 
accessing information, and monitor activity within VOs.
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Assuming some level of mandatory access controls are required within an information 
system, there needs to be some method of electronically creating and storing the rules 
represented using the basic access control formula, that define who the subjects are within a 
system and what access privileges they should be granted to the target resources on the 
system. Typically this has been provided by a list of rules known as Access Control Lists 
(ACLs) [SS94]. Operating System access controls use ACLs for access control and they are 
common within organisations to provide a means of identifying access rights of users within 
an information system. ACLs are essentially a list of rules stored in a file that stores some 
piece of identifying information about a subject, usually a username, and for each target on 
the system, an explicit rule as to whether the subject is allowed or denied access. In some 
cases this may be extended to action controls (read/write/execute) for the target. Using 
elements from the basic access control framework, we can express mandatory access control 
decisions as a function /(«*,</*,<!/,/•<,) where, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, a MAC system works 
by passing a user identifier (uz) together with the target document identifier (dx), a requested 
action at, and a set of rules (r0) to the function. The function then determines if the requested 
action is allowed or denied by evaluating the set of rules (r0), which is stored in the ACL, and 
a result of ‘allow’ or ‘deny’ would be returned. The function can include labels, but they are 
not usually considered within ACLs.
Access Request Details 
{userlD { u j ,docID (rfj, 
action [ai ), rules (r0)}
Access Request Decision 
(Yes/No)
■ llltl
Function
c n
Figure 4.1 -  The Mandatory Access Control Approach
The desire to create an access control policy that allows system administrators to assign 
access rights to subjects of the system, based on a flexible and discretional set of rules, gave 
rise to the concept of Rule-Based Access Control [LZXQ05]. Rule-Based controls involve 
setting up fine-grained parameters by which an individual can access resources on a system.
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As the name suggests, these parameters are written as rules such as “user X can access 
resource Y, but cannot access resource Z”. This can be also represented using the access 
control decision function f(uz,dx,aj,r0). However, in this case, an ACL is not used, rather a 
rule base is accessed to determine the result. In Figure 4.1, the ACL would be replaced by a 
more detailed set of rules. This concept, although a major step forward towards the realisation 
of flexibility requirements, causes a complex scenario for administrators of large systems 
with hundreds of users and thousands of resources. The maintenance of a list of rules for a 
system of this size would be very time intensive and thus not easily scalable or maintainable. 
In a VO environment where users have a dynamic presence and role within the VO, they 
have varying levels of responsibility and access rights, making rule based controls of this 
nature very unfit for purpose, due to the amount of human effort and time required to 
maintain the rules. Users enter and leave VOs at a much more rapid rate than conventional 
organisations meaning that the lists have to be kept up to date after each change in VO 
membership. As a concept, Rule-Based access control is not suited to dynamic or large-scale 
environments, and this flaw is one reason why Role-Based Access Control was developed.
Unlike Rule-Based Controls where each subject is assigned a set of rules to control their 
access rights, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [FK92, SCFY96] is based on the real- 
world organisational concept of developing a set of roles within an organisation: e.g. 
Manager, Assistant Manager, System Administrator, and assigning each subject in the 
organisation one or more roles based on the responsibilities required by the subject in order to 
carry out their duties. Each role (for example, human resources manager) is assigned a set of 
access rights that reflect the responsibilities required by that role (for example, read and write 
access to employee name and address database, salaries database, contractual documents), 
and allow those actions to be carried out. Access control decisions are based on the actions a 
user is allowed to perform under their role within the organisation [FK92]. Again the access 
control decision function f(uz,dx,ai,r0) can be used to makes decisions because, as in rule- 
based control, the concept is still fundamentally based on rules. However, the role-based 
approach is much easier to maintain, as there are fewer roles than employees within the 
organisation, which means it is easier to the access rights. For example, if an organisation has 
five hundred employees, in a rule-based list that would mean managing and maintaining five 
hundred lists, whereas in a role-based approach the organisation may have fifteen roles for 
those five hundred employees, meaning only fifteen access control lists are needed and a 
correlating employee(wz)-role table. If an employee’s role changes, in a rule-based
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environment there could be several changes required to access control lists, and this would be 
almost impossible to keep track of in a dynamically evolving VO, where it would be common 
for members to change roles frequently. Whereas, in a role-based control environment, the 
administrator can simply change the user’s role to one that encompasses all the access right 
rules of their new position, and the change of access control takes effect immediately the next 
time the user logs in. From a scalability and dynamically manageable point of view this 
functionality is imperative and makes role-based access control very suitable for VO 
environments. This is where an information classification scheme and labels can be useful. 
Instead of complex rules or an explicit rule for each user-resource relationship, users can be 
given a security label from an information classification scheme, as can resources, and rules 
can be set that define the relationship required for users to access resources, as formulated in 
the basic access control formula ra = cku + {=,>=,<=,>,<} + ckd• If a person changes their role, 
they change their label. Resources remain at the same level of classification; users change the 
levels of classification. The rules defining who can access what are stored in an ACL-like 
document, based on the basic access control formula. The access control system, as illustrated 
in Figure 4.1 still applies, but with the addition of a classification scheme, as shown in Figure 
4.2. With the addition of labels in addition to and document identifier, the access control 
function becomes f(cku,Ckd,cii,ro), where the user and document identifiers are replaced with 
security labels.
Access Request Details 
(userlD+Label (ckJ , 
docID+Label (ckd), 
action (a ,), rules (r0)}
T—
MAC System
Function
w
Access Request Decision 
(Yes/No)
Figure 4.2 -  MAC System for RBAC
As role-based control is MAC based, there is still the problem of managing multiple roles for 
subjects. A user could have multiple roles encompassing different levels of access control. 
Where subjects hold multiple roles, there is still a requirement to trust them to use the 
appropriate role for their current duties and not just use the highest level role to carry out all
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tasks. In a VO there may be frequent changes to a subject’s role, and new roles may be 
created dynamically for specific tasks within the VO. Thus, the administration of access 
control policy is an important issue in such environments.
4.2. Access Control Administration
If an Access Control Policy is centrally controlled, a single authority is responsible for the 
derivation, maintenance and enforcement of the policy and its rules. In a VO environment 
that is configured to be centrally managed, this means members from disparate organisations 
managing the access control for the entire VO from a centralised point. One concern that 
could arise in a centralised approach is the potential for a bottleneck when large numbers of 
system users are requesting the service from the system, to authenticate and authorise them at 
the same time. At busy times of the day, such as first thing in the morning or after lunch, this 
could have a significant impact on the performance of the system. Another concern is that a 
single point of access also means a single point of failure. If the access point is unavailable 
for whatever reason then nobody can get authorisation to access anything. A way round these 
problems is to have mirrors or backups of the access control system that become available, if 
the access point becomes unavailable, to replace the failed access point. However, another 
concern, which is in fact one of the most important issues with this approach within a VO 
environment, is how to define and enforce community policies [PWF+02]. It is highly 
doubtful that a VO member responsible for protecting restricted information being shared in a 
collaborative working VO, would trust other members from different and possibly 
competitive organisations to have an input into the access control rule definition for their 
information. This is particularly true if they are responsible for personally identifiable 
information under Data Protection Laws. This approach takes full control over access away 
from the organisation, and could mean that their information might become exposed to 
people that the organisation would not wish to grant access to, even though they are fellow 
members of a VO. An approach that solves some of the centralised problems, particularly 
those identified above, is decentralised control. In decentralised access control [SCK+06], 
each organisation manages its own access control point that manages the rules protecting its 
own resources. This puts the onus on the organisation to protect its own information, as if 
anybody gains unauthorised access to any of its resources, the cause is them not maintaining 
a proper set of access controls. While reducing the amount of trust required in the VO 
management to protect resources, the decentralised approach assumes that the resource itself
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is physically stored within the secured perimeter of its owner’s system. This is one area 
where current decentralised approaches fail to support secure collaborative working. It is also 
where the need for de-perimeterization becomes evident. The traditional method of securing 
information, as used in the centralised and de-centralised approaches, is to store documents in 
protected perimeters and enforce access control at or within the perimeter. Network 
perimeters are the most commonly used barrier between users and documents, as described in 
Section 1.2. However, a distributed collaborative information-sharing environment is 
inherently detrimental to the security of information secured using this approach, because to 
share information the documents often have to leave organizational perimeters, rendering the 
access control technology used to protect the documents ineffective, no matter whether the 
administration is centralised or de-centralised. For example, if a GP e-mails a patient record 
to a clinical consultant at a hospital, or gives them access to an online repository from which 
the record can be downloaded, the document that comprises the record moves from within the 
GP’s perimeter to the hospital’s perimeter where the controls used to restrict access within 
the GP’s perimeter cannot be used to enforce access control rules. The real requirement, as 
hypothesised in this research, is to enable more effective information sharing by supporting 
the enforcement of rules defining an information resource’s access control, wherever the 
information is stored or used in an Internet connected environment, rather than the current 
perimeterized approach where the information resource must remain under the control of its 
owner to enforce access control. If this were possible, then the trust requirement from a 
resource owner point of view would be shifted from allowing somebody else to manage and 
control access to its resources, to the ability to be able to trust that the access control 
enforcement technology can accurately perform authentication and authorisation of a subject, 
a model suggested by Clark and Wilson. Resource owners would remain in control of their 
information, by managing a local access control policy, while the policy itself could be 
enforced on information that has already been shared. The information would not have to 
remain under the control of its owner to enforce policy.
This discussion is introducing a new element for consideration in addition to the existing 
basic access control framework. This is enforcement control. Enforcement controls are absent 
from the basic access control framework because so far the investigation has focussed on 
existing access control models, that is, how to model access control decisions. Enforcement is 
independent of access control model. Indeed, it is an implementation of the result of a 
decision made using an access control model. To address this issue, the study focus will now
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move to the implementation of access control model decisions and investigate the technology 
that is used to enforce access control.
4.3. Access Control Technologies
This section first provides an overview of some of the supporting technologies used within 
security architectures to enforce confidentiality and integrity in distributed systems, and 
continues with a literature review of the most prominent and related technology 
implementations currently published.
4.3.1. Confidentiality, Integrity and Identity in Distributed Systems
4.3.1.1. Achieving Confidentiality
When sending information across unsecured networks such as the Internet, where snooping 
third parties may intercept the information and use it for their own purposes, it is important 
that the information is protected while in transit, so as to maintain the confidentiality and 
integrity of the information. Confidentiality in this sense means that only authorized people 
can read the information. The most commonly used approach to protecting information while 
in transit is cryptography, an approach that provides confidentiality through the 
transformation of plain text into a form that is unreadable to humans called cipher text using 
an encryption algorithm and an encryption key. Applying cryptographic techniques to an 
information resource means that anyone who intercepts the information cannot use it to their 
advantage, as it is meaningless to them, unless they know the algorithm needed to decrypt it, 
and posses the encryption key to reverse the transformation and decrypt the information. The 
algorithm is normally made public as they do not need to be kept secret, and there are a 
number of encryption algorithms that are in common use within organisations and within 
messaging clients such as email applications. The important component to be kept secret is 
the encryption key, as this is the component that keeps the encrypted information “locked”. 
Each party that wishes to decrypt the information must have prior knowledge of the algorithm 
to perform decryption, and the encryption key, as this is applied to the information. This 
approach is known as Symmetric Cryptography since the sender and receiver must use the 
same key to encrypt and decrypt messages. Symmetric Cryptography has some important 
flaws in its provision of information security, namely:
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• How to send the shared key to all relevant parties. Any snooping third parties that 
might intercept the information that is to be protected might also intercept the shared 
key if it is sent across the same unsecured channels, in which case they can use it to 
decipher any encrypted messages they intercept in the future that use this key.
• Once the shared key is given out by the sender there is no control over what 
information the other parties can decrypt with that key. For example anybody could 
use the same key to decrypt other information that the sender has encrypted using the 
same key including future messages the sender might transmit that are not meant for 
the eyes of previous receivers. Thus, it could be used to access files on the sender’s 
local machine that have been encrypted.
To overcome these flaws, the concept of Asymmetric Cryptography was introduced. In this 
technique, senders and receivers of information do not share a single key for encryption and 
decryption; instead they each have a pair of keys known as public and private keys or the key 
pair, hence the reason for asymmetric mode often being known as Public Key Cryptography. 
These keys work in such a way that information encrypted using the public key can only be 
decrypted with the corresponding private key and vice versa. A passphrase known only to the 
owner of the private key prevents the private key from being used without entering the 
correct passphrase for the key when attempting to use it for encryption or decryption. A 
passphrase is similar to a password but is more complex as it can include many symbols and 
characters and is typically much longer than a password making it more difficult to hack or 
guess. The underlying concept is that the public key can be made available to anyone by 
sending it via email, on a memory stick, or storing it in a networked directory, essentially it 
does not matter who has possession of the public key, so it can be sent across unsecured 
channels. A person can then use a public key to encrypt information and send it to the person 
who they believe to be the owner of that public key, confident in the knowledge that the only 
person who can decrypt the information is the person with the corresponding private key and 
passphrase. If the information is intercepted, it is not a problem, as it cannot be decrypted 
without the private key or passphrase. If the information is sent to the wrong person, i.e. not 
the owner of the public key used to encrypt it, it is an inconvenience but still not a problem, 
as only the owner with the corresponding private key can decrypt it. The major difference 
between the symmetric and asymmetric methods is that the private key is not required to be 
shared and indeed should never leave the possession of its owner. The private key can be 
resident on a local machine, laptop, secure token or whatever storage medium the owner
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chooses, but careful control of it must be exercised as, along with the passphrase, it is the 
“locking” and “unlocking” secret for encrypted information. Further, when the private key is 
used to decrypt the information, the person will be prompted for the passphrase which 
protects the private key usage, meaning that if the person has the private key but not the 
passphrase to use it, encryption or decryption cannot occur.
4.3.1.2. Achieving Integrity
Confidentiality through encryption is only one of the purposes of public key cryptography. 
The encryption of information using a public key ensures that only the individual with the 
corresponding private key can decrypt it. Conversely, the private key can be used to apply 
what is known as a Digital Signature to an information resource. Digital signatures involve 
the encryption of an information resource with an individual’s private key. The only way to 
decrypt information that has been encrypted with a private key is to use the corresponding 
public key. Of course, this may be obtained by anybody, which means confidentiality using 
this approach would be minimal; however, confidentiality is not the aim of digital signature. 
The private key cannot be utilised unless a person has prior knowledge of the passphrase 
required to use it. This adds integrity to the information encrypted with a private key, as 
anybody decrypting the information using a public key knows that the information almost 
certainly will have originated from the owner of that public key and nobody else. Integrity in 
this sense means that information is only modified by those authorised to do so. Using public 
key cryptography in this way is one method for providing user authentication. Electronic 
messages such as requests for access and shared information can be signed with digital 
signatures and will carry the identity stamp of the user sending the message. This approach 
allows access control infrastructures to automatically pass identity attributes between 
distributed access control systems without the user having to provide a username and 
password each time they interact. In addition to the authenticity of the information, digital 
signature also means that upon decryption of information, the person reading it can be sure 
that the information has not been tampered with or modified at all since its encryption by the 
person who generated the information. This technique is often used in email to prove that the 
email originator was indeed, who they portray to be and it is not a spoofed email from an 
impostor. This provides confidence in the integrity of the email, as it will not have been 
modified since it was sent, as there is no way anybody else could have encrypted it with a 
private key unless they used the originator’s private key.
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4.3.1.3. Achieving Confidence in Identity
Public Key Encryption also allows user identity to be passed between electronic access 
control systems automatically, and it supports user authentication on actions such as requests 
to access information. However, like other forms of identity token, a public key is susceptible 
to imitation by fraudulent people pretending to pass a public key with a fraudulent identity as 
their own. The success of public key cryptography depends on the establishment of trust in a 
public key, that it does in fact belong to the person that is presenting it as their own, and that 
the person is who they claim to be. This requires an ability to unquestionably bind public 
keys to the identity of a person. These requirements are addressed by the Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) framework [BFPW07].
PKI consists of several components that support the establishment of a trust hierarchy and the 
binding of a user identity to a public key through the issuing of a Digital Certificate. Users, 
who do not inherently trust each other, need to be able to establish a level of trust in the 
public key presented to them as a token of another user’s identity. This is the role of a 
recognised and trusted authority, aptly named a Certificate Authority (CA). The CA, in 
relation to electronic trust establishment, is what the identity and passport services of the 
world are to passport control at borders and ports. It is a third party, that issues identity 
tokens (passports) to individuals under its jurisdiction, and the identity authorities from other 
jurisdictions trust it as an identity verification authority, when they are presented with a set of 
identity credentials by an individual attempting to prove their identity at border controls. A 
CA will accept requests from individuals for a proof of identity, perform some level of 
identity verification, and then issue the individual with a Digital Certificate containing the 
individual’s identity information and the public key to be used in cryptography. Before it is 
issued, the digital certificate is digitally signed by the CA with their private key. This allows 
anybody, who trusts that CA as a Source of Authority (SoA), i.e. they trust the CA to have 
performed the necessary identity verification checks and issued a valid identity document, to 
obtain the public key of the CA and verify that the certificate was in fact signed by the CA. 
This provides integrity in the binding of public key and identity to an individual. Users who 
do not trust each other establish their own trust relationship with the CA, and can then trust 
that any certificates issued by that CA are a valid identification of a user.
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4.3.2. Existing Approaches to Access Control in VOs
The Virtual Organisation Membership Service (VOMS) [ACC+03] classifies authorisation 
information within VOs into two categories:
1. general information regarding the relationship of the user with their VO: groups 
they belong to, roles they are allowed to cover and capabilities they should present 
to resource providers
2. information regarding what the user is allowed to do, due to their membership of a 
particular VO
The authors suggest the first type of information should be contained in a server managed by 
the VO itself, while the second is probably best kept at the local sites, near the resources 
involved. This makes sense, as the VO is responsible for maintaining user groups and roles, 
while the owner of a shared resource will wish to keep the access control policy for their 
information private, and close to the physical location of the information. The VOMS service 
contains an administrative interface for modifying user roles and capabilities, thereby 
supporting dynamic control of access rights. This enables instant control over access rights 
through the creation and modification of user access privileges. This allows members of a 
VO to manage and maintain the VO credentials of its members and relate them to their role 
and status within the VO. It is separated from the management of access controls for 
resources shared within the VO, which can be mapped to the local access control policy of 
each member. VOMS and other existing technology, such as CAS and Shibboleth [PWF+02, 
Shib, WSJ07] provide a manageable solution to the first category of information. VO user 
relationships are well managed through such interfaces. The second category is the focus of 
this research, that is how information regarding user access privileges is managed, held and 
used to enforce access control both before and after information is shared in distributed 
collaborative environments.
4.3.2.1. Defining and Enforcing Access Control
Within VO environments, resource providers (VO members) specify their security 
requirements, i.e. a set of policies (rules) defining how information shared within the VO 
should be protected. This could be expressed through access control lists, rule or role-base 
controls in a number of different formats. These policies are stored at a Policy Storage Point
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(PSP) and used when requests for access are made at a Policy Decision Point (PDP), to 
determine whether or not a requesting user should be allowed access to the resource 
[PCC+06]. User requests for access to controlled resources require details of user credentials 
(uz), the identifier of the resource they wish to access (dx), and an action(s) they wish to carry 
out to be sent to the PDP. This request is handled by a separate Policy Enforcement Point 
(PEP), which is used to accept access requests and invoke the PDP. The PDP invokes access 
control functions such as f(uz,dx,ai,r0) or f(cku,Ckd,cn,r0), depending on whether labels are used 
or not, and uses the function to evaluate access requests, using the rules defined and stored at 
a known PSP. PSPs effectively store rules such as those held in ACLs or Rule and Role- 
based access control lists. VOMS [ACC+03] is an example of this in practice. The outcome 
of this is an access control decision, as detailed in Section 4.1. In a VO environment, a 
project identifier and a VO identifier may also be included, so that the resource provider can 
make a decision based on the project and VO that the requesting user is coming from, rather 
than solely on the user’s credentials.
Another current example of this approach in practice is the PERMIS [CO02] infrastructure 
for access control in distributed environments. The PERMIS infrastructure defines a 
Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI), which can be likened to the Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI), described earlier in this chapter. PKI is used to bind an identity to a 
certificate issued by a trusted authority. PMI extends the binding of identity to include user 
access privilege attributes for a particular identity. PMI defines Attribute Authorities (AAs), 
who issue digital certificates, similar to CAs in PKI. These certificates called Attribute 
Certificates (ACs), are stored in X.509 format, the standard format for digital certificates. The 
architecture software allows AA administrators to construct and sign ACs and store them in 
searchable, networked directories as PSPs, making them easily accessible when required by 
the PERMIS PDP to make access control decisions. Access control decisions in PERMIS are 
made using an authorisation policy, and for added integrity the policy itself is held within a 
signed AC. The AC contains a set of attributes bound to the owner of the certificate, defining 
the privileges granted to a subject by the issuing AA. The certificate is then signed by the AA 
to provide the set of privileges with integrity. The inclusion of all this information, and the 
signature of the issuer strongly bind the set of attributes to the holder, and anyone wishing to 
verify the integrity of this information can validate the digital signature of the AC, which is 
the Source of Authority (SoA). When a change in user circumstances occurs in a PKI 
controlled environment, the certificate of a user can be revoked. The same applies in this
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case, as at any time, the AC for any user can be revoked, which means all the user’s 
privileges are revoked. While the authorisation structure is the same as VOMS, the major 
difference between VOMS and PERMIS is the use of X.509 certificates to bind attributes and 
identity to a user. This effectively allows the VO to create their own PKI, where the user 
identity of the collaborators can be bound to a public key along with their role in the VO and 
even access privileges if that is deemed necessary. However, the use of public keys to hold 
access privileges may not be ideally suited to VOs, because it means any change in access 
privilege would involve revoking the public key and reissuing a new key with the new 
privileges. This removes some of the dynamism and flexibility of the VO environment and 
adds to the user management overhead.
The ISO 10181-3 Access Control Framework [IS096], as followed by the PERMIS 
infrastructure, splits the functionality of an access control application into two components: 
the Access Control Enforcement Function (AEF) and the Access Control Decision Function 
(ADF). The PERMIS PEP performs the function of the AEF to deal with authentication, 
while the ADF is performed by the PDP as it makes an authorisation decision based on the 
access control policy for the organisation. It considers the identity of the subject making the 
request, the action requested to be performed on the target resource and other environmental 
factors such as time of day. The splitting of the two components is a natural division of tasks 
in an access control scenario. Authentication and Authorisation are two cooperating and 
intrinsically linked services, but research into the methods used to achieve the optimum 
functionality of each service is often separated into domain specific approaches. This division 
allows the selection and potential distribution of an appropriate mechanism to maximise the 
performance and flexibility of the access control application.
The ISO 10181-3 framework clearly splits access control decision-making and access control 
enforcement. Technology such as VOMS and PERMIS is evidently doing the same, defining 
a decision point (PDP) and an enforcement point (PEP) for access control. The access control 
enforcement (PEP) implementations are effectively enforcing decisions made by the PDP. 
PDP functionality maps directly onto the basic access control functions f(uz,dx,aj,r0) and 
f{cku,Ckd,ai,r0), which models access control decision-making. This is evident by the focus on 
users (uz), resources (dx), actions and rules. However, the PEP functionality must now also be 
included as it is crucial to supporting access control, which means extending the framework 
to include enforcement controls. Therefore:
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Let D be a set of documents.
Let C be set of information classification schemes.
Let Ube a set of users.
Let A be a set of actions (to be performed on a document).
Let R be a set of access control rules, 
and
Let E be the set of all enforcement controls
The basic access control formula of ra = cuu + /=,>=, <=,>,</ + Ckd for representing rules and 
function f(cku,Ckd,di,r0), still stand, eb where eb E E is any enforcement control that enforces 
access control decisions made using the access control decision function. Now that we have 
the addition of enforcement controls, we will investigate how enforcement controls are 
currently implemented and draw out any limitations in existing approaches, given the 
hypothesis that information can have its access control policy modified and enforced no 
matter where it is stored in an Internet connected environment.
4.3.2.2. The Centralised Perimeterized Approach
Both VOMS and PERMIS, together with other existing approaches to access control, such as 
CAS [PWF+02], Akenti [AKE] and VPMan [VPM] that deploy a similar approach, can be 
classified as Perimeterized approaches to enforcing access control. That is, they are 
perimeter-based protection mechanisms, and rely on the location of the target resource being 
kept under the control of an organisation within a secured information system perimeter. If 
the organisation wishes to share that information outside their secured perimeter, with these 
existing approaches, the PEP and PDP are no longer available as a mandatory barrier to 
enforce access controls. This is a major limitation in relation to controlling information in 
collaborative and distributed environments, where control of access to information is 
important, and there is a reliance on information sharing.
The introduction of perimeters as a factor in the implementation of enforcement controls 
requires the inclusion of virtual spatial concepts in the basic access control framework, 
namely domains and perimeters.
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A perimeter in this context is the interface between Internet-connected users and 
organisation-owned documents. This is typically an organisation’s network perimeter.
A domain in this context comprises a subset of all perimeters with a common and agreed 
information classification scheme and set of access control rules. For example, a domain 
could be a collection of organisations with common national purpose such as hospitals within 
the National Health Service or Government departments, or a wider international purpose 
such as the G8 forum.
An enforcement control in this context is a technology that makes decisions on whether to 
allow or deny document access to a user, and enforces the decision.
Thus, to extend the basic access control framework further:
Let I be the Internet-connected environment, as defined in Chapter 1.
Let M be the set of all domains within the Internet
Let P  be the set of all perimeters
On the basis that I contains all machines that are connected to the Internet, let us call it the 
super-domain, within which all other domains are sub-domains. All organisations have 
perimeters. All domains have perimeters. However, a domain can be a subset of all 
perimeters, when comprised of several organisations.
A given organisation’s perimeter was formulated in Section 1.2 as Pa = 
< {d\..dn},{r\..rn},{e\..en}>, which defines a perimeter as a element within which a set of 
documents, rules and enforcement controls are contained. All documents have specific rules, 
which must be enforced by specific controls. Both the appropriate rules and controls must be 
present in order to enforce control on a document. The perimeterized approach to access 
control includes all approaches where control can only be enforced on documents while they 
remain within a perimeter that contains the appropriate rules and controls. Sharing rules is 
difficult when handling sensitive information, because the information owner is responsible 
for managing information access and usage, due to security requirements such as legal, 
reputational or intellectual property, to name a few. If rules move between perimeters, with 
existing approaches to access control, the owner loses full control of them. Thus, 
perimeterized approaches to access control are flawed for distributed collaborative working 
environments.
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To identify a way round this limitation requires consideration of how access control is 
enforced in these perimeterized approaches. Access control enforcement can be either 
centralised or de-centralised. A centralised approach involves a single point of access control, 
where a centralised set of policies (rules) exists to enforce access control at a single location. 
In the case of a VO, this involves the VO members defining and agreeing to the access 
control polices for information shared within the VO. VOMS uses a centralised approach to 
access control. As discussed in Section 4.2 , this approach has its drawbacks, such as the 
single point of failure if only one centralised access control point exists, meaning nobody can 
get access to any resources if it fails. It also means a large amount of user management is 
needed to manage all users of a VO from a single point, especially if the VO is dynamic and 
its users, roles and information protection requirements are frequently changing. Most 
importantly for collaborative VO environments, it also removes a lot of control from the 
owner of the resource. They will have some control over the rules that define access rights to 
their information, but ultimately if they are not the administrator of the VO, the control of 
information has passed to somebody else. This is not appropriate for sharing sensitive 
information.
4.3.2.3. The Decentralised Perimeterized Approach
A de-centralised approach involves moving parts of the access control infrastructure outside 
the centralised system. This allows more dynamism within the VO and less overheads in 
terms of user management, as well as removing the single point of failure issue. Welch et al. 
[WSF+03] present the concept of security as services, where authentication and authorisation 
processes are performed outside the perimeter and the results of the processes are returned to 
the perimeterized environment to control access. Sinnott et al. [SCD+08] present a 
comparison of the centralised model against the de-centralised approach, and detail the 
advantages of a de-centralised approach. In summary, in a de-centralised approach, access 
control policy for resources can be defined by the owners, rather than the VO members 
having to develop and agree on a VO-wide policy for all resources under centralised control. 
This occurs when a resource owner defines the access control policy and places responsibility 
with other remote (distributed) administrators within the VO, who they trust to issue users 
access rights based on this policy. This approach is called delegation and has been 
implemented in the DyVOSE project [WKSS06]. The use of delegation to issue and manage 
user access rights has the potential to reduce the user management overhead of resource 
owners within VOs, as each collaborating organisation within a VO will have an
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administrator who will assign user roles and access rights to users under their control on 
behalf of the other administrators. In theory, this also means the remote users are assigned a 
more accurate set of access rights because the remote administrator knows and understands 
the rights required by their own users to carry out their duties and can more accurately issue 
rights. Delegation and de-centralisation of access control policy definition is particularly 
important in VOs for these reasons.
There are issues with a de-centralised approach. One is how VO members know where and 
how to locate and access resources without a centralised access point. Another is how roles 
defined by one VO administrator should be interpreted by other VO administrators. For 
example, if the role “manager” is defined by one administrator, how should other 
administrators interpret the access rights associated with that role? Centralised access control 
does not have these problems, so a hybrid of the two would create a solution that offers both 
sets of advantages, while removing most of the drawbacks. VOTES [SCD+08] creates a 
hybrid by using VOMS to manage user roles centrally, while using PERMIS to de-centralise 
access control policy decision and enforcement.
4.3.2.4. Limitations of the Perimeterized Approach
However, both centralised and de-centralised approaches are still based on perimeterization 
and can rely on the perimeter element formula Pa — <{d\...dn) ,{r\..rn) ,{e\...en}> to contain 
documents, rules and enforcement controls. While the access control policy definition is 
returned, to some extent, to the owner of the resource in a de-centralised approach, the 
document is still required to remain within a secured perimeter to allow enforcement of the 
policy.
The limitation of the perimeterized approach, whether it be centralised or de-centralised, is 
the requirement for the document to remain within a perimeter to enforce policy. De­
centralisation allows, what was previously a centrally defined and agreed access control 
policy to be decomposed, and control of its definition and enforcement to be returned to the 
owners of the information shared within a VO. To effectively control access to information 
outside the perimeter would require a de-centralised access control policy and system level 
enforcement controls to enforce policy, to not only be returned or moved to the resource 
owners’ systems, but to be present on the systems of anybody who has access to the 
distributed information. Effectively, the policy (rules) and controls need to travel with, or at 
least maintain control over, the information, wherever it goes. If this could be achieved, part
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of the hypothesis, the claim that information can have its policy modified and enforced 
wherever it is stored in an Internet connected environment, could be supported.
This issue with this is that, in order for information owners to maintain control of their 
information, they must remain in control of the access control policy, which means the rules 
cannot be openly distributed, lest they lost control of them. Perimeterized enforcement 
controls act as a barrier between the user and the resource. Sharing documents outside the 
perimeter would require that barrier to remain available, so that access controls can be 
enforced. Thus, instead of being an identifiable, addressable endpoint, such as a centralised or 
de-centralised point of access control, the barrier itself has to be completely distributed, to the 
extent that it would have to be present or available to control access anywhere and on any 
machine to which information may be copied or moved. Thus, enforcement controls must be 
available on any machines to enforce policy, but the policy itself must remain centralised.
This can be achieved theoretically by redefining the perimeter and by making certain 
elements of the perimeter available within all other perimeters and domains in the Internet 
connected environment. The aim of this is to make documents, rules and enforcement 
controls available to everyone in all domains, and allow access control rules to be enforced 
outside the perimeter, while ensuring the information owner retains control of their 
information. Thus, the formula Pa = <{di..dn},{r\..rn},{e\...en}>, which defines a perimeter 
as a subset of all documents, rules and enforcement controls, can be redefined as a new de- 
perimeterized element formula Pz = D + {r\...rn}  + E, which means a single perimeter 
element contains the complete set of documents and enforcement controls, and a subset of all 
rules. This modification requires a change in thinking about segregation between computer 
networks. Previously, each perimeter had its own set of documents, rules and enforcement 
controls. Whereas, actually, it is the access control rules which are the only element that must 
remain perimeter-controlled. Documents can be shared and enforcement controls can be 
invoked as services or applications on demand [WSF+03], as long as the correct rules for the 
document can be accessed and enforced, while the rules remain under the control of the 
document owner.
The de-perimeterized element theoretically supports one of the claims of the hypothesis. 
Information could have its access control policy enforced wherever it is stored. It has been 
defined by identifying the weakness of perimeterized access and offers a new way of thinking 
about access control enforcement focusing on the decentralisation and distribution of
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documents and policy control (rule) enforcement, where current thinking was focussed on 
decentralising policy development and decision making. The feasibility of achieving this will 
be discussed in Section 4.3.2.6, after the issue of granularity is discussed.
4.3.2.5. Granularity of Access Control
In addition to the perimeterization problem, there is also the issue of limitation on the level of 
granularity to which information resources within a VO can currently be protected. The most 
commonly implemented method of document security labelling is to take a label (cjy) from a 
classification scheme, and assign it to a document dx. This creates a document security label 
Ckd. This means the entire document is classified at a single level and user access can be 
restricted using the access control decision function f(cku,Ckd,ai,r0), using rules defined using 
the basic access control formula ra = + /=,>=,<=,>,</ + cud, as previously defined.
However, this assumes that if a user meets the requirements of the formula, they should be 
able to access the entire document, and that all content within the document has the same 
security requirements. This is often not the case. For example, take an Electronic Patient 
Record (EPR) in a medical information-sharing scenario. The record comprises demographic 
patient details, medical history, current and previously taken medication, and long-term 
illness details. The information owner, for example a GP, may wish to share some of this 
information with a local hospital when referring a patient. Or, from a global view, a patient 
may become ill while abroad and the local hospital may require access to an EPR to 
understand a patient’s reaction to a particular treatment. The GP, and in fact the patient, may 
not wish to share the entire record. Long term illness such as HIV or previous medication for 
depression is not relevant to anyone other than the GP and could be damaging to the patient’s 
reputation if exposed. Therefore, only the parts of the document necessary for collaborative 
working should be shared. The basic access control formula becomes inappropriate at this 
point for information shared in distributed collaborative environments.
The entire-resource level of control can be compared to centralised access control policy 
development, where a single system defines the controls for the resource. De-centralisation 
means that multiple access control policies can exist, allowing information owners to specify 
different controls reflecting the varying levels of sensitivity of their shared resources. More 
sensitive content can be controlled with different controls to less sensitive content. This 
allows resource owners to classify their information according to its level of sensitivity.
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Information resources themselves, particularly large resources, have the potential to contain 
content of varying levels of sensitivity. A resource owner may be forced to classify entire 
resources with a high level security label, when in fact a very small amount of the content 
within the resource requires high level classification. This affects the overall classification of 
the document due to the limitation of entire-resource controls, which ultimately limits the 
information that can be shared in collaborative VOs. If centralised access control policy 
development can be de-centralised, to allow resource owners to define different policies 
based on their own varying security requirements for the content within their resources, 
perhaps entire-resource controls can also be “de-centralised”, so that the owner of that 
information can define access control policy relating to different sections of the content, 
based on relative sensitivity, for example at a paragraph, line or even word level. This 
approach is very similar to that suggested in the Landwehr model (See Section 3.1).
To achieve this, we need to introduce the concept of sections of content within an overall 
document. Extending the basic access control framework further, we can add the concept of 
document sections:
Let dxy be the yth section of dx,
The basic access control formula ra — cku + /=,>=,<=,>,</ + ckd only considers the label of the 
document (dx) in its entirety, representing it as a single element of a classification scheme ck. 
We need to change this by representing the document label a set of classification labels that 
are applied to different sections (dxy). This can be done by extending the basic access control 
formula to include more than one label, creating a new granular access control formula ra = 
cku + {=,>=,<=,>,<} + ckd, where ckd e  ck. This formula can then either invoke the access 
control function f(cku,Ckd,ai,r0) 1 to y times, where y is the total number sections in a 
document, and send each label to the function individually. Otherwise, the function could be 
modified to accept the set of all labels. Each section’s label from 1 to y is evaluated against 
the user’s security label CkU, meaning the user may gain access to some parts of the document 
but not others. Extending the formula in this way to create the granular access control 
formula overcomes the granularity issue.
The granular access control formula theoretically supports another claim of the hypothesis, 
that a document’s content can have security enforced at different levels of granularity within 
the overall document. The rationale behind this formula is based on the theory of de­
centralising access control policies such that information resource owners can control access
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to their own resources and manage the access control policies within their own systems, and 
for their own individual resources. Community defined, centralised policies take away some 
of the owner’s autonomy when defining access control for their resources as fellow 
collaborators have some control over the access control polices for the shared documents. 
Allowing the resource owner to have full control of the access control policy for their 
information allows them to classify and control their resources according to their sensitivity 
and restriction requirements. The granular access control formula takes this one step further 
and allows resource owners to classify and control content within a resource as well as the 
entire resource, giving them much more control over their shared content. It enables them to 
share content they were previously unable to share due to being classified at a higher level 
than was necessary, due to being in the same document as other highly classified content; and 
to share sections of content within a resource, such as an Electronic Patient Record, based on 
the information required by collaborators to perform their role in the collaborative working 
group, rather than giving them access to everything within the resource. This reduces the 
likelihood of potentially sensitive content being exposed. The granular access control 
formula, built on the basic access control framework, is another contribution of this thesis.
Research published by Damiani et al. [DCPS02] and Bertino et al. [BCF+04] focuses on 
breaking down the content of information resources, and applying controls to different 
sections of content with specific protection requirements. This allows the resource owner to 
classify the content of an information resource, and allow or restrict access, depending on 
who is requesting access. Rather than sharing an entire resource with a collaborator, these 
approaches allow only part of the resource to be shared, with the rest remaining restricted. 
This is particularly appropriate for enforcing access control in a distributed collaborative 
environment, as it provides the additional flexibility required by resource owners, to only 
share enough information so that a collaborator can perform the tasks required of them, 
without sharing information that is not relevant to them. This is required by the government 
[TW08] and healthcare information sharing [And08] scenarios.
The Damiani et al. approach is based on the perimeterized model, and thus does not provide 
the required de-perimeterized access control or implement de-perimeterized element formula. 
The Bertino et al. approach can support de-perimeterization and does follow the structure of 
the de-perimeterized element formula to some extent, by allowing documents and 
enforcement controls to be part of all perimeters while still enforcing access control. It works
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by encrypting different sections of content with an individual key, meaning a role-based set 
of keys can be shared with collaborating users, based on their identity and information access 
requirement, allowing them to decrypt the information relevant to them, outside the 
perimeter. Both approaches rely on the resource being well structured, so that it can be 
broken down into different sections within the file data structure. As a result, both apply their 
approaches to XML-based information, a well-structured, standardized document format. It is 
this feature of both approaches that makes them particularly appropriate to this research, and 
the aim of finer-grained access control. XML is a standard specification language defined by 
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). Its syntax is structured, and can be used to form 
structured documents and messages. XML is platform independent and is accepted as the 
universal language for most Internet information exchanges. It is very flexible, allowing data 
to be structured into almost any representation. XML can be searched, parsed and tagged to 
pinpoint any data value held in an XML document. This document structure allows its 
content to be broken down, or fragmented, into subsections of information. The ability to 
break documents down into smaller, self contained sections of information is very useful 
when addressing the issue of granularity within current access control technologies, and is 
comparable to Landwehr’s military message model.
XML documents consist of a number of hierarchical blocks of data. Each piece of 
information within the document is encapsulated within an XML element. A hierarchy of 
elements within the document makes each piece of information within the document 
individually addressable. When considering a Patient medical record, for example, Patient 
identity information, current medication, and medical history, can be held within separate 
XML elements. The Patient identity element can be broken down further into name, address 
and date of birth elements, which become a subset of the Patient identity element. Each 
element can be individually addressed using XPath path queries. For example, the path query 
IIMedical Record/Patient Identity/Name would uniquely address the Patient name element of 
the medical record. This hierarchical, addressable data structure is an advantage of using 
XML to represent information. Damiani et al. and Bertino et al. use XPath queries and 
associate them with an access control policy. Thus, a document dx can be fragmented into 
subsections dX(J’"n), and the access control policy for information can be structured using a 
table of access control privileges, in the form of subject-object-action-sign, where subject is a 
user (uz), object is the section of text identified by a path specified in an XPath query 
( d x ( y * a c t i o n  is the action that is to be performed, and sign is a + or -  indicating whether
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the action is allowed or not. This once again follows the access control decision function and 
it can be extended to include the granularity controls. The aforementioned example path 
query could be used in an access control policy to define rules based on information at that 
location, thus individually controlling access to each element. Therefore both the Damiani et 
al. and Bertino et al. approaches follow an implementation of the granular access control 
formula and could support the implementation of that formula.
4.3.2.6. Managing Loss of Control
A drawback in the work of Damiani et al., Bertino et al., in relation to this research, is the 
lack of ability to retain sustained control over information in collaborative environments. 
Section 4.3.2.2 discusses the difficulty of sharing rules when handling sensitive information. 
If rules move between perimeters, the owner loses full control of them. The hypothesis states 
that access control policy for shared information must not only be enforceable outside the 
perimeter, but also modifiable. Perioellis et al [PCC+06] note that VOs by nature are 
dynamic and thus user authorisation needs to be inherently dynamic to properly support VO 
activity. Access rights should not be automatically assumed on assignment of a role within a 
VO. This supports the concept that the access control policy for shared information must be 
able to be modified, with the changes enforced on information already shared and stored on 
remote autonomous systems. Damiani et al. rely on a perimeterized model, where the 
information must remain within a secured network perimeter to be controlled. This does not 
support the concept of de-perimeterization within VO environments. Bertino et al. present an 
approach that could, in theory, be mapped to an implementation of the de-perimeterized 
element formula. They suggest the encryption of each section of an information resource 
based on the protection requirements for the section, with each section having its own 
encryption key. Based on an access control policy for the resource, information is then either 
requested (pull mode) through a centralised access control policy decision point, where the 
keys for decryption are presented to the user based on their credentials and relative access 
rights granted in the access control policy, or sent out to users (push mode) with the relevant 
keys for decryption accompanying the information. This is Role Based Access Control, based 
on the user’s identity, credentials and access rights, granted within the access control policy. 
An issue with this approach is the number of keys that will be generated for each document, 
causing a potential key management problem. If a document is encrypted with several keys 
reflecting the different levels of protection required in the document, this could create a large
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number of keys for an organisation to manage. Another issue is that the key distribution is 
permanent, that is, there is no way of revoking decryption keys once they have been 
distributed. This means that should an organisation wish to modify or remove access 
privileges to information at any time in the future, it would not be possible as, although the 
information is encrypted, the keys are permanently distributed. Thus, while access control 
can be limited to a certain set of users, the access control policy is not modifiable after key 
distribution.
The key to working around this problem, as defined in the de-perimeterized element formula 
Pz = D + {r\.„rn} + E, is to distribute documents and enforcement controls, while keeping the 
rules within the protected perimeter. Referring back to the ISO 10181-3 Access Control 
Framework [IS096], which splits the functionality of an access control application into two 
components: the Access Control Enforcement Function (AEF) or Policy Enforcement Point 
(PDP) and the Access Control Decision Function (ADF) or Policy Decision Pont (PDP), they 
are separate but intrinsically linked entities. The enforcement point must be able to contact 
the decision point. Typically, in a perimeterized environment, the PDP (rules) and PEP 
(enforcement point) are known, addressable network entities. That is, they know how to 
contact each other within the perimeter. By moving the enforcement point outside the 
perimeter, the PEP and PDP lose contact, unless a link is maintained. This is something that 
must be overcome for the de-perimeterized element formula support secure information 
sharing.
Another approach to providing continuous control over distributed information, that is 
becoming increasingly prominent in commercial information systems, is Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) [Sta02, LSS03]. DRM techniques enable access and usage restriction 
controls to be applied outside the secure network perimeter, even if it is stored on media 
outside the control of the organisation that owns it. It works by defining an access control 
policy for a resource prior to its release, which remains effective throughout its lifetime and is 
distributed with the resource itself. DRM requires anybody outside the network perimeter to 
install proprietary software on their machine in order to access and use the information. This 
software acts as an extension of the organisation’s information system as it is a distributed, 
policy decision and enforcement point. The policy (rules), PDP and PEP are kept together in 
one distributed package. It is the DRM software in this case that acts as the secure perimeter. 
DRM software, in this case, is an implementation of the perimeter formula Pa = 
<{di...dn},{n..rn},{ei...en}>. For example, when downloading music from somewhere like
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iTunes, you cannot play the downloaded track without a limited licence, which is obtained on 
purchase and enforced using a proprietary media player loaded with the proprietary software. 
This restricts the sharing of the file on other machines. One drawback with DRM is the 
reliance on application and platform restraints. Users are subject to controls implemented by 
DRM vendors through specific software, and it cannot be assumed that all users in the 
working community will have access to the same application. For example, Microsoft have 
produced the Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) [MSFAQ] approach to 
DRM, but this cannot be used by somebody not working on a Microsoft based operating 
system, who wishes to provide DRM controls, when sharing information within a VO. For an 
implementation of the de-perimeterized element formula to be successful, where all 
enforcement controls are contained within all perimeters, the enforcement controls must be 
platform independent.
The DRM approach is also limited by the granularity of its controls. It is still restricted to 
controlling access to a resource in its entirety, meaning that an information resource can only 
be protected as a whole. It cannot support the implementation of the granular access control 
formula where document classification comprises a set of classification labels rather than a 
single label.
Another drawback with the current DRM technology is the lack of modifiable controls over 
the resource being protected. With an audio file, the controls for its use are unlikely to change 
so just enforcing the requirement for a limited usage licence through the use of specific 
software is suitable. In a VO environment, the requirements for control over shared files may 
change as the collaboration agreement in the VO changes. For example, if a document is 
shared with a VO member for collaboration purposes, the owner may want to protect its use. 
DRM can provide controls over system level operations, i.e. read, write, execute, copy, 
delete, and print, for the lifetime of the resource, giving the owner the option of restricting the 
use of their resource. However, at some point the owner may wish to revoke the ability of any 
collaborator to perform previously allowed system level operations. For example the owner 
may have lost trust in a collaborator and wish to revoke their ability to read this information. 
This action requires the ability to modify the access control policy and enforce it on 
previously shared information, which is not currently possible because with DRM the policy 
enforcement and decision points are both distributed in the form of a proprietary piece of 
software, together with the policy which is used by the software. In this case, the PEP and
65
PDP are still in contact, but the resource owner has been cut off from their information, 
therefore, not following the de-perimeterized element formula.
The concept of DRM goes some way to providing continuous control over distributed 
resources, through a trusted software client acting as the secure perimeter between the user 
and a resource. This supports the concept of the Clark-Wilson security model, which suggests 
the use of trusted software to enforce MAC controls. However, it still lacks the ability to 
modify the access control policy. The concept of a client tool that acts as a perimeter offers a 
solution as to how to completely de-centralise and distribute system level controls, but to 
facilitate a modifiable policy it is necessary for the resource owner to maintain control of the 
access control policy for the resource and enforce an up to date set of access controls.
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De-centralised e.g. PERMIS
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De-Perimeterised e.g. DRM, Bertino
Figure 4.1 -  Shift in Perimeter Control
Figure 4.1 shows the shift in control from centralised through de-centralised, to de- 
perimeterized approaches in terms of the perimeter of control over the information. In the 
centralised approach all shared information is controlled by a single PEP (the dashed line) 
inside a single network perimeter (the solid line). The policy that defines access control 
restrictions is defined by the VO, and the policy and all shared resources must remain within 
the perimeter to enforce access control. Information owners must give up complete control of 
their resources and store them outside their own perimeter, but within the perimeter of the 
VO system. In a de-centralised model, the PEP is returned to the organisations that are 
responsible for controlling access to the shared information. This occurs within their local 
network perimeters, where they maintain complete control of their information as the 
information and its access control policy is stored within their perimeter, while allowing 
shared access on the basis of retaining storage of the information. Both of these approaches 
are limited by the fact that the perimeters of control are fixed, and if the information is taken 
outside the perimeter, it can no longer be controlled. In a de-perimeterized model, the PEP 
and must be portable and the rules stored at a PSP and used by the PDP must be accessible by 
the PEP, so that the policy can be enforced outside the network perimeter and within other 
distributed network perimeters. The de-perimeterized element formula Pz = D + {r\„rn}  + E, 
ensures the rules remain under the owner’s control while documents and enforcement 
controls become part of all perimeters. However, to be able to modify access control policy, 
even after a document has been shared, and still be able to enforce changes to access control 
policy on information held by collaborating parties outside the resource owner’s perimeter, 
there must exist a link between the PEP (eb where eb E E), the PDP, which is bound to the 
access control policy {r\..rn}  for document dx where dx E D, and the resource owner. Let us 
assume the resource owner is Pz as the perimeter is effectively a representation of a resource 
owner’s boundary of control. This defines the relationship between all elements of de- 
perimeterized element formula. We can assume call this the de-perimeterized linkage rule 
that states there must exist a permanent link between a document dx, eb, {r\.,rn}, and Pz.
4.4. Summary
Up to this point, the research presented has been focused on developing an access control 
framework and a set of formulae and rules to support the hypothesis. The hypothesis of the 
research:.
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A document’s content can have security enforced at different levels of granularity within 
the overall document, and the rules defining its access control are always modifiable and 
enforceable in an Internet connected environment, no matter where the document is held.
There are three claims in total:
i) security can be enforced at different levels of granularity within a document,
ii) access control policy can be enforced outside the perimeter, no matter where it is 
stored within an Internet connected environment, and,
iii) access control policy can be modified and ii) is still applicable
The basic access control framework is as follows:
Let D be a set of documents, of which dx is a document element that can be assigned a 
single label Ckd or a set of labels Ckd, where Ckd E  c*, when classified at a granular level 
on its sections dxy
Let C be a set of information classification schemes, of which Ck is a classification 
scheme used within a perimeter or domain.
Let t/be a set of users, of which uz is an element that can be assigned label Cku
Let A be a set of actions (to be performed on a document), o f which at is a specific 
action element
Let R be a set of access control rules, from which a subset of rules {r\...rn}  can be 
defined to support an organisation’s access control policy
Let E be the set of all enforcement controls, of which eb is an enforcement control 
element
Let I be the Internet-connected environment, as defined in Chapter 1.
Let Mbe the set of all domains within the Internet 
Let P be the set of all perimeters
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These are the components required to frame the level of thinking necessary to support the 
claims of the hypothesis. Using these components, two formulae and an associated rule have 
been derived to theoretically support the claims.
The granular access control formula ra = Cku + /=,>=,<=,>,</ + Ckd, where Ckd E c*. represents 
a user (uz) being assigned a classification label (Cku) from a classification scheme (Ck), which 
has some relationship to the classification labels used to classify the sections of content (Ckd) 
within a document (dx). Each section (dxy), within a document can be classified with its own 
label by using a subset of labels to represent the security requirements of the document, rather 
than a single label. The access control function f(cku,Ckd,di,r0) will evaluate each label against 
the user’s label to determine whether access should be granted or not, in support the 
enforcement of security at different levels of granularity within a document (Claim (i)).
The de-perimeterized element formula Pz = D + {r\..rn}  + E represents all enforcement 
controls (E) being available within all perimeters (of which Pz is a single element), to support 
access control policy enforcement on all documents (D) stored outside the perimeter, no 
matter where it is stored within an Internet connected environment (Claim (ii)).
The de-perimeterized linkage rule which states that there must exist a permanent link 
between a document (dXj), the appropriate enforcement controls (eb,), its access control policy 
{ri..rn}  and its the owner (via their perimeter) (Pz) supports Claim (iii).
To test the feasibility of implementing these formulae and rules, the next Chapter documents 
an implementation of a prototype application that aims to implement them.
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Chapter 5 - An Enhanced Approach to Access Control 
for VOs
To enhance current information security capability in support of more secure information 
sharing in collaborative distributed environments, the hypothesis of this research makes three 
claims, and the research so far has produced two formulae and a rule, based on an access 
control framework, in support of these claims. :
i) security can be enforced at different levels of granularity within a document, 
ra= c ku + {=,>=,<=,>,<} + ckd, where ckd e.ck
ii) access control policy can be enforced outside the perimeter, no matter where it is 
stored within an Internet connected environment, and,
PZ = D + {r\...rn}  + E
iii) access control policy can be modified and ii) is still applicable
There must exist a permanent link between a document dx, e  ^{r\..rn}, and Pz
This chapter details the development and implementation of a prototype system that aims to 
implement these formulae and rules to demonstrate the feasibility of their implementation. 
The rationale behind doing this is that, if they can be implemented, it would provide a strong 
argument in support of the hypothesis.
Additionally, Chapter 3, the study of existing access control models, identified some 
desirable features that would exist in a security system for distributed collaborative 
information sharing. These are shown for reference in Figure 5.1. There were a number of 
features that came from the multi-level and multi-lateral models. The label-based approach of 
multi-level is supportive of advanced access control granularity, to the content level inside a 
document. While the Clark-Wilson model of application-level controls and audit logs is 
supportive of client-PEP controls such as those developed in Digital Rights Management. 
The key thing that is missing in existing technology is the ability to conform to the de-
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perimeterized linkage rule, which requires a permanent link between d„ eb, {r\..rn}, and Pz„ 
This is something that the prototype system will aim to overcome. We will begin with an 
approach to achieve this.
• Classify users and assign labels based on the levels o f access they are allowed, in order to 
define the maximum level o f information a user can access. This is based on the strengths of 
the Bell-La Padula and Biba models. It limits user access to information, when access is not 
required to carry out their tasks in an organisation.
• Classify content within information resources to a much finer-grained level, in line with the 
Landwehr model for access control. This allows content with varying levels o f sensitivity to 
be classified at different levels in the same resource, and also allows contributors to an 
information resource to classify their own information, with their own protection 
requirements.
• Support classification label interoperability between organisations, so that classifications 
defined by one organisation can be interpreted by another organisation when accessing and 
handling information. This is an issue from studying the application o f  Denning’s lattice, in 
collaborative environments, between multiple organisations.
• Be implementable as machine enforceable controls, so that classification labels can be related 
to access control restrictions, and controls can be enforced. This would enable mandatory 
access control through a software infrastructure, as suggested by Clark and W ilson’s 
separation o f duties model.
• Support an audit trail by logging user access requests, as suggested by Clark and Wilson’s 
well-formed transaction model. In the case o f information misuse, an audit can be performed 
to analyse actions which determine the acting parties.
• Ensure that information is not released to collaborating organisations that have a conflict o f  
interest, based on the Chinese Wall model.
Figure 5.1 -  Desirable Features of an Access Control Model
5.1. Achieving the Link that Obeys the De-perimeterized 
Linkage Rule
Linking information to a usage control policy is something that has been achieved by the 
Creative Commons community [AALY06]. Rather than an access control policy, Creative
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Commons defines an acceptable usage policy and associated license for distributed 
information. It comprises a set of icons, embedded in a shared resource, that inform the 
reader of their obligations and limitations when sharing and reusing the information. For 
example, there are icons that represent “no profit must be gained from its use”, and “no 
derivative work may be based on it”. The approach embeds a URL within the resource that 
links to a document detailing how the reader should interpret the icons, and adhere to the 
usage policy. This is a live URL and, of course, can be updated and modified at any time, 
should the meaning of the icons change. There are no technical controls that enforce the 
Creative Commons licenses; rather the licenses are represented in human, machine and 
lawyer readable form, such that any information misuse can lead to prosecution.
To achieve retention of access control for shared information, it could be possible to build on 
the Creative Commons approach of linking what are effectively classification labels to an 
acceptable use policy for shared information, and modify it to replace the acceptable use 
policy with an access control policy. This could provide the necessary link between PEP, 
PDP and resource owner and satisfy the de-perimeterized linkage rule. The PEP could be 
distributed as a client-side piece of software that enforce policy decisions, while the access 
control policy and PDP could remain under the control of the owner, rather than distributing 
the policy, PDP and PEP, as DRM does. The link between PEP and PDP could be provided 
by embedding a URL in the document before it is shared, as Creative Commons does. This 
link could be accessed by the PEP and used to connect it to the centralized PDP and policy. 
By doing this, the policy remains under the control of the information owner and is 
modifiable, while the PEP can get the latest version of the policy each time an access control 
request is made. With the PEP being an enforcement control (eb) in relation to the access 
control framework, the de-perimeterized access control formula can be satisfied, so long as 
the control is accessible outside the perimeter. Section 4.3.2.3 details the concept as 
suggested by Welch et al. [WSF+03] of security as services, where authentication and 
authorization processes are performed outside the perimeter, and the results of the processes 
are returned to the perimeterized environment to control access. There is no reason, why 
policy enforcement couldn’t also exist as a service, using Web Services techniques (see 
Chapter 2) to codify similar controls to those deployed in perimeterized environments, as a 
client-side application. This is effectively how DRM works. However, DRM lacks the ability 
modify policy. This could be overcome using the approach discussed in this section.
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The system developed in support of demonstrating the feasibility of the new formulae and 
rules breaks access control policy down into two distinct but related elements. These are: a 
distributed element, and a centralised access control matrix. The distributed element utilises 
classification labels, following the access control models of Bell-La Padula and Biba. The 
labels are embedded within the body of a distributed information resource, building on the 
work of Creative Commons. The labels relate to a centrally managed access control matrix. 
The matrix defines the identity attributes required to gain access to content within the 
resource that has been classified with security labels. This matrix remains at a centralised 
location, where the mapping between classification labels and identity attributes can be 
modified at any time to add or remove access privileges to classified information, while the 
classification labels remain permanently within the body of distributed information. The 
important part in making the access control policy enforceable outside the perimeter is to 
maintain the link between the matrix and the classification labels after distribution. This is 
made possible through the technical mechanisms described in this chapter.
5.2. De-Perimeterized Security - Architectural Components
The functional architectural components within the basic access control framework are as 
follows:
Let C be a set of information classification schemes, of which Ck is a classification 
scheme used within a perimeter or domain.
Let R be a set of access control rules, from which a subset of rules {r\..rn}  can be 
defined to support an organisation’s access control policy
Let E be the set of all enforcement controls, of which eb is an enforcement control 
element
The following sections explain the development and implementation of a set of technical 
mechanisms encompassing these components and identify the key advancements to existing 
methods and approaches, which distinguish these developments from other work and 
contribute to the information security domain.
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5.2.1. Information Classification Scheme
People within organisations have various roles. With these roles come varying levels of 
responsibility and a requirement for access to information necessary to carry out the duties of 
the role. The various roles in an organisation will have different levels of access to restricted 
information. It is more important to restrict access to some information content than others, 
from the data controller’s point of view. This depends on its value to the organisation, and the 
legislation and regulation that controls its use. A lattice or matrix structure is formed 
involving people (subjects) and information (targets), which maps from the roles available to 
any given subject and the information that is of a restricted nature. Research documented in 
Chapter 4 has shown the evolution of access control from simple access control lists to 
complex rules, and currently to access control rules based on a set of roles. Roles are usually 
decided by replicating the organisational employee hierarchy of the real world, where people 
are given roles that allow them to assume privileges within the organisation to carry out their 
jobs. However, in domains such as healthcare and Government, information is much more 
complex than a single entity containing content to which a single classification label can be 
applied and a single role allowed access. Consequently there should be functionality available 
to split content into sections, which are classified according to their confidentiality and 
integrity protection requirements. As a result of this functionality, subjects should be able to 
access limited amounts of information within a resource based on their identity and role 
within the organisation. To be able to make this sustainable, scalable and usable throughout 
an organisation, and to support its enforcement through interpretation by a human and 
software infrastructure, the classification needs to be carried out under the guidance of a 
specific and concise set of rules that encapsulate the necessary security requirements that 
apply to the roles defined within the organisation. This set of rules is known as an 
Information Classification Scheme or ICS.
Perhaps the most widely known ICS is the military/governmental scheme shown in Table 5.1, 
which is taken from [Brag06]
Classification Description
Top Secret Disclosure of top secret data would 
cause severe damage to national
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security
Secret Disclosure of secret data would cause 
serious damage to national security. 
This data is considered less sensitive 
than data classified as top secret
Confidential Confidential data is usually data that 
is exempt from disclosure under laws 
such as the Freedom of Information 
Act, but is not classified as national 
security data
Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) SBU data is data that is not considered 
vital to national security, but its 
disclosure would do some harm. 
Many agencies classify data they 
collect form citizens as SBU.
Unclassified Unclassified is data that has no 
classification or is not classified as 
sensitive
Table 5.1 -  Governmental Classification Scheme
Considering the potential benefit of the Bell-LaPadula and Biba models for access control, 
the military classification scheme seems a good starting point for designing an ICS. Its 
classifications are clear and distinct, however, as Clark and Wilson observed [CW87], they 
are not all relevant to the commercial world, and there is no flexibility within them to allow 
commercial concepts or restrictions to be applied. For example, there is no classification for 
proprietary information that is confidential, but which can be released under certain licensing 
conditions that restrict its use. Clark and Wilson also noted that commercial information 
cannot necessarily be classified solely in terms of confidentiality (exposure). The integrity of 
information is sometimes just as important in the commercial sector when considering the 
impact of uncontrolled editing of information. Not only must the information be protected 
against unauthorised eyes seeing it, it must also be protected from being written to by 
unauthorised people, where its correctness and completeness could be damaged. The
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classification scheme used in a VO information sharing scenario, would ideally reflect the 
dynamic and flexible nature of the VO itself, and so must contain a set of classification labels 
that reflect differing levels of confidentiality and integrity.
There is no globally agreed standard for classification of commercial or nongovernmental 
information. In this case, the level of classification is dependent on the discretionary level of 
restriction required by the owner of the information, and the desired level of confidentiality 
and integrity. [Brag06] defines a set of commercial data classifications, that provide a range 
that could be used to provide further levels of granularity from highest to lowest as shown in 
Table 5.2.
Classification Description
Sensitive Data that is to have the most limited 
access and requires a high degree of 
integrity. This is typically data that 
will do most damage to the 
organisation should it be disclosed
Confidential Data that might be less restrictive 
within the company but might cause 
damage if disclosed
Private Private data is usually compartmental 
data that might not do the company 
damage but must be kept private for 
other reasons. Human resources data 
is one example of data that can be 
classified as private
Proprietary Proprietary data is data that is 
disclosed outside the company on a 
limited basis or contains information 
that could reduce the company’s 
competitive advantage, such as the 
technical specifications of a new
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product
Public Public data is the least sensitive data 
used by the company and would cause 
the least harm if disclosed. This could 
be anything from data used for 
marketing to the number of employees 
in the company
Table 5.2 -  Commercial Information Classification Scheme
This set of classification labels offers more to the commercial classification of information 
than the military/governmental model because it includes commercial factors, such as 
proprietary information. However, the classification is still very much focussed on creating a 
superficial label that is applied to a target, which is aimed at identifying its protection 
requirements. As Clark and Wilson identified [CW87], commercial information depends on 
its integrity, while the military approach is heavily based on confidentiality. These 
requirements continually emerge as the two most important aspects of information assurance 
from an access control perspective. Confidentiality is the requirement that only authorised 
users can view information. Integrity is the requirement that only authorised users can modify 
information. Thus, the classification scheme should ideally encompass both requirements. In 
a collaborative working environment where both confidentiality and integrity are important, it 
may be prudent to select a label for each and assign them to a user. For example, using the 
military classification scheme as an example, a user might be able to read ‘Top Secret’ 
information, but not write to it. Their write label might be capped at ‘Secret’. However, this 
goes against the rules of Bell-LaPadula and Biba, which restricts read and write access to 
information classified with a single label. Both of these classification schemes are 
hierarchical, meaning the classifications get more restrictive higher up the list of labels. 
Organisational roles are also typically hierarchical. For example, office junior, manager, 
senior manager, and chief executive are hierarchical roles and, as such, the hierarchical 
classification schemes are appropriate. They follow a multi-level security model, enforced 
using the rules of Bell-LaPadula and Biba. The objective of sharing information in 
collaborative distributed environments is to enable collaborators to be able to perform the 
duties required of them to achieve the goal of the collaborative working group. This is task 
oriented, not hierarchical. It may be feasible that an office junior from one organisation and a
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chief executive from another, are using the same information to complete a collaborative 
effort. Therefore, it is the information circulation requirements across multiple domains that 
are important in deriving its security requirements. Multi-lateral security models may be 
more appropriate in this case, restricting information flow between domains, rather than 
between hierarchical levels.
A classification scheme that is particularly appropriate for classifying information to be 
shared across multiple domains, and which could support a multi-lateral flow of information 
control using separate controls for confidentiality and integrity, is the Traffic Light 
Classification Scheme, as used by the G8 Nations [JF09]. This protocol has now been 
accepted as a model for trusted information exchange by over 30 countries. The protocol 
provides four information sharing levels for the handling of sensitive information. The four 
information sharing levels are:
• RED -  Personal. For named recipients only.
• AMBER - Limited distribution. This can be interpreted as a requirement to share 
within a collaborative working arrangement or VO.
• GREEN - Community wide. The circulation of this information is still limited, but in 
a broader sense than amber. This could be interpreted as within or between specific 
organisations.
• WHITE - Unlimited. May be distributed freely, without restriction.
These levels do not focus on assigning a hierarchical level to information. Rather they focus 
on circulation requirements, that is, which groups of people can access information. The 
meaning of the labels remains the same between all organisations, so the sharing 
requirements are clear. This alleviates any confusion of label meaning that might arise 
between organisations. For example, if an organisation receives a resource classified as 
‘Secret’, it is unclear whom they can share it with. Does this mean ‘Secret’ within the 
organisation, or ‘Secret’ across organisations? Can they discuss this with colleagues? Using 
the traffic light scheme, they know that ‘Amber’ classified information should only be shared 
within a collaborative working group, and not with other colleagues who are not involved in 
the collaboration. Likewise, ‘Red’ allows information to be shared with specific individuals. 
Even the highest level of military classification cannot support this. In collaborative working 
groups, this is particularly appropriate because, as the consortium develops, there may be 
information that begins as restricted to a number of named recipients, which later expands to
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all members of a particular working group, and finally, expands to specific organisations. The 
red, amber and green levels support this. Also, confidentiality and integrity can be handled 
individually. For example, ‘Amber’ information may be shared with the entire working 
group, but only edited by specific ‘Red’ individuals.
Information can be classified based on its value to an organisation in terms of financial, legal, 
operational or reputational impact if data misuse occurs. The factors affecting the choice of 
label could be relative amounts of system downtime, lost sales, threat to users and so on, with 
the major unit of measure potentially being cost or loss of life.
Using the basic access control framework, (c/J can represent the schema shown in tables 5.1 
and 5.2, the military and commercial classification schema, as well as the Traffic Light 
Scheme. It is classification scheme agnostic. Any of the schemes could be used to make 
access control decision using the basic access control formula and, importantly, the granular 
access control formula. Read and Write controls can have separate rule-bases and access can 
be based on role, identity or any other user credential, by representing it as Uz. The important 
point to note is that classification schemes must be agreed between collaborators before 
information is shared. The access control decision formula only holds true if an agreed 
classification scheme is achieved. Agreeing terms and conditions o f a classification scheme is 
beyond the scope of this work but may be considered in future, as the basic access control 
framework provides a good basis for research into mappings between different organisational 
classification schemes and enforcement controls.
For the purposes of demonstrating the feasibility of implementing the granular access control 
formula, the traffic light classification scheme is used in the prototype system. The traffic 
light schema is ideally suited to be a worked example because of its context-free nature, that 
is, the colours could have various meanings either in a multi-level or multilateral sense. 
However, the hierarchical model used in the military or commercial ICS is equally 
applicable. This thesis is not arguing the case for any particular ICS to be adopted. It aims to 
be agnostic of ICS.
The purpose of the prototype is to demonstrate the feasibility of implementing the formulae 
and rule developed in support of the hypothesis. The granular access control formula (claim 
(i)), supports the concept of finer-grained access control and enables a person wishing to 
classify information to evaluate the importance of the information within a resource and 
select classification labels for the sections of information they feel should be restricted to
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anyone, who does not possess the required identity attributes. The application requires 
subjects requesting access to supply specific identity information. To enable a range of 
controls on identity, Digital Certificate identity attributes have been used as authentication 
credentials, to enable the establishment of trust in an identity, and create a range of identity 
based controls when defining access control policy. The identity attributes able to be 
extracted from digital certificates are an:
• individual name,
• organisation, or
• VO identifier.
Thus, permutations of access control rules in collaborative environments can be supported, 
where control can apply to an individual, based on their role; an entire organisation, based on 
its role, or a VO working group in its entirety. This supports scenarios where information can 
be shared VO-wide, or restricted to a selection of collaborating organisations within a VO, or 
even further, to the individual person level within an organisation or a VO. This offers much 
more flexibility than a simple username and password. All of these can relate to uz in the 
access control framework.
Subjects (uz) may obtain privileges to view (confidentiality) or modify (integrity) content 
within a document (dxy) , classified with a particular label. Thus, supporting advanced access 
control to achieve fine grained access control to paragraph, line or even word level, based on 
identity attributes.
Consider the set of identity attributes in Figure 5.2 that are used for access control decision 
making. The identity attributes held by subjects wishing to access information resources, 
map onto a matrix of classification labels that define the identity or role based attributes 
required to gain access privileges to information classified with those labels. For example, 
anyone with the identity attribute (uz) “Cardiff University” as an “Organisation Name” may 
be granted read access to information classified as RED (Pxy= RED), but only those with a 
“VO Identifier” attribute of “Teaching Working Group”, which defines a particular role 
within the organisation, may be granted write access to information classified as RED.
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Subject Identity Attributes
Personal Name_____________
Organisation Name_________
VO I d e n t i f i e r
ACCESS CONTROL MATRIX
Id en tity  A ttr ib u te s Read W rite
Joe Bloggs:Cardiff U niversity:T eaching W o rk s h o p  G roup RED:AMBER:GREEN RED:AMBER:GREEN
Dave Binks:Cardiff U n iversityrD eveiop m en t W o rk s h o p  G roup RED:AMBER:GREEN AMBER:GREEN
Figure 5.2 -  Policy Attributes and Values
Note that each classification label is stored individually in the access control matrix. A 
traditional hierarchical classification scheme would automatically allow access to AMBER 
and GREEN labels if the subject had RED access. In this case the controls available are much 
greater because each label is controlled in its own right. In theory, a subject could have read 
access to RED and GREEN, but not to AMBER. This means that, in future, the labels could 
relate to other controls in addition to the basic read control. For example, GREEN access 
could mean full access allowed, AMBER -  time based access, only between the hours of 9 
and 5, and RED - the country the access request is coming from must be the UK.
The identity information is provided to a user and bound into a Digital Certificate from a 
locally hosted VO through a PKI service, described in the PERMIS architecture in Section 
4.4.2.1. This allows identity details to be trusted by all VO members, who trust the issuing 
PKI service for the VO.
A matrix exists for each document. The rules represented in Figure 5.2, using the granular 
access control formula ra = q m + {= ,>= ,<=,> ,<} + Ckd, where Ckd E Ck for context are:
For all sections (/'""> within d x , user Joe Bloggs (u j oeBioggs) has a Read label c*« and Write 
label Cku of Red, Amber and Green.
For all sections (/"'") within d x , user Dave Binks (uoaveBinks) has a Read label CkU of Red, 
Amber and Green, and Write label Cku of Amber and Green.
So if section y within document d x , has a classification of Red i.e. Ckd ~ r e d  , using the function 
f(cku,Ckd,di,r0), given the user Joe Bloggs and the action write, the function call would be
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f  {{Red,Amber,Green},{Red},{Write},{Reference to ruleset as shown in Fig. 5.2}), and would 
result in access being allowed.
5.2.1.1. Implementing the Granular Access Control Formula
As published by Damiani et al. [DCPS02] and Bertino et al. [BCF+04], the method for 
applying classification labels to the body of proprietary information lies in the flexibility of 
XML. Because of its structured nature, XML can be used to encapsulate information into 
nested sections. XML data is structured in such a way that it has related elements that open 
and close around sections of content, with all information between the elements being 
encapsulated within. This allows sections of content to be fragmented into separate chunks 
according to the protection requirements of the content. Each opening XML element can 
contain attributes, which make the addition of tags possible within the body of an XML 
document. A major issue is that most information resources are saved in a proprietary format. 
Microsoft is the predominant product within most organisations for electronic information 
processing and the file format is interpretable only to other Microsoft products. However, 
with the increasing adoption of service oriented architectures that use XML as their 
information exchange language, even Microsoft are moving to a similar format creating an 
open standard called Office Open XML or OOXML [ECMA08] as the file format for their 
Office 2007 suite. This format is an interpretation of XML which can be transformed into raw 
XML through various schemas. For legacy Microsoft document formats, and many other 
proprietary formats, there are multiple releases of free software such as Doc Vert [DV] that 
can convert proprietary documents into raw XML that can be manipulated for this purpose.
As a working example, consider the sample document shown in Figure 5.3. It is made up of 
paragraphs of text in normal presentation format - a title and three paragraphs of text with 
different confidentiality and integrity assurance requirements that are self explanatory when 
reading the text. The sample excerpt is taken from a Microsoft Word document and would be 
saved in the format associated with that. This means nothing can be added to the document 
by a user that could be hidden away or transparently manipulated by the system, as would be 
required to support the addition of security labels.
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D ocum ent Title
This is paragraph one , an openly  availab le and editable p iece of information with 
no requirem ent for protection from  anyon e.
This is paragraph tw o, a confidential p iece  of information which should be 
restricted to  th e  e y e s  of th o se  within th e  organisation only, and m odifiable by 
th o se  have read a ccess .
This is paragraph th ree, another confidential piece of inform ation which should be 
restricted to th e  e y e s  of th o se  within a specific  working group or VO within the  
organisation . This is an integrity sen s it iv e  p iece o f information though and should  
not be ed itab le by an yon e e x ce p t a se lection  of nam ed individuals within a specific  
working group or VO within an organisation.
Figure 5.3 -  Paragraphs of text in normal format
The prototype system handles proprietary data by converting the entire document into an
XML format that would allow such manipulation. This is made possible by using software
services, such as DocVert, which provide a Web Service to accept proprietary files as input,
and convert the proprietary document into raw XML format. Figure 5.4 shows the same
document after this conversion has taken place. Each paragraph is now held between its own
XML elements that open and close around the paragraph.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<db:book x m ln s:d b = "h ttp ://d o c b o o k .o r g /n s/d o cb o o k ">
<db:preface>
<db:para> D ocum ent T itle< /db: para>
<db:para>
This is paragraph o n e , an openly  availab le and ed itab le  p iece of inform ation with no 
requirem ent for protection from a n yon e.
< /db:para>
<db:para>
This is paragraph tw o, a confidential p iece of inform ation which should be restricted to 
the e y e s  of th o se  within th e  organisation only, and m odifiable by th o se  have read 
a ccess.
< /d b:para>
<db:para>
This is paragraph three, another confidential p iece of inform ation which should be 
restricted to th e  e y e s  of th o se  within a specific  working group or VO within the  
organisation. This is an integrity sen s itiv e  p iece  of inform ation though and should not 
be editable by anyon e ex cep t a se lection  o f nam ed individuals within a specific  working 
group or VO within an organisation.
< /d b:para>
< /d b :p reface>
< /d b :b ook >
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Figure 5.4 -  The same paragraphs in XML format
While Damiani et al. [DCPS02] and Bertino et al. [BCF+04] used XPath queries to define 
policies that reference precise sections of content within XML, it is also important to note 
that XML elements, such as the <db:para> element, can have multiple attributes associated 
with them, which can store extra information about that element. This feature of XML allows 
the information classification labels to be bound to the information. Figure 5.5 shows how the 
XML can be modified to include the classification labels for the information based on the 
traffic light information classification scheme.
To add labels to information, a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to interface with the 
application has been developed, so that an information owner can use the GUI to open a 
document, highlight sections of text and then select an information classification label from a 
list. On saving the document, the underlying information labelling mechanism dynamically 
embeds the chosen label into the information at the relevant point, to encapsulate the selected 
information in a classified container, as shown in Figure 5.5.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<db:book xm lns:db="h ttp ://d o cb o o k .o rg /n s/d o cb o o k ">
<db:preface>
<db:para>D ocum ent T itle< /db: para>
<db:para>
This is paragraph on e , an openly  availab le and ed itab le  p iece of inform ation with no 
requirem ent for protection from anyon e.
</db:para>
<db:para label= "A M B E R ">
This is paragraph tw o, a confidential p iece  o f inform ation which should be restricted to the e y e s  
of th ose  within th e  organisation only, and m odifiable by th o se  have read a ccess .
< /db:para>
<db:para label= "R E D ">
This is paragraph three, anoth er confidential p iece  o f inform ation which should be restricted to  
the e y e s  o f th o se  within a specific  working group or VO within th e  organisation. This is an 
integrity sen sitiv e  p iece o f information though and should not be editable by anyone ex cep t a 
selection  of nam ed individuals within a sp ecific  working group or VO within an organisation.
< /db:para>
< /d b:preface>
</d b:book >
Figure 5.5 -  The same paragraphs, in XML format with addition of sensitivity labels
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The information now has embedded classification labels encapsulating content within the 
overall resource that is particularly sensitive, and is required to be protected differently from 
other content within the same resource. The choice of label is driven by the ICS for an 
organisation and is representative of the impact of the information not being appropriately 
protected. This example also illustrates how information sharing is limited without the 
advancement of access control to the information content level. File-level classification 
would force the entire resource to be classified as RED because of the small amount of 
content classified RED within the resource. Information-level labelling allows the RED 
content to be classified differently to the rest of the content, and further levels of sensitivity to 
be supported.
5.2.2. Access Control Policy Generation
Once the labels have been embedded, the document enters its controlled state. From this 
point on, the access control model considers the requirements of the system threat model 
(Section 2.4.2) in order to maintain information security in a de-perimeterized environment. 
The first action is to secure the information, both the resource content and classification 
labels, against unauthorised access outside the perimeter. This is achieved by encrypting the 
entire resource, content and labels. The encryption algorithm used is AES, with a 256-bit key. 
This configuration was chosen because it is currently unbreakable at the time of writing. The 
symmetric encryption/decryption key is stored locally in a table that maps the encryption key 
to a resource identifier. Each resource has a unique resource identifier generated when it first 
enters its controlled state. The resource identifier is appended to the encrypted resource in 
clear text, so that it can be extracted by the policy enforcement mechanism and mapped onto 
the table of keys to obtain the decryption key.
Next, given the nature of an information sharing environment, where the information should 
now be able to be shared with collaborators outside of the perimeter of its owner, and in order 
to support the de-perimeterized access control formula and de-perimeterized linkage rule, it is 
essential to embed a link into the information that maintains a link between the distributed 
resource, more specifically the security labels in the resource, and the centralised access 
control matrix. This link allows the owner to maintain continuous control over access to their 
classified information through the policy enforcement mechanism. The existing perimeterized 
approach works by accepting access requests from subjects wishing to gain access to 
information stored within the perimeter. The perimeter has an interface through which access
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requests are accepted, and access control decisions are made within the perimeter. If access is 
allowed, the subject gains access to the information held within the perimeter. If the 
information moves outside the perimeter, the barrier between subject and information is 
removed and the subject can gain full access to the information. The prototype application 
shifts the perimeter to the distributed policy enforcement mechanism, which is effectively a 
distributed PEP. Instead of a subject going directly to the perimeter interface to request 
access, they interface directly with the policy enforcement mechanism, which interfaces with 
the centralised access control matrix through a Web Service interface hosted by the 
information owner. The location of this interface, known as the Policy Decision Point (PDP), 
is embedded into the resource in cleartext, along with the resource identifier, so that it can be 
extracted by the policy enforcement mechanism when access requests are made.
Finally, an access control matrix is created for the classified resource. The matrix is linked to 
the resource through the resource identifier and contains a list of known subjects for which 
access control will be enforced. The GUI developed to demonstrate the prototype system 
provides a policy management interface that allows the information owner to select subject 
identities and define the classification labels to which they should be allowed access for any 
given resource. As the information owner makes these decisions through the GUI, the policy 
definition mechanism instantly and transparently updates the access control matrix for the 
resource to reflect access and modify privileges for subjects, as they are added or removed.
5.2.3. Access Control Policy Enforcement
A distributed policy enforcement point was developed to support the implementation of the 
de-perimeterized access control formula. A GUI was also created to provide a user interface 
to the PEP. Subjects who wish to gain access to distributed information must use the PEP 
GUI tool to request access, as the information is rendered unusable until they do so. This can 
be executed on a remote client by downloading and running the GUI. It will run on any 
operating system because it is written in Java. It runs from a self-executing file, meaning no 
installation is required. This is an advantage because information system administrators often 
limit the installation of proprietary software on machines under their control.
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5.2.3.1. Implementing the De-perimeterized Access Control Formula and
De-Perimeterized Linkage Rule
As shown in Figure 5.6, the policy enforcement mechanism, initiated by the GUI upon 
requests for access, extracts the cleartext from the resource, which includes the location of the 
PDP for the resource, and the unique resource identifier.
The mechanism then extracts the requesting user’s identity credentials from their Digital 
Certificate. The subject must configure the location of their certificate before any access 
requests take place.
Next, the mechanism creates an access request, containing the resource identifier and the 
requesting user’s identity credentials, and sends it to the PDP at the location extracted from 
the resource. Figure 5.7 illustrates how the PDP service maps the request onto the relevant 
access control matrix, using the resource identifier from the request to locate the correct 
matrix.
ClientInformation Controller
Policy Enforcement 
Mechanism
Shared
D ocum ents
(Encrypted)
U s e r  I den t i t y  De t a  .is
PDP
Location
U ser
Certificate
Control
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__________ __
Figure 5.6 -  Conceptual Architecture Overview
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Resource-Specific Access Privileges (Subject Security Label) 
Resource Identifier
Figure 5.7 -  Information Owner PDP
If the subject’s identity is found in the matrix, a security label is dynamically created for the 
subject. The subject’s security label contains the classification labels to which they have been 
granted access, and is made up of two parts: a read element and a write element. Each 
element contains a subset of the labels used to classify the resource, and defines the level of 
access the subject has been given to perform for that action (read and write). For example the 
read element could contain RED, AMBER and GREEN labels, giving full read access; while 
the write label may only contain the GREEN label, giving write access to only the 
unclassified content and content classified as GREEN.
The PDP service also locates the decryption key for the resource, using the resource identifier 
to extract the key from the table of encryption/decryption keys. The subject’s security label 
and the decryption key for the resource are returned to the policy enforcement mechanism 
across a secure channel. Figure 5.8 illustrates that the mechanism is then able to decrypt the 
resource and temporarily hold it in the memory of the machine it is running on.
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Policy Enforcem ent 
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• Allow/Disallow changes to content depending on 
label
Figure 5.8 -  Policy Enforcement Mechanism
The bold text in Figure 5.5 showed the addition of XML attributes to the <db:para> elements. 
Another advantage of XML is that it supports parsing tools, which allow elements to be 
searched for by name. The policy enforcement mechanism is able to scan through the 
resource held in the machine’s memory, for elements with a specified name value. In this 
case, a search for the value “<db:para>” will locate the beginning of each paragraph in the 
document. Further XML searching capability allows the mechanism to extract all information 
between the <db:para> element and its associated closing element </db:para>, including the 
classification labels stored within the opening element.
If a label is present in the opening element, it defines the classification of the content 
encapsulated between that element and its closing element. When a label is found, the policy 
enforcement mechanism searches the subject’s security label to determine if the subject has 
read or write access for content classified with that label, and enforces an access control 
decision. The mechanism effectively generates a new version of the information resource in 
the machine’s memory. If the label is in the subject’s security read label, the content is added 
to the new version. If not, the content will be omitted. Once the entire document has been 
parsed, the new version is displayed to the subject using the GUI, and the original document 
is closed. The subject can then read and edit the resource using the GUI. They are able to see 
the classification labels associated with the text they are reading, in order that they know the 
level of information they are reading and can handle it appropriately. For example, if they are 
reading “RED” information and they know they do not have “RED” write access, there is no 
point in them trying to modify it. Likewise, they should not show it to someone they know is
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not classified to read “RED” information. Upon saving any changes to the resource, the 
content is taken from the GUI, and the labels encapsulating sections of content are once again 
inspected by the policy enforcement mechanism. If a section of content has an associated 
label, the mechanism searches the write element of the subject’s security label, and 
determines if the subject is allowed to modify content classified with that label. If the subject 
has been granted write access to information, the changes are saved back into the XML 
format from which it was extracted, and re-encrypted. If not, any changes will be discarded 
and the subject notified of this.
Access control restrictions, as defined in the access control matrix, are based on the 
information assurance requirements: confidentiality -  meaning read access to information is 
restricted to certain people, and integrity — meaning write access to information is restricted 
to certain people, based on the identity attributes of the subject requesting the action. This 
may appear simple and obvious when considering access control models, such as Bell- 
LaPadula and Clark-Wilson, but it was not previously possible to take an information 
resource and apply these restrictions within the body of the information to selected sections 
of information, and then modify and enforce the restrictions at a later date, after information 
is shared outside of a controlled perimeter. This work has implemented the de-perimeterized 
access control formula as the enforcement controls are available outside the perimeter, and 
obeys the de-perimeterized linkage rule because there is permanent link between the policy 
enforcement point, the access control policy itself, and the resource owner.
5.3. Management of Information within the Application
All information modification takes place through the client side editing tool within the 
modified security model. It is understandable that many users will prefer to use their own 
editing tool, such as the proprietary Microsoft Office tools. In theory, this is not a problem; 
the conversion from proprietary format to XML is reversible. However there are limitations 
to doing this. By not using the GUI editor, the policy enforcement mechanism cannot be 
invoked; therefore, the information owner will lose the ability to enforce access control 
policy. This is because proprietary software does not currently support the ability to control 
whether or not the text is viewable and editable within a resource at paragraph level. The 
document is either read only or editable in its entirety, so the granularity over paragraph level 
control is lost. This is not a surprise, as it is one of the major issues highlighted in the
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problem description of this thesis. The work has arrived at a requirement for more flexibility 
over information control, and to take the information back into the proprietary domain would 
defeat this aim. However, this scenario highlights the potential to bridge the gap between 
proprietary solutions and open standards based solutions, and illustrates one of the major 
failings in current information management controls.
The continuous link between information and its resource owner can be used to maintain a 
record of who exactly has access to information at any given time. This opens up the 
possibility to create logs of access control privileges granted and revoked, and resource 
access requests. This information could be useful in an audit of the access control system, 
should any breach of security occur, to find out who had access to the information when the 
breach occurred, following the suggestion of the Clark and Wilson access control model.
5.3.1. Policy Versioning
As information assurance requirements, legislation and regulation change over time, the 
labels used in an ICS to classify information, and the labelling decisions made on previously 
shared information, may also need to be modified to reflect the changes. This will involve 
revoking all existing access privileges to previously shared information that is affected by 
these changes, so that the new requirements can be fully enforced. This is done through 
policy versioning.
Each resource has its own access control matrix defining the identity credentials required to 
gain access to information held within the resource, based on the classification labels 
embedded within its body. Each resource has a globally unique identifier, which is bound to 
the access control matrix for the resource. The resource identifier is embedded as part o f the 
body of the information, so that when a request for access is made, the policy decision point 
knows which access control matrix to use to make the access decision.
When a change of requirements occurs that affects a shared information resource, either to 
the labels used to classify the resource (the ICS), or to the assignment of labels within the 
resource (change of labelling required), existing information classification becomes invalid, 
and so all access needs to be revoked. This is done using the policy management interface by 
removing all access privileges, for all users, meaning that when somebody attempts to access 
the resource, they are notified that the policy has expired and that they need to obtain a new 
version of the resource. The important thing to note here is that the existing document now
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becomes unusable, so the information is not at risk because of changes to classification 
requirements. Previously, there would have been no way to revoke access to shared 
information that had changed its classification.
This revocation of all access in light o f a change in classification requirements involves 
policy management, which is not a trivial task, but can be built into the system as part of the 
information classification functionality. The first time information is labelled, it won’t have 
an associated access control matrix or resource identifier. After the resource has been 
classified for the first time, by adding the security labels to the information, a resource 
identifier will be created and bound to the access control matrix for the resource. If a change 
in information classification requirements occurs, the current resource identifier can be 
marked as expired in its access control matrix. The matrix could be appended with a link to 
the new version of the resource, which can be returned to the requesting subject, allowing 
them to obtain a copy. The new version will be classified correctly and a subject will be able 
to access its content to the extent defined by the information owner.
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Chapter 6 - Evaluation
To enhance current information security capability in support of more secure information 
sharing in collaborative distributed environments, the hypothesis of this research makes three 
claims, and the research has produced two formulae and a rule, based on an access control 
framework, in support of these claims. :
i) security can be enforced at different levels of granularity within a document, 
ra = cku + {=,>=,<=,>,<} + ckd, where ckd(=ck
ii) access control policy can be enforced outside the perimeter, no matter where it is 
stored within an Internet connected environment, and,
Pz = D  + {r\..ra}  + E
iii) access control policy can be modified and ii) is still applicable
There must exist a permanent link between a document dx, eb, {r \..rn}, and Pz
The introductory chapters of this thesis have outlined a rationale and motivation for making 
these claims. The literature review of existing access control models and technology in 
Chapters 3 and 4 has shown that an implementation of these claims is lacking at present, and 
has drawn out the basic access control framework, from which two formulae and a rule have 
been defined to explain and address the limitations, and support these claims. The argument 
for the validity of these is in Section 4.3.2. Chapter 5 has detailed the implementation of a 
prototype application that was developed with an aim to test the feasibility of implementing 
the formulae and rule, and to enable finer-grained, remotely enforced, modifiable access 
control for information shared in collaborative distributed environments. In order to validate 
the feasibility of implementing the suggested formulae and rule in support of the claims of 
the hypothesis, an evaluation which consists of a set of testing scenarios and set of test scripts 
is used to test the prototype application does indeed implement the formulae and rules, and 
the enhancements do support these claims.
6.1. Testing Strategy
There are three key claims that the newly implemented technical solution must satisfy to 
support the hypothesis, which also relate to the risks identified in the three layer system threat
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model. Namely: finer-grained access control; access control for information outside the 
perimeter; and modifiable access control policy after information has been shared. The 
evaluation of these claims follows a three step approach, evaluating each of the mechanisms 
in turn, to show the application makes these claims possible. The development of the 
formulae and rule has been argued within the framework that was set out in the first chapter 
to identify the problem, and used throughout to define and explain limitations of existing 
methods and tools. Therefore, if the argument is accepted, and the framework and formulae 
are logically correct, the formulae and rules theoretically solve the problems. The application 
has implemented them and if it can be tested to show the expected functionality exists, there 
is strong argument to support the claims of the hypothesis. This is why the evaluation 
approach has been developed this way.
Following evaluation, which determines whether the mechanisms support the hypothesis, a 
risk assessment will be performed on existing access control technology, and again on the 
advanced mechanisms, to determine if and how existing risks to information sharing in 
collaborative distributed environments have been mitigated, and if any new risks have been 
introduced by creating the new approach to access control enforcement.
The evaluation will use an information sharing scenario, to which the test scripts can be 
applied. The scenario will be based on the healthcare patient information sharing scenario 
identified in Chapter 1 as a motivation for the research. This is a particularly appropriate 
scenario as it includes personally identifiable information, something that a resource owner 
must retain appropriate control of in shared environments, under the Data Protection Act. It is 
also an information sharing scenario that is specifically cited by Anderson [And08], which he 
states has yet to be achieved.
The evaluation aim is to show that the prototype application that implements the new 
formulae, as documented in Chapter 5, works in such a way that the claims of the hypothesis 
can be supported. That is, to demonstrate the prototype application actually obeys the rules of 
the theoretical formulae and rule. The scenario will be used to do this. However, the 
evaluation approach does have its limitations. The scenario used is only a representative 
information sharing case. Other scenarios may have different security requirements and may 
produce different issues that may cause the new technology to fail. This is accepted as a 
limitation o f the testing methodology.
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6.1.1. Testing Scenario
The test scripts are based on a hypothetical testing environment and action-based scenario, 
using fictional users and data, but which is based on real-world access control requirements, 
actual organisational structure and a true-to-life information sharing scenario. The scenario is:
A patient presenting symptoms to their GP, is assessed, and diagnosed. A report is then 
written by the GP. I f the symptoms present a case for further investigation, such as a painful 
lump beneath the skin, the GP refer the patient to a hospital for a scan. The presented 
symptoms, symptom duration, location and degree o f pain it is causing will be added to the 
patient’s Electronic Health Record (EHR). The hospital would be given access to the EHR to 
view the symptom detail, but not other information such as patient demographics, medical 
history or current medication. The hospital visit may result in a scan and an associated 
report. This will be added to the EHR. If required, the patient may be referred to a second 
hospital where they have a physics report produced. The second hospital would be given 
access to scan and initial symptoms, but not other information such as patient demographics, 
medical history or current medication. If a cancer is confirmed, the patient will be referred to 
a consultant oncologist who will write a prognosis report and write up a course o f treatment, 
based on all the relevant information shared by the other institutions. The oncologist will 
need access to full medical history and current medication, so has a different access control 
requirement than the hospitals.
The actors in the scenario are also fictional but have roles based on real-world roles:
John Boxter is the GP at ThisTown GP Surgery
Pete Bumap is a clinician at ThisTown hospital performing the scan
Jason Ritchie is a clinician at ThatTown hospital performing the physics test
Ross Boone is a consultant oncologist at ThisTown cancer specialist clinic
The requirements for the information sharing scenario are that certain parts of the EHR need 
to be shared with different collaborating partners, based on their role within the collaboration. 
The initial content of the EHR includes:
• Patient name and address
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• Medical History
• Current Medication
• Past Lab Results
• Scanned Images
Not all of this content should be shared with every collaborator, as they do not need it all to 
conduct the duties required of their role. Access should not be assumed on inclusion in a VO, 
it should be given as required [PCC+06]. Appropriate security should limit the sharing of 
personal information. The less that is shared, the less likely there is that information will be 
leaked that can used to affect the individual that it is relevant to the Data Protection Act 
(1998) [DPA98].
John Boxter is the GP. He will have full access to the EHR.
Pete Bumap will require access to part of the medical history, the part that contains the 
current symptoms the patient is presenting. But not the rest of the medical history, the current 
medication, or past lab results. He will add a new scanned image to the EHR, but not be able 
to see any of the other scanned images in the resource.
Jason Ritchie has the same access control requirements as Pete Bumap, and will have access 
to the scan that Pete added to the EHR.
Ross Boone will need access to the full medical history, current medication and the latest 
scanned images when accessing the EHR.
The technical enforcement mechanisms needed to facilitate these requirements mirror those 
identified in the threat model in Section 2.4, and reflect some of the issues discovered in the 
literature review of existing electronic information management. These are:
• The requirement to be able to control access and modification rights to content within 
a document, not just the entire resource. Different users should have different access 
rights depending on their role in the consortium,
• The requirement to be able to enforce the controls once the information has been 
distributed to collaborating project team members and is stored on remote, 
autonomous information systems, outside the control of the information owner. All 
users will be sent and given access to this document and be able to add to and modify
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the contents. Access controls need to be applied to the information even after it has 
been shared outside the perimeter of the GP’s protected network, and 
• The requirement to be able to modify the controls at a later date from a centralised 
point. Once treatment of the patient ends, the collaborating parties will disperse and 
access to the EHR needs to be revoked by the GP to prevent any further use of the 
patient’s data. Securing it in use for the purpose of treating the patient is appropriate. 
Letting the collaborators retain access once the goal of the collaboration is over is 
arguably unnecessary and inappropriate. It opens up the opportunity for information 
collation and use for secondary purposes.
Current access control technology cannot currently facilitate these requirements. This thesis 
hypothesises that these requirements can be made possible through enhanced access controls 
that implement the new formulae.
An example document to be access controlled is shown in Figure 6.1. This document is a 
sample EHR, containing some hypothetical content for the purposes o f illustration of the 
concept.
6.1.2. Testing Environment
The mechanisms developed in support of the hypothesis claim to enable the aforementioned 
requirements to be applied to information, such as that contained in the exemplar document, 
which is to be shared in collaborative distributed environments. Thus, the environment in 
which testing is performed must replicate the sharing environment of a collaborative 
distributed system. To achieve this, four machines were setup on a wide area network 
replicating different users being on different networks and working on remote machines. The 
information owner (John Boxter) hosts the Policy Decision Point (PDP) Web Service, and 
holds the encryption keys and access control matrices for shared documents. He uses the 
mechanisms developed to define and apply the access control policy to the document being 
shared. Pete Bumap and Jason Ritchie are based on another Network replicating the Cardiff 
University internal network, and use the mechanisms to request access to the shared 
document, as does Ross Boone who is on another network replicating MyTime Consulting’s 
internal network. The network architecture and links between remote users is illustrated in 
Figure 6.2. The environment has been designed in this way so that the mechanisms can be 
properly tested in a real-world environment. This will not only achieve the validation that the
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mechanisms work correctly and enable an access control policy to be defined, modified and 
enforced, but may also pick up any environmental issues, such as network delays in accessing 
information, firewall blocks where requests between remote systems are blocked, and 
weaknesses in the security that arise from communication across the open, insecure Internet.
Patient Details
Joseph Bloggs 
24 This Road 
This Street 
ThisPlace 
TH15PLC
Medical History
1984 -  Broken Fibia and Tibia 
1990 -  Chest Infection 
1992 -  Diagnosis of Asthma 
1994 -  Chronic Excema 
1998 -  Lower back pain 
2000 -  Broken Metatarsol 
2010 -  Painful lump on neck
Current Medication
Ventolin Inhaler 
Past Lab Results
Screening for diabetes -  Result: Negative
Scanned Images
Links to X-Ray image documents
Figure 6.1 -  Example Document (Unclassified)
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ThisTown GP Network
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r * i  Pete Bumap i " ' |  ThisTown H ospital Network  
r ? » Jason Ritchie T 3"! ThatTown Hospital Network
Policy Decision Point W eb Service Ross B oone * 10 I ThisTown Cancer Clinic N etw ork
Figure 6.2 Testing Environment
6.2. Test Scripts
The test scripts detail tests to be applied to the mechanisms to validate their ability to support 
the advanced security requirements, and give the expected outcome of the test, should it be 
successful in supporting the claims of the hypothesis. To enable user interaction and to test 
the underlying mechanisms that have been developed, a lightweight Graphical User Interface 
(GUI) was developed to demonstrate the capability of the underlying mechanisms. The tool 
itself is lightweight, written in Java and will run on any platform. It does not even need to be 
installed, as it runs as a self-executing file that can be invoked across the Web. As the 
mechanisms perform access control definition and enforcement transparently to the user, it is 
difficult to capture evidence of them working. However, testing actions within the scripts 
make reference to the numbers in the testing environment diagram shown in Figure 6.2, so
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that the action being carried out can be visualised to some extent and, where possible, 
screenshots from the GUI are provided as evidence of the outcome of the test.
Each test has:
• A description, giving an overview of the action carried out in the test
• A purpose, giving more detail for the action and a reason behind its existence
• An overall result, detailing a pass or fail for the test. Every test step must pass for a 
pass to be achieved overall
• A number of test steps that test the functionality of the tested action, together with an 
expected outcome which creates a result in the form of pass or fail for the step, 
depending on the actual outcome.
• Where possible and relevant, a screen shot shows the result of the test steps
The rationale behind this testing approach is to create a walkthrough of each stage of an 
action so functionality can be tested and errors and issues can be pinpointed. It was also 
anticipated that other environmental issues such as firewalls and network connections would 
become evident during the step-by-step process. At the end of the test process, each action is 
fully tested and validated for its anticipated functionality.
6.2.1. Test Phase 1 -  Advanced granularity of control over 
information.
This test demonstrates that it is possible to drill down into the body of an information 
resource and apply security requirements within the content of the resource - thus 
overcoming the limitation of file-level classification in proprietary information. The GUI is 
used, together with the traffic light information classification scheme, defined in Section
5.1.1, to invoke the policy definition mechanism, and apply this level of control to a 
proprietary document format. It is then used to define access privileges to the labels 
embedded in this specific document, for collaborating users. As Microsoft Word is arguably 
the most popular document editing tool at present, in that most people in a collaborative 
environment share and edit documents using Microsoft Word, it was decided that a Microsoft 
Word 2003 document should be used as the test case document. The DocVert Web Service 
[DV] is used to convert the Word Document to raw XML prior to being used in the example.
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In relation to the testing environment diagram in Figure 6.2, this test is being carried out 
within the GP’s internal network, marked as number 7 in the diagram. There is no network 
functionality testing and no application of access control policy. This is purely designed to 
test the functionality of access control labelling.
Test# 1
Description Apply access control metadata to a proprietary document
Purpose To enable part of the access control policy to exist within the body of an 
information resource so that it can be used to enforce access control remotely.
Overall Result Pass
Steps Expected Outcome Step
Result
1 -  Run the prototype application GUI. The main application window should 
appear.
P
2 -  Use the GUI to load a document into 
the editor
‘Open’ dialog should appear allowing user 
to select a file. Text should appear in the 
editor pane after a file is selected.
P
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y y  s p i d e r
File Edit C lassify Control Identity
'atient Details
oseph Bloggs 
!4 This Road 
'his Street 
'hisPlace 
H15PLC
ledical History
ICONS REPRESENTING TRAFFIC 
LIGHT INORMATION 
CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
984 - Broken Fibia and Tibia 
1990 - Chest Infection 
1992 - Diagnosis of Asthma 
1994 - Chronic Excema 
1998 - Lower back pain 
2000 - Broken Metatarsol 
2010 - Painful lump on neck
Current Medication
Ventolin Inhaler
Past Lab Results
Screening for diabetes - Result: Negative
Scanned Images
Links to X-Ray image documents
3 -  Highlight sections of text and click an 
information classification label to apply 
the label to the document
Highlighted Text
M  C la s s i f y
Label should appear at the beginning and 
the end of the highlighted section.
P a tie n t  D e t a i ls
m g ? J o s e p h  B lo g g s
©
2 4  T h is  R o a d  
T h is  S tr e e t  
T h is P la c e  
TH1 5 P L C
M ed ica l H isto ry©
1 9 8 4  -  B r o k e n  F ib ia  a n d  T
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Classified Text
B  Classity _____________________
P a tien t D etails
n  BEGIN R ed  ] J o s e p h  B lo g g s 
24 T h is R o ad  
T h is S tree t 
T h isP lac e
T H 15 PLC H  END R ed  ] 
M edical H istory
4 QQA  _ P rn L * a n  T ik i 'S  o n r l  T i h i a
4 -  Save the document Classification labels should appear in the P
body of the classified document after being
saved
©
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<?xml version = "1.0" ?> < d b :b o o k  x m ln s :d b = "h ttp :/ /d o cb o o k .o ra /n s /d o cb o o k " 
x m ln s:h tm l= "h ttp : / /w w w .w 3 .o ra /1 9 9 9 /x h tm l" xml:lang="en" version="5.0">  
<db:preface>
">Patient D eta ils< /db:para>
"></db :p ara>
Red">Joseph B loggs< /db :p ara>
Red">24 This R oad</db:para>
Red">This S treet< /d b :p ara>
Red" >T hisP lace< /db: para >
Red">TH15 PLC</db:para>
"> < /db:para>
"> </db :p ara>
">Medical H istory</db:para>
"> </db :p ara>
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
<db:para  
< /d b :p refa ce>  
< /d b :b o o k >
labe =  "
labe = "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe __ n
labe i i
labe =  "
labe
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe __ i i
labe —
labe
labe
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe =  "
labe
labe 11
labe
labe __ i i
labe _i t
labe __ i i
labe —  "
labe _n
Broken Fibia and T ibia</db:para>  
Chest In fection< /db:para>  
Diagnosis of A sth m a< /d b :p ara>  
Chronic E xcem a</db :p ara>
Lower back pain</db:para>
Broken M etatarsol< /db:para>
Painful lump on n eck < /d b :p a ra >
R ed">1984  
R ed">1990  
R ed">1992  
Red">1994  
R ed">1998  
R ed">2000  
"> < /db :p ara>
Am ber">2010  
"> </db:para>
"> </db:para>
">Current Medication</db:para>
"></db:para>
Red">Ventolin Inhaler</db:para>
"></db:para>
"></db:para>
">Past Lab R esu lts< /db:para>
"></db:para>
Red">Screening for d iabetes  “ Result: N eg a tiv e< /d b :p a ra >  
"></db:para>
"></db:para>
">Scanned Im a g es< /d b :p a ra >
"></db:para>
Amber">Links to X-Ray im age d o cu m en ts< /d b :p a r a >  
"></db:para>
5 -  Encrypt the document Document should be encrypted on saving. 
The PDP location and Document ID 
should be appended to the bottom of the 
file and remain unencrypted
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6 -  Define access control policy for the 
labels embedded within the document
The labels are now embedded within the 
document. These will travel with the 
document and relate to a centralised access 
control matrix, defining who has access to 
those labels
Policy Management Window within GUI
m
File Edit Classify Control Identity
B  Policy &
Pete Burnap:Clinician:ThisTown Hospital 
Jason Ritchie:Clinician:ThatTown Hospital 
Ross Boone:Oncologist:ThisTown Cancer Spec 
John Boxter:GP:ThisTown GP Surgery
A ccess  
0 R e d  
0  Amber 
0  Green
Modify 
0 R e d  
0  Amber 
0  Green
Relating Access Control Matrix in MS Access
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3 L S E * . .
ID User A ccess Modify
2 P ete  8urnap:Clinician:ThssTown Hospital am ber:green null
3 Jason Ritchie:Clinician:ThatTovvn Hospital amber.-green null
4  Ross Boone:O ncologist:ThisTown Cancer Specialist Unit red:am ber:green null
5 John Boxter:GP:ThisTown GP Surgery red:am ber:green red:am ber:green
The passing of each of the test steps gives the policy definition and application mechanism an 
overall pass. A document can be opened (step 2). Labels can be added to the document by 
highlighting chunks of text and clicking the appropriate label icon (step 3). These labels are 
stored in the body of the information resource, transparently to the user when the file is saved 
(step 4). The whole document is then encrypted (step 5) and is protected against unauthorised 
access and modification. A unique document identifier is generated for the document and 
stored within the document in unencrypted form. The identifier relates directly to a 
document-specific access control matrix stored on the information owner’s system (step 6). 
The access control table remains under the control of the information owner, and defines who 
has access and modify privileges to the labels embedded in this particular document (step 6). 
The location of the owner’s policy decision point (PDP) Web Service is also embedded in the 
document, in unencrypted form (step 5). The policy enforcement mechanisms (which are 
tested next) can extract the document identifier and PDP location and send access requests to 
the PDP along with the document identifier, so that the PDP service knows which document a 
user is requesting access to and can query the appropriate access control table. At this point 
the document can now be distributed with security labels embedded and encrypted along with 
the rest of the content. The information is now unreadable until the policy enforcement 
mechanism is used to request access and decrypt the document.
6.2.2. Test Phase 2 -  Enforcement of Access Control in De- 
perimeterized Environments
To demonstrate the possibility that the access control policy for an information resource can 
be applied in a De-P environment, i.e. on autonomously managed machines outside the 
control of the information resource owner, four distributed machines were set up to represent 
different organisations and users. These machines are shown in numbers 1, 4, 5 and 6 in 
Figure 6.2. A different identity and role was created for a user on each machine based on the 
identities defined in the testing scenario.
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In the scenario described, the now encrypted document (numbered 2 in Figure 6.2) is sent to 
each user to be accessed on their local machines. At this point the information owner would 
previously be giving up all control of their information. This is a limitation of existing access 
control technology and the perimeterized security model. To advance current security 
models, the policy enforcement mechanism developed in support of the claims in this thesis, 
together with the information classification labels embedded within the information resource, 
as achieved in test 1, are used to maintain some control over information after it has been 
shared, by locally enforcing the (remote) access control policy for the distributed resource. A 
user wishing to access the document must use the client mode of the GUI to open and view it, 
mandating enforcement of application-based controls, based on the Clark-Wilson model and 
existing DRM approaches, and in doing so, the GUI acts as a proxy to invoke the underlying 
mechanisms and request access remotely to the PDP and thus open the document to view.
This test is designed to check the functionality of remote policy enforcement. When the 
document is sent to Pete Bumap, Jason Ritchie and Ross Boone, it leaves John Boxter’s 
network perimeter and enters the autonomously managed network perimeters of the hospitals 
and the cancer clinic. John Boxter cannot have any control within these perimeters unless he 
has a remote service enforcing policy on his behalf. This is the purpose of the policy 
enforcement mechanism developed in support of making de-perimeterized access control a 
possibility.
Test # 2
Description Enforce access control policy on a remote endpoint outside of the control of 
the information owner
Purpose To enable access control policy defined by the information owner to be 
enforced when the information resource is stored on information systems 
outside their control
Overall Result Pass
Steps Expected Outcome Step
Result
1 -  Run the application. The main application window should 
appear.
P
2 -  Select an identity to use when 
accessing the document. First use John 
Boxter from his local machine, pictured 
as number 1 in Fig 6.2
‘Open’ dialog should appear allowing user 
to select a Digital Certificate to use as 
identity credentials. Identity credentials 
should load into the GUI when a certificate 
has been selected
P
User Certificate
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B2E2SS3BBBHS
G eneral Details j Certification P a th  |
j j x J
Show: J <All>
Field Value . 1 -
I n v e r s io n V3
1 3  Serial num ber 61 4e  5f d8 00 00 00 00 00 93
S  Signature algorithm shalR S A
a  Issuer CardiffSandpitlssuingCA-W in, ...
3  Valid from T uesday , May 04, 2010 1 0 :28 ...
3  Valid to T uesday , N ovem ber 16, 2010 ...
a  Public key RSA (1024 Bits)
' john@ thistow n.com  
IN =  John Boxter 
)U =  GP 
= ThisTown GP Surgery 
ThisCity 
= ThisState
: =  gb
Identity Credentials loaded into GUI
File Edit C lassify  Control Identity
I  □  Identity
U sernam e Jo h n  Boxter
O rganisation ThisTown GP Surgery
O rganisation Unit GP
Issu ed  By Cardiff University u s in g  the  CardiffSandpitlssuingCA-Win
Valid From Tue May 04 10:28:41 B S T 2 0 1 0
Valid To T u e N o v 1 6  12:33:18 GMT 2010
3 -  Load a document into the editor ‘Open’ dialog should appear allowing user 
to select a file. Text should appear in the 
editor pane after a file is selected. The 
underlying policy enforcement mechanism 
should create an access request to the PDP 
for this particular document, and should
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receive a set of access privileges and a 
decryption key in return. The mechanisms 
should then decrypt the document on the 
user’s machine and parse it for security 
labels. A new document should be created 
displaying only the information that is 
unclassified or is classified at a level to 
which the user has been granted access. 
Initially, this is all the information as John 
Boxter has full access. Note: this is local 
access. The document is stored on the 
same network as the access control table as 
it is the information owner requesting 
access
Access control table for the document
i a  «*« .....
ID * User -  A ccess - M odify
2 P ete  Burnap:Ctinician:ThisTown H ospital am ber:green null
3 Jason Ritchie:Clinician:ThatTown Hospital am bengreen  null
4  Ross Boone:Oncologist:ThisTown Cancer Specialist Unit red:am ber:green null
5 John Boxter:GP:ThisTovvn GP Surgery red:am b en g reen  red:am ber:green
View of information for John Boxter
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| * j  SPIDER
File Edit C lassify  Control Identity
Q  Control
P a tie n t D etails
[*] BEGIN R ed  ] J o s e p h  B loggs n  END R ed  ] 
n  BEGIN R ed  ] 24 T his R oad  n  END R ed  ]
H  BEGIN R ed  ] This S treet [*] END R ed  ] 
n  BEGIN R ed  ] T h isP lace  H  END R ed  ]
[*] BEGIN R ed  ] TH 15 PLC END R ed  J
M edical History
n BEGIN R ed  ] 1984 - Broken Fibia an d  Tibia [*] END R ed  1 
n  BEGIN R ed  ] 1990 -  C h e s t  Infection D  END R ed  ] 
n  BEGIN R ed  ] 1992  -  D ia g n o sis  of A sthm a [*] END R ed  ] 
n BEGIN R ed  ] 1994 -  C hronic E xcem a H  END R ed  ] 
n BEGIN R ed  ] 1998 -  Low er b ack  pain  n END R ed  ] 
n BEGIN R ed  ] 2000 -  Broken M etatarsol [*] END R ed  ]
[*] BEGIN A m ber] 2010  -  Painful lum p on neck]*] END A m ber]
C urren t M edication
n  BEGIN R ed  ] Ventolin Inhaler [*] END R ed  ]
P a s t  Lab R esu lts
[*] BEGIN R ed  ] S c reen ing  for d ia b e te s  -  R esult: N egative [*] END R ed  ] 
S c a n n e d  Im a g e s
H  BEGIN A m ber ] Links to X-Ray im age  d o cu m en ts  [*] END A m ber ]
4 -  Access the document from a 
different machine on another network as 
a different user identity. Use the identity 
of Jason Ritchie from his local machine, 
pictured as number 5 in Fig 6.2
The view of information should be 
changed. Jason Ritchie should not be able 
to view any information classified as ‘red’. 
Note: this request happens between 
firewalled networks so, if  successful, this 
also proves that the mechanism 
communication can navigate firewalls. It 
will also highlight any delays to access 
through network delay
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yy s p i d e r
File Edit Classify Control Identity
P  Control
[Patien t D etails
^CONTENT-REMOVED*]
CONTENT-REMOVED*]
CONTENT-REMOVED*]
CONTENT-REMOVED*]
CONTENT-REMOVED*]
'RED' CONTENT REMOVED
[Medical History
"CONTENT-REMOVED*]
"CONTENT-REMOVED*]
"CONTENT-REMOVED*]
"CONTENT-REMOVED*]
"CONTENT-REMOVED*] 
f i a H H O i i u a t t a i i  
[[*] BEGIN A m b e r]  2 0 1 0  - Painful lum p on n e c k  [*] END A m ber]
Jurrent Medication
iP a s t  Lab R e s u l t s
"CONTENT-REMOVED*]
S c a n n e d  I m a g e s
|[*] BEGIN A m b e r ]  Links to X-Ray im a g e  d o c u m e n t s  [*] END A m b er]
5 - Access the document from a 
different machine on another network as 
a different user identity. Use the identity 
of Ross Boone on his local machine, 
pictured as number 6 in Fig 6.2.
The view of information should be 
changed. Ross Boone should be able to see 
all information
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'( jy  SPIDER
File Edit C lassify  Control Identity
G=D (Jl
0  Control □ E f
pa t ien t  Details
n  BEGIN R ed  ] J o s e p h  Bloggs [*1 END R ed  ] 
n BEGIN R ed  ] 24 This  R oad  n END Red ]
[*] BEGIN R ed  ] This  Street [*] END Red  ] 
n BEGIN Red  ] Th isPlace n  END Red  ] 
f ]  BEGIN Red  ] TH15 PLC H  END R ed  ]
jMedical History
In BEGIN R ed  ] 1984 - Broken Fibia and Tibia n END R ed  ] 
n BEGIN R ed  ] 1990 - C h es t  Infection H  END R ed  ] 
n  BEGIN R ed  ] 1992 -  D iagnosis  of Asthma n  END R ed  ] 
n BEGIN R ed  ] 1994 -  Chronic Excema n  END Red ]
H  BEGIN R ed  ] 1993 -  Lower back  pain n  END Red ] 
n BEGIN R ed  J 2000 -  Broken Metatarsol n  END R ed  ] 
n  BEGIN Amber ] 2010 - Painful lump on neck n  END Am ber ]
Current Medication
H  BEGIN R ed  ] Ventolin Inhaler n  END Red  ] 
p a s t  Lab Resu l ts
In BEGIN R ed  ] Screening for d iab e tes  -  Result: Negative n  END R ed  ] 
Sca n n e d  Im a g e s
n  BEGIN Amber ] Links to X-Ray im age  docum ents  n  END A m ber  ]
5 -  Ross Boone does not have any 
‘modify’ rights for the classified 
information. Make changes to 
information classified ‘amber’ and try to 
save the document.
Modifications will not be saved. 
Notification will be shown to the user.
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14  ^
File Edit Classify Control Identity
Q  Control nrfM
Patient Details
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*]
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*]
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*]
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*]
[•content-removed*] CHANGES TO AMBER CONTENT
Medical History *
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*]
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*] S
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*] S
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*] ^
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*] ^
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*]
[*] BEGIN Amber ] 2010 - Benign Painful lump on neck [*] END Amber ]
2SJ
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*] A N
You do not have permission to modify some of the content you have changed. These changes will be discarded.
Past Lab Results
I OK I
[•CONTENT-REMOVED*] ~ J
Scanned Images
[*] BEGIN Amber] Links to X-Ray image documents [*] END Amber]
The passing of this test demonstrates that access control enforcement for the shared document 
is achievable between and across remote networks where the machines on those networks are 
running the prototype mechanisms. Firewalls were present on all machines and posed no 
problem. However, the network port listening for incoming requests was port 8080 which is 
the standard port used in Apache Tomcat, the web server used to host the PDP web service. 
This port is configured within many firewalls to allow incoming requests from the Internet. If 
the port is changed to something else such as 1234, the firewall must be configured to accept 
requests on that port. If it is not, access will be blocked. This is not a limitation as much as a 
setup requirement.
The machines were tested on Wide Area Networks and no time delay was evident when 
sending and receiving access requests and responses to remote servers. The amount of data 
required to be sent each way is very small and as such causes minimal delay. With regard to 
scalability, you may expect to see a slightly longer delay as the number of shared resources 
and number of sharing users rises, as there are more potential access control tables to search, 
and more users to search through.
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One issue that is evident is that if no connection can be made to the remote PDP with an 
access request, the document is inaccessible and the requesting user cannot gain access. In the 
ever growing ambient Internet environment where Broadband has become mobile and mobile 
phones can access the Internet; this could be seen as an issue that is becoming less of a 
problem every day. However, this is only the case in some parts o f the world. In less well 
connected areas and on aircraft, ships and so on, the lack of Internet access prevents the 
system from working. One way around this may be to produce time-based tokens whereby 
the PDP is shifted to an electronic token that can be sent to a remote machine and remain 
active for a specific time period before becoming inactive and requests need to return to the 
central server. This is a case for future work.
6.2.3. Test Phase 3 -  Modification of Access Control Policy following 
Distribution.
To prove that is possible to distribute the information while maintaining modifiable access 
control over information, the access control table under John Boxter’s control is modified in 
this step. The changes represent the owner revisiting the document following the end of the 
collaborative effort and reviewing the previously defined access controls. The owner can 
modify the privileges in their access control table so that some of the content is more strictly 
controlled, and some of the content is less strictly controlled. The changes are representative 
of the same real-world activity that the fictional test scenario is based on:
John Boxter’s access remains the same as he is the information owner and retains full 
access.
Pete Bumap, Jason Ritchie and Ross Boone can no longer see any part of the 
classified patient record as they no longer need it once the collaboration is over.
This test is designed to test the ability to change the details in an access control table and for 
the enforcement mechanism to produce a different document view for users, based on these 
changes.
T est# 3
Description Modify access control table form a central point and see the changes enforced at 
remote endpoints outside of the control of the information owner
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Purpose To enable access control policy defined by the information owner to be 
modified after the information has been shared, and continue to be enforced 
when the information resource is stored on information systems outside their 
control
Overall Result Pass
Steps Expected Outcome Step
Result
1 -  Run the application. The main application window should 
appear.
2 -  Make changes to the access control 
matrix representative of the changes 
detailed above.
Access control matrix will have a different 
set of access controls for this document.
Access Control matrix before changes
1 Uiers J -  • : „ .
ID - User - j Access Modify
2 Pete  Burnap:Clmidan:Th*sTown Hospital am bengreen null
3 Jason Ritchie:CHnidan:ThatTovvn Hospital am bengreen
4 Ross Boone:Oncologist:ThisTown Cancer Specialist Unit red :am ber:g reen
5 John Boxter:GP:ThisTown GP Surgery red:amber:green
null
null
red :am ber:green
Access Control matrix after changes
MMEj Users
User
2 P e te  Burnap:Clinician:ThisTown H ospital null
3 Jason Ritchie:Clinidan:ThatTow n H ospital null
4 Ross 8oone:O ncologist:ThisTow n C ancer S pecialist Unit null
5 John 8oxter:GP:ThisTown GP Surgery red :a m b e r:g reen
M odify
null
null
null
red :am b er:g reen
3 — Select an identity to use when 
accessing the document. Use the identity 
of Jason Ritchie from his local machine, 
pictured as number 5 in Fig 6.2
‘Open’ dialog should appear allowing user 
to select a Digital Certificate to use as 
identity credentials. Identity credentials 
should load into the GUI when a certificate 
has been selected
P
(see test 
2 .2)
4 -  Load a document into the editor As 2.3. Policy should be enforced, 
however, the new changes to the access 
control matrix should be reflected when 
the policy is enforced.
Previous view of information for Jason Ritchie
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r  C 0  NTE NT- REM 0  VE D*] 
[*C 0  NTE NT- R E M 0  VE D*] 
[*C 0  NTE NT- REM 0  VE D*] 
[*CONTENT-REMOVED*]
[*] BEGIN A m b e r ]  2 0 1 0  - Pa infu l l u m p  on  neck[*]  EN D A m b e r ]  
C u r r e n t  Medica t ion  
r  C 0  NTE NT- REM 0  VE D*]
AMBER7 CONTENT SHOWN
P a s t  Lab  R e s u l t s  
rCONTENT-REMOVED*]
S c a n n e d  I m a g e s
H  BEGIN A m b e r ]  Links to X-Ray i m a g e  d o c u m e n t s  n  END A m b e r ;
New view with access control table changes (removal of of ‘amber’ access)
edical History
CONTENT-REMOVED*] 
CONTENT-REMOVED*] 
CONTENT-REMOVED*] 
CONTENT-REMOVED*] 
CO NTE NT-REMOVED*] 
CONTENT-REMOVED*]
AMBER7 CONTENT REMOVEDCO NTE NT-REMOVED*]
urrent Medication
CONTENT-REMOVED*]
ast Lab Results
CONTENT-REMOVED*]
canned Images
CO NTE NT-REMOVED*]
The passing of this test proves that it is possible for the information owner to change the 
previously defined access privileges for a collaborative partner, after they have shared 
information with them, and see the changes enforced next time the partner accesses the 
document. Previously, once a document had been shared, all control over it was lost. Now, 
with the development of a de-perimeterized access control enforcement mechanism that links 
to a centrally managed policy decision point, any changes to access control requirements can 
be locally modified and remotely enforced with immediate effect.
The passing of all three tests demonstrates that the claims made in the hypothesis are valid 
and possible. It also demonstrates a working prototype of a system that supports the 
requirements of the system threat model defined in Section 2.4. One limitation that is evident 
in relation to the third risk of the system threat model is that the risk is actually defined as 
collaborating users not being able to control access to their own content in a collaboratively 
developed resource. This prototype enables information to be classified by its owner and 
continuously controlled in a shared, De-P environment, which mitigates the risk to a large 
extent. However, ideally, each collaborator should control access to their own information. 
This means that when they access a shared document and add content to it, they should be 
able to use the same mechanisms to apply classification labels and relative controls to the 
content they have added. This functionality is currently not present. In theory, this would 
mean multiple resource identifiers and multiple PDP locations to be embedded in a single 
document. Each time access is requested, the policy enforcement mechanism would have to 
request access to each and every PDP stored in the resource. This is something that will be 
considered in future work.
6.3. Position to Existing Technology
The rationale behind the development of the advanced security mechanisms was to advance 
the security available to distributed collaborators through existing access control 
technologies. The analysis of existing access control technology shows there are already 
several very well development systems that deal with identity management and access control 
policy in distributed environments. The lack of granularity, and as a result, lack of ability to 
modify access control policy within a finer-grained solution is evident in current technology. 
This thesis aimed to prove that, with the approach developed through the research, it is
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possible to achieve this using open standards and software. The evaluation chapter has 
presented the evidence to demonstrate this is possible.
It is envisaged that the advanced access control functionality enabled by the mechanisms 
could be integrated with existing technology in one of three ways, explained below and using 
Figure 6.3:
Scenario A: As a separate entity that interfaces with an existing technology but remains a 
standalone implementation. This would be the case where access to application code is not 
possible, but developing plug-ins to enable an interface is possible. This may be the case if  it 
were implemented with Microsoft Word.
Scenario B: As a semi-integrated entity that is built in to an existing technology to some 
extent, but where part of the solution is not integrated and remains a standalone entity. This 
would be the case when access to application code is possible, but the application does not 
support some of the required functionality, such as database connectivity or web based 
connectivity.
Scenario C: As a fully integrated entity that is completely built into an existing technology. 
All database connectivity and communication, text editing and access control policy 
development takes place inside the technology through the interface within an existing 
application. This will be the most difficult to achieve, but is certainly possible with open 
source and open standards software.
S olu tion
E x is ting
Technology
S olution
6  In terface ^ —  -------
 ------ f l n t c r f a c e ^ ^ )
E x is ting
Technology
Solution
Interface
E xis ting
Technology
Scenario A  Scenario B Scenario C
Figure 6.3 -  Visualisation of Solution Integration with Existing Tools
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6.4. Risk Assessment
The threat model defined in Section 2.4, from which the requirements of the mechanism 
developed in support of the hypothesis were derived, was developed using a qualitative risk 
assessment of the literature review covering current methods of electronic information 
management. The most pertinent threats were drawn into the system threat model.
Having evaluated existing access control technology through the literature review in Chapter 
4, which discovered that current technology was largely perimeter based; and having 
developed a set of mechanism that provide advanced access control for de-perimeterized 
environments, it is necessary to evaluate the existing risk to information secured within the 
perimeter and shared in collaborative distributed environments, in order to define if and how 
these risks have been mitigated in the de-perimeterized approach presented in this thesis. This 
is documented in Table 6.1. Following that, it is also essential that any new risk to 
information outside the perimeter is also evaluated, to define limits on the security afforded 
to information shared in this way and secured using the suggested approach. This is captured 
in Table 6.2.
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Asset Vulnerability Threat
Agent
Recommended
Response
Mitigated
in
Solution?
How Mitigated
Information
stored
within
network
perimeter
Unauthorised access 
through firewall hack
Internal or 
external 
malicious 
user
Encrypt in situ
o
Tool encrypts all 
new information by 
default, exisiting 
information after 
classification
Authorised access but 
loss of control if 
information is 
moved/stored outside 
the perimeter
Any
authorised
user
Prevent data 
moving outside 
the perimeter or 
protect it if  it 
does move. o
Information allowed 
to move outside 
perimeter, no more 
loss o f control due to 
link to central policy 
decision point and 
de-perimeterized 
policy enforcement 
point
“Analog Hole” -  People 
being able to 
read/copy/photograph 
information
Any user 
that gets 
hold of the 
data
There is nothing 
you can do 
about this.
/
Once information 
has been viewed, 
there is no way of 
controlling that 
information. It can 
be memorised, 
copied out by hand, 
photographed and so 
on.
Information 
shared 
outside the 
perimeter
Outside of perimeter of 
access control
Any user 
that gets 
hold of the 
data
Encrypt outside 
the perimeter
°
Information shared 
outside the perimeter 
must first be 
classified using the 
tool, which encrypts 
it before sharing
Highly 
sensitive 
content in 
an
information
resource
Confidentiality/Integrity 
breach. Data exposure
Any user 
that gets 
hold o f the 
data
Classify and 
restrict access to 
highly sensitive 
data o
Tool allows 
information within a 
resource to be 
classified according 
to its security 
requirement in 
accordance with ISO 
27001:2005
Table 6.1 - Risk Assessment -  Perimeterized Access Control (with current controls) 
1 Vulnerability Mitigated
Unable to mitigate Vulnerability
121
To summarise, the recommended response to the vulnerabilities in the perimeterized 
access control model is largely focussed around the use of encryption and information 
classification to enable maximum confidentiality and integrity for information stored 
within the perimeter, and when shared outside the perimeter. Unsurprisingly this 
mirrors the suggestion of ISO 27001:2005, which suggests the classification of 
information, and the Data Protection Act 1998 which requires “appropriate security” 
measures to be taken, to which HMRC and ONS have responded with a complete 
lockdown of unencrypted data being taken outside of the perimeter. The mechanisms 
developed in support of this thesis support a shift to a de-perimeterized model, where 
the vulnerabilities identified in the perimeterized model can be mitigated, providing 
“appropriate security” through the encryption and continuous control over 
information shared outside the perimeter. Most of the risks to information shared in 
collaborative distributed environments and secured using the perimeterized approach 
are mitigated through the mechanisms developed in support of this thesis. One issue 
that cannot be solved is the ‘Analog Hole’ issue. This is the problem where text must 
ultimately be displayed to a user such that they can read and process the information. 
Once a person has read something, they can memorise it and reproduce it. They can 
also photograph it; copy it down and screen dump the content. There is currently no 
way of preventing this in either approach.
While the mechanisms provide the ability to share information outside the perimeter 
of control, they also present new vulnerabilities, as highlighted in Table 6.2. The 
major vulnerability introduced when allowing information to move outside the 
secured perimeter comes with the enforcement of de-perimeterized controls. The 
information shared remains encrypted until such a time as a request is made, through 
the mechanism developed, to the centralised point of policy decision. This 
communication and the response from the server containing the access control 
privileges for that user and the decryption key for the information is secured using an 
encrypted communication link, thus protecting the decryption key and access 
privileges. The mechanisms are then used, along with the decryption key, to decrypt 
the information on the user’s machines; parse the information for information security 
labels; and enforce the access controls by removing confidential information to which 
the user does not have access privileges, and marking the integrity sensitive 
information so that it can only be modified (saved after modification by the user) if
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they have the appropriate privileges. All of this is done in the memory of the machine 
from which access is requested and on which the information resides. At some point, 
after decryption, the information, access privileges, classification labels and 
decryption key will be held in clear text in the computer’s memory. If a malicious 
user was able to capture memory content at this point, or stream it into a new file, the 
information could be leaked. Alongside screen-scraping, which cannot be avoided 
completely due to the fact that information is displayed on the screen for the user to 
read, this is the major vulnerability of the modified architecture for access control. 
The vulnerability really comes from the machine being used to access the information 
being outside the information owner’s control. Although the access control 
enforcement mechanism acts as a remote agent on behalf of the information owner to 
enforce policy, the memory of the machine is accessible to the person requesting 
access as they have physical access to the machine. A threat to this vulnerability is 
much less likely to occur in a perimeterized model because the memory of the 
machine is not so readily accessible to the person requesting access because they have 
no physical access to the machine.
Asset Vulnerability Threat Agent Recommended
Response
Addressed by 
Tool?
Information 
shared outside the 
perimeter
Unauthorised access 
through memory hack
Internal or 
external 
malicious user
Use memory 
curtaining to detect 
hack and wipe data ©
Decryption key 
and Access 
Privileges in 
transit
Key or Privileges 
capture through 
sniffing the connection 
to the server
Hacker Encrypt client- 
server
communication o
Encryption
Algorithm/Key
Cracking of encryption 
key and/or algorithm
Hacker Use strongest 
possible algorithm 
and suitably large 
key °
Table 6.2. Risk Assessment -  De-Perimeterized Access Control (with new
controls)
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This vulnerability could be overcome by using Trusted Computing technology. 
Trusted Computing allows what is known as Memory Curtaining, which prevents any 
hardware or software, even the operating system itself, from accessing specific 
sections of memory. This could prevent malicious users capturing knowledge from 
the memory of a machine by wiping the information if memory tampering is detected. 
While this goes some way to mitigating the vulnerability of memory attacks, it also 
requires every user using the de-perimeterized approach to have a Trusted Computing 
chip in their machines in order to make the approach more secure. Trusted Computing 
chips are becoming more readily available within machines but the whole ethos of the 
de-perimeterized approach is that information can be shared with anyone, regardless 
of the operating system, computing platforms or hardware specifics of local machines. 
To mandate the use of Trusted Computing chips would dramatically reduce the 
number of users able to receive this shared information. This means that this 
vulnerability is an ongoing one. There may be a point in time in the future where 
Trusted Computing chips are built in to every computer, at which time the de- 
perimeterized approach will become more secure than is currently possible in an 
open, platform-independent information sharing environment.
6.5. Summary
The three step approach to evaluating the advanced mechanisms for defining, 
modifying and enforcing data-level access control policy for information shared in 
distributed, collaborative environments has been tested using the testing strategy. The 
evidence demonstrates that it is indeed possible to take security labelling to a finer 
level of granularity and apply it within information resources, which is an 
implementation of the new granular access control formula. This is an enhancement 
of what is currently possible within existing access control technology. It is also 
proven that it is possible to enforce these controls outside the perimeter, through the 
classification labels being securely embedded within the information as it travels 
around the distributed Internet, while keeping the access privileges component of the 
access control policy under the control o f the information owner. This is an 
implementation of the de-perimeterized access control formula and obeys the de- 
perimeterized linkage rule This not only allows the access control policy to be applied 
outside the perimeter of organisational information systems, but it also supports the
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modification of access control policy such that any changes are immediately enforced 
on any network. Something not currently possible in access control technology.
One of the standout dependencies of this approach is a live connection to the Internet. 
Without that connectivity it is impossible to request access to distributed information. 
That is not to say that the information becomes any less secure. It remains in its 
encrypted form until an access request can be made. But in terms of availability, one 
of the key requirements of Information Security, it can mean the information is 
unavailable at times. Clearly this is not acceptable with critical information relating to 
human life or national infrastructure so further work is needed to address this issue. 
Perhaps time-based tokens could be issued while offline. This has been identified as 
an issue for further work.
For the purposes of supporting the hypothesis, the implementation and evaluation of 
the prototype application has provided evidence that the new formulae and rules can 
be implemented, and that security can be advanced to the point where information 
sharing can be made much more effective due to increased granularity in classifying 
and labelling information with security requirements, and enforcing controls in 
distributed collaborative environments while, importantly, retaining control over the 
access control policy so that modifications can be made to the policy even after 
information has been shared beyond the current perimeterized point of control.
For the purposes of providing advancement to current access control models and 
technology, the mechanisms developed in support of the hypothesis provide an 
implementation of the industry-recognised De-P security model. The system threat 
model and risk assessment of existing access control technology, when used to share 
information in collaborative distributed environments such as VOs, define risks that 
have been largely mitigated by the functionality available in these new mechanisms. 
Although there is new risk presented in the de-perimeterized implementation, the 
existing risks have been greatly reduced and information sharing has the capability to 
become more inherently secure across organisational boundaries, dynamic in its 
security controls and permanent in its control of information.
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion
The main aim of this research was to define a framework that would provide a 
platform for the enhancement of existing access control approaches, to allow 
individuals and businesses to share information required for collaboration where, 
previously, limitations in technology may have restricted their ability to share such 
information, due to: small amounts o f highly restricted content in a resource raising 
the classification of the entire resource or; the requirement to retain sustained control 
over the information to comply with data protection laws. Also, to reduce the 
likelihood of the kind of information exposures and losses that have been reported 
recently.
The motivation for the research, based on observations of real-world security breaches 
and scenarios, indicated that important issues needing to be addressed were:
• Enabling a refined, granular classification and labelling of information so that 
reflects varying levels of content security requirements within an information 
resource could be enforced.
• Defining, modifying and enforcing an access control policy on information 
shared outside the perimeter in distributed collaborative Internet connected 
environments.
Thus, the hypothesis of the research was:
A document’s content can have security enforced at different levels of granularity 
within the overall document, and the rules defining its access control are always 
modifiable and enforceable in an Internet connected environment, no matter 
where the document is held.
In support of these claims, the research has contributed several formulae and rules, 
detailed in Section 4.3.2, all based on an access control framework that was developed 
throughout Chapters 3 and 4, and is summarised in Section 4.4.
The basic access control framework developed through this research includes 
components that are required to model a distributed collaborative computing scenario, 
and allow formulae to be defined that represent an information resource owner’s
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boundaries of control in distributed collaborative environments, and the level of 
granularity to which security should be applied to information resources. The 
framework is an important reference point from which risks to information can 
defined, as limitations of control are clearly identified.
It was determined that two key parts of access control are: decision and enforcement. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the fundamental elements of decision-making. The basic access 
control function f{cku,Ckd,cti,r0), is used to evaluate access control requests using a 
rule-base. The rule base could be an ACL, a rule-based access control or a role-based 
access control table. The evaluation of access requests can also informed by an 
information classification scheme, which is used to determine a user’s access control 
privileges. Fundamentally, if a system exists that has an application that implements 
the access control decision function, a rule-base, and an information classification 
scheme, access control decisions can be made, no matter what mode of 
implementation is chosen or what the classification scheme is, as long as it interacts 
as shown in Figure 7.1. The research showed that enforcement of access control 
policy, and not decision making, was the problem in distributed collaborative 
working. The risks were coming from information being classified as entire resources 
with respect to security level, and being shared outside the perimeter. It was clear that 
enforcement controls needed enhancing to deal with these needs.
Access Request Details
With regard to access control enforcement, the granular access control formula ra= Cku 
+ {=,>=,<=,>,<} + Ckd, where Ckd €E Ck provides a basis to allow security to be 
enforced at different levels of granularity within a document. The requirements for 
this formula to hold true are that there exists users (uz), documents (dx), and an
{userlD+Label (ckl' 
docID+Label (ckd), 
action (a, ), rules (
Classification
Scheme
MAC System 
Function
Access Request Decisiori
[Yes/No)
Figure 7.1 -  The MAC Approach
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information classification scheme (c*) of security labels that can be applied to both 
users and documents. There must also exist a rule-base that can be used to represent 
relationships between users and documents, and can be evaluated with a Boolean 
result that can be used to allow or deny access, as per Figure 7.1. It was determined 
that most security systems could support this configuration and therefore could 
support the implementation of the formula. A limitation of the formula is that labels 
must be applicable within the body of a document to achieve granular access. Chapter 
5 detailed an implementation of the formula that worked with XML documents, 
which was tested in Chapter 6 , and demonstrated that it was possible to implement the 
formula. It is expected that the formula should also hold true for databases, as they are 
reference-able data structures (columns/rows) that can be searched for labels, and can 
have upper and lower boundaries (Column X, Rows Y to Z, for example), that hold 
information in a classifiable container. It is an accepted limitation that the formula 
may not hold true where the content is not so easily reference-able, such as images 
and proprietary document formats. The formula works by assigning each user a label 
from a classification scheme, and the specific sections of a document, such as 
paragraphs and lines of text, are also assigned labels from the same scheme. Using an 
access control system that implements the access control function, the user’s label can 
be evaluated against the labels used for document sections. This means access control 
can be refined to the content with a document as well as the document in its entirety.
The de-perimeterized element formula Pz = D + {r\..rn}  + E  provides an method for 
supporting the enforcement of access control policy outside the perimeter, no matter 
where it is stored within an Internet connected environment. This means information 
can be sent from one individual or organisation to another, stored on any Internet 
connected machine, and still have its access control policy enforced, even though the 
destination is outside of the owner’s locus of control i.e. the perimeter. This is based 
on shifting the enforcement mechanisms that currently exist within perimeterized 
environments, outside the perimeter, and making them accessible within all 
perimeters. By doing this, if  information moves outside the perimeter as it often does 
for collaborative working arrangements, the policy enforcement mechanisms are 
available and able to enforce the policy. However, this only works if the access 
control policy either moves to, or is accessible from, the location of the information. 
In order for access control policy to be enforced on information outside the perimeter,
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and for the owner to be able to modify the access control policy for an information 
resource and see the changes take effect on information previously shared outside the 
perimeter, the de-perimeterized linkage rule was created. This rule creates a 
permanent link between the document (dx), its access control policy (rules) {r\.. rn}, 
the appropriate rule enforcement controls (e*), and the resource owner themselves 
(Pz). This must be true for the de-perimeterized formula to be applicable. The rule 
states there must exist a permanent link between a document dx, et>, {r\...rn}, and Pz., 
This was implemented in the prototype application documented in Chapter 5, and 
tested in Chapter 6 , however, there is a very obvious limitation with this approach, 
which is if the any of those entities do not have access to the Internet for whatever 
reason or become unreachable, such as when working on an airplane or remote 
location, the rule cannot be true. However, the hypothesis stated that the claims were 
only associated with information stored in an Internet-connected environment, so this 
limitation and set of situations means the information is not currently held in such an 
environment.
7.1. Contributions
Thus, the research has made several contributions to the information security and 
collaborative working domains.
The formulae and rules documented in Chapter 4, and the prototype implementation 
of these, documented in Chapter 5, demonstrated that different sections in an 
information resource can be classified based on different security requirements. This 
is an advance on the traditional method of classifying information resources as a 
single entity, which results in the withholding of information that would be useful to 
share with collaborators, because of a small amount of sensitive information within 
the resource. This enhancement allows small amounts of sensitive information to be 
classified and restricted from users from outside the organisation, while the rest of the 
resource can be shared. The impact of this is that a greater amount of information will 
be able to be shared within collaborative working arrangements. The electronic 
patient record is a good example of this. A complete patient record contains a great 
deal of sensitive information, that a patient is obliged to keep private, but also needs 
to be able to share different parts with different people. For this reason, the entire
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resource cannot be shared with all other healthcare professionals. The prototype 
application allows the sensitive information to be restricted to a patient’s GP alone, 
while other information, such as scans, biopsies and other information can be shared 
with members of the medical team treating the patient, in such a way that the sharing 
reflects the role of the user in the treatment.
Additionally, the approach addresses the issue of resource owners not being able to 
have confidence that their information could be adequately controlled outside their 
own secured perimeter. This is due to the approach having the ability to maintain 
control over the access control policy for the information, even after it has been 
shared. Changes to the UK Data Protection Act (1998) mean there are stricter controls 
and harsher penalties for data controllers o f personally identifiable information who 
do not enforce these controls. This affects any individual or organisation that shares 
information with other parties, in collaborative working environments, whether in 
academic, industry or healthcare domains. This situation has the potential to cause a 
lock-down of data to avoid such penalties due to the increased accountability of the 
data owner. This is a limiting factor on the potential for collaboration. In fact, in the 
light of the loss of 25 million personal records, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HRMC), did just that on the advice o f the Government. The identified de- 
perimeterized access control formula and linkage rule provides a framework, which 
supports access control policy enforcement of information outside the perimeter. 
Consider the HMRC data losses. Information was stored on discs and sent to a 
recipient at the Office of National Statistics (ONS). The discs were lost, and the 
whereabouts of the data was unknown. If  de-perimeterized access control had been 
used, as described in Chapter 5, to classify the personal data on those discs, the data 
loss could have had much less impact, as only an authenticated user would have been 
able to read what was on the discs. Thus, even though the discs were lost, the data on 
them would have be unreadable by anyone who found them, unless they had the 
required access rights.
Furthermore, the de-perimeterization developments allow an access control policy to 
not only be enforced remotely, but to be retained and modified from a central point by 
the information resource owner. This has many implications. Given the HMRC data 
loss, the HMRC could have revoked all access previously granted to the lost data,
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meaning nobody in the future, not even an authenticated employee who received the 
lost package a few weeks later, would be able to access the data. This achieves 
complete information redaction after it has been shared. Something that was not 
previously possible. In the healthcare collaboration, once a patient’s care is complete, 
access to the parts of a patient record shared with other organisations treating the 
patient can be revoked. This removes any further access to patient information. The 
Data Protection Act (1998), requires “appropriate protection” to be given to personal 
information. There is a strong argument for the requirement to share patient 
information. The more information healthcare professionals have about the patient, 
the better informed they are when making treatment choices. However, they only need 
this access while they are treating the patient. It is no longer appropriate for them to 
have access to the information after the care is complete. Previously, there was no 
way of revoking access to this information. Therefore, the de-perimeterization and 
granular access control approaches can enable more “appropriate protection”, because 
it allows legitimate access to personal information to be revoked after the requirement 
for its access is no longer present.
7.2. Future Work
The prototype application demonstrates the capability to implement the new formulae 
and achieve de-perimeterized access control for XML content, which can be extended 
to proprietary content by converting it to XML through open-source Web Services. 
Applying labels to a structured resource means that the approach could feasibly be 
used for more than standard text documents. Databases are also structured resources. 
Much of the online content produced in Web pages, wikis, blogs and social 
networking content, is actually derived from a database back end. If the fields of a 
database could be classified using labels, the approach could feasibly be used to 
enforce access control for information displayed online. When a query extracts data 
from a database, the labels that classify the various fields that produce the results of 
the query could be inspected and, depending on the identity of the user making the 
request for access, restricted accordingly. Indeed, referring again to the HMRC data 
loss, the information that was stored on the lost discs was generated from a large 
dataset resulting from a database query. If the database had “built-in” labels that
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classified the personal data as restricted outside the organisation, it could have been 
automatically encrypted and restricted to named recipients, using this approach.
Building on the idea of automated content restriction from database queries, another 
use for the approach could be in the automatic restriction of information flow outside 
an organisation. People often share information through attachments to email 
messages, or in the email message itself. There are tools available to scan the content 
of outgoing messages and flag up instances of specific terms and content to the user, 
prompting them to consider the security of the message they are sending. If, when 
prompted, they were given a set of security labels to choose from, an implementation 
of the approach could be used to automatically classify the flagged content, encrypt 
the content, and require user authentication and access control through the de- 
perimeterized client, before allowing access to it. This has wider implications in terms 
of management and usability. The time involved in implementing this level of 
security, and its ease of use by users, would require investigation as to whether it 
involved unacceptable overheads. However, the semantic analysis of information 
resources, whether they are emails, documents or databases, is an interesting concept 
for future investigation.
It is questionable whether complete security can ever be made possible, given that the 
“Analog hole” problem means information can always be reproduced after a person 
has read it. Even with system level controls to prevent printing, copying or screen 
dumping, the reader can always reproduce the information from memory or by 
working around system level controls by photographing the screen and re-typing 
information. As the de-perimeterized access control formula and linkage rule enable a 
permanent link between an information resource and its owner, requiring 
communication between user and resource owner on every request for access, it could 
be used to create an auditable log of access requests in support of Clark-Wilson’s 
well-formed transaction. This has the potential to allow investigation of the legal 
stance in future. Audit information could be used to present a case for prosecution in 
an alleged misuse case. The requirements for court admissibility of this type of 
information are a grey area. There is a recent standard published that defines the legal 
admissibility of electronic evidence [BS08], which would need further investigation, 
but the de-perimeterized logic provides a foundation to build on the collection of
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information required to create such cases. Auditable access request logs could provide 
back-up for collaboration agreements, where shared information is to be returned at 
the end of collaboration. The system already provides a sustained link between the 
information resource and its owner. If there was any evidence of collaborators using 
the information after the end of a collaboration, the capability to extract an access 
control policy history from the logs that, together with the collaboration agreement, 
prove the person had agreed not to further use the information and that access had 
been revoked, would allow the creation of a misuse case against the collaborator if 
they violate the agreement.
To conclude, the research in this thesis has made significant advances in information 
security methods and technology, particularly with respect to information shared in 
collaborative working environments. The ability to drill down into a resource and 
control access to different sections of its content depending on their security 
requirements will allow more information to be shared, where previously large parts 
of information resources were restricted due to a small amount of sensitive 
information. The ability to share information while retaining control of its access 
control policy and having modifications to the policy enforced on information outside 
an organisation’s perimeter, gives the resource owners a control that they do not 
currently have. De-perimeterization is a recognised ideology, but there is very limited 
published research on its implementation. This thesis contributes to that domain. The 
section on future work highlights there is plenty of directions this research could take 
in the future. The evaluation also shows that there are still some issues to be addressed 
to improve the implementation of the formulae and rules. The results however, prove 
that a significant advance has been made to access control for information shared in 
distributed collaborative environments.
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